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Max Weber once told an audience of students that in order to pursue
any form of study one must first clarify his or her ultimate values and "obey
the demon who holds the fiber of his very life." This work reflects the truth of
Weber's insight on several levels. I first learned about Guatemala while
working with Oxfam America and Amnesty International in the early 1980s. In
that context I was continually confronted by many horrendous and wondrous
human acts, unimaginable cruelty and courage, savagery and compassion. But
no country more consistently astonished me than Guatemala, both in terms of
the human capacity for cruelty as well as courage and heroism. I struggled to
resist the tendency to view those who resisted oppression with such strength
as somehow special and different. What was indeed most moving and
inspiring was the realization that the courage to bear torture and pervasive
terror was something of which many were capable. And yet the opposite
realization was frightening: that the perpetrators of such barbarism in
Guatemala, and elsewhere, were also not special.
A work such as this could not pretend to offer conclusive answers to
the mysteries of the human soul which its subject matter presents. Social
scientists often imagine that human behavior can be effectively measured, but
they are wrong. Instead, we can ask, How do individuals and communities
construct their sense of meaning and identity? The effort to think about that
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question in Guatemala and more generally led me to reconsider the issue of
political culture. The answers I have offered are meant to be provocative and
provisional, a stimulus to further study, some suggestions about how to
proceed, a case study to provide examples.
But Weber's insights into the connection between identity and forms of
inquiry are illustrated by this work in a still more personal fashion.
Completing this work and drawing back from it a little, it is clear to me now,
in a way it was not at all when I began, that the ways I understand culture,
meaning, and identity are not detached observations. If I am interested in
cultures as both historically grounded and yet endlessly reshaped by
contingency, it's partly because that is how I understand my own life. My
parents taught me to think for myself, and then spent years having their
conservative convictions taken to task. Learning to understand the tensions
and the bonds within that community has gradually in turn persuaded me
how much I have been shaped by my parents and their values. While I am
neither Catholic or conservative, their influence remains central to who I am
and how I think. This experience has thus strengthened an assumption that
underlies much of this work: that identity is always the product of conflict and
change, and yet that we seldom wholly reinvent ourselves. Today many in the
United States fear our "multiculturalism," as if the issue forced us to choose
"once and for all" who "we" are in some definitive sense. My own experience,
fortified by the powerful example of others such as the Maya in Guatemala,
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has convinced me that confronting the present means truly remembering
where we came from. This work is thus meant to express a faith in the
inventiveness of human cultures to both redeem the past and transform the
present. My deepest debts go then to my mother and my father; though they
would not agree with much of what I have written, I am thankful for the faith,
skepticism, and persistence that they taught me.
As I sought to ask these kinds of questions in graduate school, the field
of comparative politics often seemed ill at ease with such question. Beliefs and
attitudes which couldn't be quantified, words that had more than one
meaning, world views in flux, beset by contingency and contradiction. I have
been fortunate to study in a program which encouraged innovation and
theoretical openness. The opportunity to give extensive consideration to
thinkers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Michel Foucault
and Walter Benjamin in the context of graduate political theory seminars has
greatly enriched my perspective.
The idea that I would ever finish this project long seemed impossible to
imagine. That I kept with it is due in no small way to the support and
encouragement of my dissertation committee. Howard Wiarda was critical
when he needed to be, but helped curb my tendency to get bogged down
trying to answer too many questions. I am especially appreciative of the
openness and encouragement he offered to my efforts to question mainstream
comparative politics. Nick Xenos' seminars provided some of the context in
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which my ideas on culture first emerged; his respect for, openness to, and
encouragement of my attempts to bring more theoretical reflection to
comparative politics was also crucial in developing more confidence about
where I was going. Paul Dosal served his capacity as the "outside reader" in a
way which thoroughly affirmed my choice to ask him to sit on my committee.
He provided invaluable constructive criticism in helping untangle what
seemed a hopelessly muddled first draft of what turned out to be Chapters 3
and 4. Amrita Basu helped pinpoint some fundamental problems in my
prospectus; her comments were important in helping clarify in my own mind
what I thought I was doing. Jeneen Hobby offered her generous and
illuminating criticism of an early draft of Chapter 2. Renee Heberle provided
the same for Chapter 7.
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ABSTRACT
RETHINKING POLITICAL CULTURE: COUNTERINSURGENCY
DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IDENTITY IN GUATEMALA
'
FEBRUARY 1993
JOSEPH MARC BELANGER
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Howard Wiarda
This dissertation has two principle aims: to examine the political cultural
context for counterinsurgency in Guatemala, and in the process try to revitalize
the concept of political culture. I argue that counterinsurgency in Guatemala
must be understood as a political project with a distinct cultural agenda, and
not simply a military strategy to defeat a guerrilla movements. The goal of that
project is the construction of a modern nation state which can more fully
integrate the country's indigenous communities, establish the legitimacy of
national political institutions, and weaken the influence of independent social
and political movements. In other words, this is a project to win "hearts and
minds." I analyze the historical context, the political and cultural goals of the
military, and the other political cultural forces which it must confront. I
examine the cultural significance of ethnicity, religion, popular political
movements, and political violence, and conclude that the military has thus far
fallen far short of realizing its political, as opposed to strictly military, goals.
ix
This case study provides a concrete context within which to examine in
some depth the theoretical issues involved in the study of political culture. My
intention is to point the discussion in new and fruitful directions. By re-
examining the contribution of Max Weber and supplementing those ideas with
discussions which have taken place among historians and anthropologists
regarding cultural analysis, I critique the limitations of past uses of the concept
of political culture and set forth the constitutive elements of an approach to
cultural analysis with applications beyond Guatemala.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Nations and States
The question and the problem at the heart of this thesis began to take
shape in my mind at the very beginning of my first trip to Guatemala in late
Spring 1988, (what Guatemalans call invierno or winter.) After my Pan Am
flight landed at Aurora International Airport in Guatemala City, I entered the
terminal and went down a hallway toward the customs officials. At the time I
was mostly concerned that my weak Spanish skills get me through customs so
I could meet the representative of the language school in Quezaltenango where
I would be studying. Still, I was immediately taken aback by the first visual
images I encountered on the walls of the corridor toward customs, images
which invoked Guatemala's Mayan past and seemed chosen for their power to
convey a sense of national identity connected to that Mayan heritage. The
images jarred because I knew something of what life had been like for the
Maya over the past 450 years--and particularly over the past 15 or so. My
initial assumption was cynical: these images of ethnic heritage in this
international airport were simply intended to charm tourists and obscure a
very brutal reality. But as I learned more, and made two subsequent return
trips over the next couple of years, these images gradually became a metaphor
2for the ambiguity, conflict, and confusion within Guatemala as a national
community.
In his remarkable "reflections" on nationalism, Benedict Anderson
describes modern nation states as "imagined communities"--gatherings of
individuals who feel themselves bound by language, history, and expectations
of loyalty and sacrifice to a community, most of whose members will never
meet or come near each other. He argues that this form of community
gradually emerged between the 16th and 19th century in Western Europe in
response to economic, political, and technological changes which weakened
previous bases for community and made it possible for "growing numbers of
people to think about themselves and others in profoundly new ways" (1983:
40). Anderson attributes particular importance to the weakened power of
universalis tic religious communities and the subsequent movement toward
forms of community which were conceived as more limited in their
membership. Whereas all could be called to salvation through the Catholic
Church, the claims of many Protestant churches were usually less universal,
and nations even less so. That tendency was reinforced by state policy and
developments in print technology which encouraged the solidification of
national languages from among local dialects. Modern literary forms such as
the novel and the newspaper, consumed by a growing audience of readers,
encouraged a sense of community and connection as a "sociological organism
moving calendrically through empty time" (31). The nation as a community
3lived within human history which could be measured and judged, rather than
in accordance with a divine plan that could at best be prophesied. In the
absence of modern conceptions of history and time, Anderson argues, it would
have been impossible to "think the nation."
At the same time, Anderson argues that while the nation is a modern
political institution, the enduring power of nationalist ideologies is in their
capacity to recast and provide new answers to old questions: questions about
mortality, contingency, and suffering that still haunt us even as religious
explanations have lost some, though by no means all, of their former power.
The nation-state has, when most fully realized and in spite of its lowly status
among intellectuals, been able to marshall capacities for commitment, loyalty,
and sacrifice unmatched by other modern ideologies such as Marxism and
liberalism. While there is something fabricated in these communities, elements
of fiction, of myth, that is precisely the achievement of modern nationalisms,
whether French, Palestinian, or Indonesian: "if nation-states are widely
conceded to be 'new' and 'historical,' the nations to which they give political
expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and still more important,
glide into a limitless future" (1983: 19). Anderson argues that nationalism is a
cultural construction: a product of particular processes and experiences
gradually pieced together and then bestowed with a powerful aura of
timelessness. The concept has thus proven "capable of being transplanted, with
varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains to
4merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and
ideological constellations" (1983: 14).
This capacity to combine the old and the new in ways which powerfully
connect diverse local experiences and knowledge into a cohesive sense of
national community is a powerful source of legitimacy for modern
"nation-states." And it is partly this kind of power which Mayan images are
meant to invoke in the Aurora airport. But what kind of "imagined
community" is Guatemala? Can we even think of it in those terms? And what
might it become in the future? Those are the questions which this work will
take up in some detail. Anderson tells us that the nationalisms expressed by
states are generally the conscious constructions of political elites and succeed
or fail in the context of specific political strategies and struggles in which other
sources of legitimacy compete and must be weakened or re-oriented. The rise
of the nation state as the dominant political and economic actor of the past 200
years has provided an almost unavoidable narrative structure within which to
read history teleologically as a journey, full of dangers and obstacles to be
sure, toward modernity and nationhood. In this way the nation-state carries
deep normative assumptions about progress and modernity.
Events of recent years have served, nonetheless, to reveal how much
conflict the hyphen in the "nation-state" has often obscured. The work of
Barrington Moore (1965), Theda Skojpol (1979), and Charles Tilly (1975),
building on Marx and Weber, has demonstrated that the process of
5state-building has generally involved extensive violence, disruption and
brutality. Behind the symbols of unity and community there is often blood and
misery. Most of the states of the modern world are "multi-national" in some
sense. Indeed, the political world of today is full of enduring conflicts between
various "imagined communities" and the states which claim them but lack
legitimacy.
Guatemalan political life is deeply shaped by just such a conflict. The
successive efforts of Guatemalan political elites to construct a legitimate
political order and national "imagined community" have thus far failed.
Guatemala's present population approaches 9 million, of which approximately
half are Mayan Indians. While viewed by non-Indians in an undifferentiated
manner, the Maya speak more than 20 different languages and their political
and cultural identity has generally been oriented toward locally constructed
communities. The policies of colonial and national governments have certainly
transformed the economic and cultural life of the Maya, but they have not
succeeded in eliminating ethnicity as an important source of political identity
in indigenous communities. The legitimacy problem facing the Guatemalan
state does not involve only the continued resistance of the Maya to cultural
and political assimilation; many sectors of non-Maya or "ladino" society have
also felt excluded and imagined their own visions of Guatemala. In this way
Guatemala is a country facing fundamental questions of national identity and
cultural meaning. 1
The institution which has confronted this problem most systematically is
the Guatemalan military. Over the past decade the military has implemented
one of the most ambitious counterinsurgency programs ever undertaken in an
effort to defeat a guerrilla insurgency and pacify the country. But at the same
time, counterinsurgency in Guatemala has been more than an effort to brutally
pacify rebellious Indians. The program has also reflected an elaborate political
project aimed at constructing a vision of Guatemala as an "imagined
community." While counterinsurgency, or "low-intensity warfare," as it is now
often called, is usually examined principally as a military doctrine, its political
aspects—the winning of "hearts and minds"--have long been centrally apparent.
But it is in Guatemala that the political goals of a counterinsurgency program
have been articulated and pursued perhaps most fully. The political goal of the
Guatemalan counterinsurgency project was the creation of a political culture of
national community, a Guatemala with the emotional, as opposed to strictly
military, power to compel loyalty and commitment. This reflected elaborate
notions of order, political community, and the requisites for sustaining them
beyond the application of military force.
Central to this task was the construction of a modern state which more
fully integrated the country's majority indigenous peoples, established the
legitimacy of a national polity and institutions, while weakening the capacity
of independent social and political movements. In this work I will analyze how
the military understood this legitimacy problem, how it has proposed to
7address the problem, and what significance this political project has had for
the rest of Guatemala.
Counterinsurgencv and Political Culture
On March 23, 1982, a military coup in Guatemala initiated one of the
most brutal counterinsurgency programs ever undertaken. Three years later,
having apparently pacified the country and strengthened its grip on power, the
military oversaw the election of a civilian President-Christian Democrat Marco
Vinicio Cerezo. In January 1991, a successor-Jorge Serrano of the Movimiento
de Accion Solidario (MAS)-was elected in a process that most observers
determined took place without the fraud which characterized most elections in
Guatemala prior to 1985. The close relationship between counterinsurgency
and changing civil-military relations has placed Guatemala in an ambiguous
position within the extensive literature on democratization which has appeared
over the past decade. The degree of military control, the weakness of civilian
leaders, and the continued pattern of extensive human rights abuses, torture,
disappearances, and political murders have led most analysts to speak only of
a limited degree of democratization. While it is apparent that the political
space for opposition has grown somewhat, it is, they argue, far too early to
speak of a "consolidation" of democracy. 2
8This work will not challenge that general assessment. The most crucial
goal of counterinsurgency in Guatemala was and remains the pacification of
rebellious indigenous communities in the Western and Central Highlands. The
military made it clear that civilian politicians would be allowed no hand in the
management of that task. At the same time, the military officers who
constructed that program understood that the war they were fighting in the
early 1980s reflected a profound crisis in Guatemala's political culture to which
they, imbued as an institution with a deep sense of national mission, were
obliged to respond. In this sense they understood, at least in theory, the words
of two North American students of counterinsurgency:
Experience clearly shows that insurgencies and "revolutionary wars" are
wars for moral legitimacy—by which we mean the popular perception of
relative moral Tightness of the competing forces.. .a nation whose
government is or has been perceived as lacking in moral rectitude is a
prime target for Marxist-Leninist insurgencies and their moralistic
egalitarian doctrine. (Mainwaring and Prisk 1988: 2)
This work begins, therefore, from the premise that the effort to assess
the likelihood of political success of the Guatemalan military's project must
include an understanding of the historical and cultural context within which it
was constructed. What was the problem for which a powerful sector of the
Guatemalan military considered this project the solution?
Answering that question requires examining the political culture of the
military itself and analyzing how the challenges confronting Guatemala have
been interpreted within the military and how its thinking has been translated
9into concrete programs and political action over the past decade. Military
leaders have clearly articulated--in interviews, articles and actions-their
analysis of the political/ cultural problem facing Guatemala. The central
concept around which they have framed this analysis is "national stability." As
elaborated by former Minister of Defense General Hector Gramajo, this is a
consciously Guatemalan rejection of the notion of "national security." Gramajo
has argued that the latter idea was a North American formulation which made
Guatemala a tool of Cold War goals but did not address its own national
realities. In this way, what Gramajo has called the "thesis of national stability"
clearly reflects the strong nationalism of the Guatemalan military.
The goal of this military political program is the creation of a stronger
sense of national identity through the construction and implementation of a
coherent national project of development and, in its own terms, democracy. In
pursuing that goal, its planners have acknowledged the failures of past
governments, military and otherwise, on this account. They have also
recognized that the guerrilla movement which threatened Guatemala in the
early 1980s was not simply the product of evil communist conspiracies hatched
in Moscow and Havana; it also grew from generations of poverty, exploitation
and racism. It was understandable, they argued, that guerrilla promises,
however illusory, would gain popular support. What does winning the
"political war" mean in practice? Development poles, model villages, civil
patrols, and other institutions have been designed to strengthen the military's
10
control over the rural population, especially indigenous communities. But the
military also hoped to convince indigenous communities that now the
government was committed to making them fully a part of Guatemala and
could offer them a better life. By presenting these programs in a confident and
attractive discourse of national development, the military hoped, in David
Stoll's words, to seize the "moral initiative" away from the guerrilla.3
Indians and poor ladinos are not the only audience that the military has
wanted to address with this political project. It also carries ambitious
aspirations of transforming the political culture of Guatemala's political and
economic elites through a process of concertacion by which national consensus
might replace fragmentation and cleavages. While it is axiomatic, and generally
accurate, to assume a close relationship between the military and Guatemala's
economic elite, there are significant tensions with regard to the proper
direction of "modernization" and rationalization sought by some in the military
which must be examined. Moreover, the transition to civilian rule was not, I
will argue, something that was imposed upon a discredited military forced to
make concessions. What was most notable in Guatemala in the 1980s was not
the retreat of the military but its greater autonomy, as well as the distinctly
nationalist political and military ideology which put many officers at odds
with some of the traditional oligarchy at the same time as they sought
partnership with civilian political groups.
11
Understood as a political project in this fashion, the Guatemalan case
provides an important opportunity to analyze the cultural politics of
counterinsurgency. By approaching the matter in this way, I will be attempting
to suggest the value of cultural analysis in revealing aspects of the military's
program, and the response it has engendered, which have been
underemphasized. Much of the recent literature on Guatemala and the process
of democratization has emphasized structural and/or external forces which
pressured the military to accept civilian rule. Political change in Guatemala is
clearly influenced by socio-economic structures, natural disaster, regional
changes, U.S. foreign policy. But to explain solely by reference to these factors
is incomplete.4
The most significant factor missing from a structural account is the
political culture of legitimacy surrounding the state and its leading institutions
and actors. The Guatemalan state has never been able to rest on its coercive
power; cultural analysis can help illuminate why legitimacy has been elusive
and what "winning the political war" means. Earlier research on the political
cultures of Latin American militaries provided valuable insights into the ways
new experiences and forms of knowledge influenced institutional notions of
identity, while changing the ways traditional issues of legitimacy, participation,
order, development, and national identity were understood.
5 The program of
counterinsurgency and democratization undertaken by the Guatemalan
military as the project of "national stability" can be similarly understood as the
12
product of new thinking brought to bear in response to a long-term problem
reshaped by new events.
Cultural analysis can help interpret the goals of the military by
clarifying what it thinks the problem is and exploring how it hopes to translate
that understanding into a more legitimate political cultural order. How
successful this is likely to be in transforming the political culture of
Guatemala's indigenous communities and establishing a much stronger
allegiance to the nation, can only be assessed by understanding the political
culture the military hopes to establish and the various other political cultures
within Guatemala which confront such a project.
It must be noted quite clearly that this is the project of the military, in
conjunction with some civilian elites. Anderson's analysis of "imagined
communities" provides a useful ideal type because it conveys well many of the
aspirations of the Guatemalan state. But in studying the effort to construct a
particular vision of political community, I'm not at all implying that a
successful outcome to such a project is either possible or desirable. I shall
argue in the latter sections of this work that the military's project is fraught
with cultural contradictions which complicate the achievement of legitimacy. It
is also a project which clearly builds on the politics of violence and terror
which remains pervasive in Guatemala. This is certainly not a conflict among
equals. The military project privileges particular spaces and identities, but has
not been able to fully control the process or the responses of Guatemala's other
13
political cultures. The "democratic opening" permitted in 1985 may have been
an integral part of the military's project, but like controlled political openings
elsewhere in the hemisphere its impact was not subject to the strict control of
the military. And while the military leaders conceive of their project of
"national stability" as distinctly Guatemalan, that is not to say that external and
structural factors are not relevant to the formation, success, or failure of their
project.
Rethinking Political Culture
Analyzing counterinsurgency as a political culture project raises larger
issues regarding the way political science studies culture. The contrast between
structural and cultural analysis in the previous section illustrates a problem
which has, I would argue, crippled previous discussion of the concept. The
tendency to divide our field of study among different "approaches": statist,
rational choice, culturalist, structuralist, dependency, corporatist, etc. is not
unique to political science. A full ethnography of this phenomenon would no
doubt uncover a range of institutional and intellectual forces at work. Here I
wish only to focus on some of the theoretical problems for interpreting culture
which have emerged from an overly polemical debate.
While the writers who advocate these approaches usually acknowledge
some debt to other approaches, these discussions often seem to produce
14
confrontations in which differences and continuity are overstated in the pursuit
of theoretical victory. What began as unanswered questions, gaps or silences in
previous analysis, are hardened or codified into rigid theories seeking
paradigmatic status. Political culture, dependency, and state-centered analysis
all offered improvements over earlier studies. But once codified into
"approaches" they began to become abstract. Many of these so-called
approaches are often more helpfully considered as political facts in need of
analysis. Dependency is a good example; rather than being a hard and fast
theory which can explain inequality and underdevelopment, it is better
considered a condition which itself must be explained using a combination of
economic, cultural and historical analysis. The same can be said of the state, as
well as, in Latin America, the institutional and cultural influence of political
traditions inherited from Spain. It is not possible to undertake an interpretation
of Guatemalan politics without considering each of these factors carefully, but
any effort to ground explanation in any one factor—cultural, economic or
otherwise-will leave important gaps in our analysis.
These polemics have been particularly unkind to the concept of culture.
Consider the discussion of recent years regarding the relative autonomy of the
state. Too much of the debate has been caught up in an extremely unhelpful
dichotomy between "state-centered" and "society-centered" approaches to
political analysis. Each side tends to create overly simplistic constructions of
the other: "culturalist" arguments are labeled idealist, racist, reductionist, or
15
ethnocentric; "statists" are labeled Hegelian, idealist, reductionist, etc.6 One of
the consequences of this kind of polemic is the most important question is
never asked with any thoroughness-what is political culture? In Chapter 2 I
will set forth the constitutive elements of what I consider a viable approach
toward political culture which I will then apply, in the rest of the study, to the
case of Guatemala. I am not proposing a "cultural approach," however, if that
implies offering cultural explanations for political structures. Structural and
cultural analyses have formed one of the most enduring polemical
dichotomies, but it is time to move beyond the question of which is dependent
on the other and enquire more closely into the ongoing relationship.7
For the study of political culture this means asking some new questions
that can help construct an approach to culture which is sufficiently rich and
complex for the work at hand. In that sense, I share the sentiment expressed
by Susanne Jonas when she described her recent book "not as an effort to
elaborate (or defend) a particular theory but to interpret the Guatemalan
experience" (1991: 3). This examination of the political culture of the military's
project is conceived as a complement to rather than a rejection of other
analyses. The multi-level crisis which has confronted Guatemala over at least
the past 15 years has presented profound questions of national identity and
cultural meaning for every sector of society. Guatemalans, both as individuals
and members of larger cultural communities have been forced to try to make
sense of natural disaster, horrific political violence, external events, and an
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unparalleled economic depression. What cultural analysis can do is deepen our
understanding of the human significance, the dilemmas of identity and
meaning, which individuals and communities confront in contexts which are
seldom of their own creation. Cultural processes are a crucial, but not
determinant, element of the interpretive puzzle. A recent paper by Daniel
Levine makes this point nicely in cautioning against explanations which put
too much emphasis on structural changes:
These conjunctures provide a necessary but not a sufficient basis for
understanding...Transformations within religion (ideas, structures and
practice) need to be set in the context of changes that made them
resonate and ring true to ordinary people and gave average men and
women a chance to shape the course and content of change on their
own. (1990: 7)
The emphasis on culture as a practice means studying the ways new
structural settings generated by war, global events, economic change, etc.
inspire new understandings. When Levine refers to religion as an "existential"
art, the same might be said of culture in general. Historical traditions provide
resources for the ongoing task of constructing meaning and identity, but the
precise content changes as new historical problems are presented.8 Specific
events are viewed through a cultural lens which interprets change, asks new
questions, and, sometimes, invents new possibilities.
Structure of the Work
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The discussion of political culture I want to pursue begins from the
premise that previous approaches have been insufficiently reflective about the
nature of the subject matter. While extensive debate has occurred among
historians and anthropologists regarding what it means to speak of culture,
much of the discussion among political scientists has not entailed the same
degree of conceptual reflection. In Chapter 2 I will examine how the concept of
political culture has been constructed over the past several decades and offer
the constitutive elements of what I consider a more viable concept. While
looking to other disciplines for inspiration, my approach will be heavily
indebted to a reconsideration of Max Weber's influential but often
misunderstood analysis of the "cultural sciences."
The framework offered in Chapter 2 will then be applied to analyze the
political culture of counterinsurgency. As previously noted, the political project
which the military has tried to carry out is a response to a political problem
with deep historical roots. The work of legitimating a political cultural order
has been continually re-enacted in the nearly 500 years since the Conquest. In
Chapter 4, we will examine the ways in which Guatemala has been understood
as a political community by those who have governed it, with a particular
emphasis on the changing relationship between the Guatemalan state and the
indigenous majority. I will focus particular attention on the Colonial era, the
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subsequent impact of independent Liberal "reforms" during the 19th century,
and the political legacy of the "revolution" of 1944-54. Within each epoch I will
examine the kinds of political communities which have been "imagined," the
ways specific colonial and national political orders attempted to legitimate
themselves, and their success or failure.
In order to pursue these issues, it is necessary to clarify two theoretical
points. Historians and anthropologists have provided us with richly detailed
and analytically imaginative accounts of the ability of the Maya to retain
something of their cultural identity amidst the devastating succession of
conquests by the colonial and national governments in Guatemala. In trying to
account for the choices made by the Maya in the face of externally imposed
violence and domination, this research has convincingly established the
importance of viewing Maya as "subjects of their own history," rather than
passive objects of conquest.9 The theoretical and practical significance of that
idea will be taken up in Chapter 3 in order that the perspective on ethnic
identity and legitimacy which informs the historical discussion in Chapter 4 be
as unambiguous as possible.
The political culture of the military political project will be examined
more fully in Chapter 5. After providing an account of the historical and
cultural development of the military, two principle questions will be
addressed, How does the military understand the political and cultural
problem confronting it as Guatemala's most powerful national institution?
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What political and military institutions are being put into place to address that
problem?
Chapters 6 and 7 will then look at Guatemala's other political cultures
and analyze what the practical significance of the military's project has been
for other groups. Both chapters will employ the cultural analysis previously
applied to the military in order to ask similar questions, How have other
groups interpreted recent political and structural changes? What dilemmas of
identity and meaning have these changes presented and what responses have
they generated? No effort to understand Guatemalan political culture can
avoid the importance of religion, and the recent explosion in the growth of
evangelical Protestantism has generated enormous political controversy. In
Chapter 6, 1 will examine the political culture of religion and, in particular,
question the assumption that evangelical sects necessarily reinforce the
intentions of the military. My analysis will emphasize the complex relationship
between religious and ethnic identity in Guatemala in order to examine why
so many Mayans have converted in recent years.
Chapter 7 will analyze Guatemalan political developments since the
election of Vinicio Cerezo in 1985. One of the elements on the military's
political agenda was the creation of a process of concertacion that would
engender a national consensus regarding political and economic development.
Having examined how military leaders envisioned the "transition to
democracy," I shall examine what has actually happened since 1985. By looking
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at how other groups-political parties, as well as private sector, indigenous,
and "popular" organizations-have responded to the military's project as well
as other factors, including economic deterioration and regional and global
political developments, this analysis will suggest that, as of early 1992, the
goals of stability and concertacion remain unrealized.
My analysis of Guatemala since 1985 will suggest that a variety of
factors have encouraged a broad range of Guatemalans to see possibilities for
compromise and peace in the process of "national dialogue" currently being
undertaken. I will also suggest that some beginning steps are perhaps being
taken toward a genuine confrontation with Guatemala's long tradition of
horrific political violence. Both of these developments reflect that the political
dialogue in Guatemala has moved well beyond the boundaries originally
intended by the military. But for now, examining these new strains involves
what Albert Hirschman called a "bias for hope." Reasons for pessimism
continue to abound.
Having completed the analysis of Guatemala, I shall offer some
concluding thoughts in Chapter 8 on two of the larger issues raised in this
study: the political culture of modern nation states, and the implications of my
approach for the practice of cultural analysis and social science.
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Notes
1. The terms "Indian" and "ladino" are not as unambiguous as this introduction
might suggest. A fuller consideration of the historical development of their
meanings is included in Chapter 4. Much of that analysis is influenced by
important new work on ethnicity and the state in Guatemala which is collected
in a recent book edited by Carol A. Smith (1990).
2. The best analysis of the elections and democracy is found in the Congressional
testimony of Guatemalan lawyer and political analyst Frank Larue (U.S. Congress;
1990). Jim Handy (1986) provides an excellent analysis of the historical context for
current actions by the military. The argument in this chapter is strongly indebted
to his insightful discussion. See also articles by Robert Trudeau and Susanne Jonas
in John Booth and Mitchell Seligson, eds., (1989), Ken Anderson and Jean-Marie
Simon (1988), J. Patrice McSherry (1990), Hector Rosada (1990) and Jonas' recent
book (1991). More optimistic perspectives are offered by Georges Fauriol and Eva
Loser (1988), and Alfonso Yurrita (1991).
3. Stoll's argument is more fully discussed in Chapter 6. It is elaborated in his
recent groundbreaking work on Protestantism in Latin America (1990).
4. See Robert Trudeau' s analysis of elections in Guatemala (Booth and Seligson,
eds., 1989: 93-125). Trudeau argues that changes in political culture must be
proceeded by changes in political structure and not the other way around as he
argues "cultural explanations", such as that offered by Wiarda (1982), contend.
While I agree with most of Trudeau's analysis of the significance of elections in
Guatemala, his theoretical perspective on the process of political change is too
limited.
5. This literature is discussed in more detail in the first section of Chapter 5.
6. For a recent glimpse into these debates see the Symposium in APSR, 1988, No
1. The theory and practice of state-centered analysis is well represented in Evans,
Skojpol, and Rueschemeyer (1985). The introductory article by Skojpol provides
an extensive bibliography. Further discussion of the strengths and limits of state
centered analysis is presented in Chapter 2.
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7. For an excellent account of the debates in anthropology on this issue see
Sherry Ortner (1984). Historians explore these issues in Lynn Hunt, ed. (1988).
Two brilliant discussions of the complex relationship between social structure and
identity in two very different settings are offered by William Connolly (1981) and
Marshall Sahlins (1985).
8. Levine's approach to religion and politics will be examined more fully in
Chapter 6. Other work by Latin Americanists which skillfully analyze the ways
new knowledge and ways of thinking are institutionally shaped in different
settings includes Merilee Grindle (1986) on state development policies, Alfred
Stepan (1988) on the military, Eduardo Viola and Scott Mainwaring (1984) on
social movements, and David Stoll (1990) on religion. The literature on the latter
subject is especially rich; an excellent sample can be found in Levine, ed. (1986).
For an insightful analysis of the relevance to political culture of recent discussions
of the state in Latin America, see Susan Bourque (1989).
9. This formulation is by Nancy Farriss (1983: 19). A fuller account of this
perspective is set forth in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 2
RETHINKING POLITICAL CULTURE
Weber and Political Culture:
Some Old Issues Reconsidered
The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is
that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world from
the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a
position to create this meaning itself.
Max Weber
The study of political culture has been conflicted terrain for some time.
As formulated and developed by Gabriel Almond, Sydney Verba, Lucien Pye,
and others the concept was widely influential for a time but gradually came in
for criticism from a variety of quarters. That story will be told in more detail
later in this chapter. But first, I want to consider some of the deeper
epistemological issues involved in the study of culture. A rich starting point
for that task is offered by Max Weber's analysis of what he termed the
"cultural sciences."
It is not an easy thing to begin speaking of Max Weber. As one of the
giants of contemporary western social theory, there is practically no school of
modern thought-from Parsonian structural-functionalism, to Frankfurt School
"critical theory," to Foucauldian "genealogy," which has not in some way been
influenced by Weber. Even within the more narrow realm of modern political
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science nearly every perspective or approach traces some of its origins to
Weber's work. Hoping to avoid the polemics that competing uses of Weber
have entailed, I will not try to situate myself with regard to all those
perspectives. Instead I want to offer what I hope-dangerously perhaps on such
well-trod terrain-will be a fresh perspective on Weber's contribution to the
study of political culture. I will build upon the work of political theorists who
have recently challenged earlier interpretations of Weber and brought out
more clearly the ethical and methodological preoccupations which drove his
inquiry. Weber's work is too vast, complex, and contradictory for me to claim
that I have discovered the "true" Weber. It may be possible, however, to see
some questions at stake in his work which are important to the study of
culture and which have not received adequate attention in contemporary
political science discussions of the issue. 1
Weber continually explored the modern meanings of two concepts
which are also at the heart of this work-culture and legitimacy. His intention
was to investigate institutions in terms of their cultural significance for
individuals and communities. This was not a question of determinism, but it
was the case that institutions possessed "developmental tendencies" which
Weber sought to understand in terms of the forms of human action and
identity they tended to inspire. Weber did not believe that culture could be
derived from structure. But while intending to illustrate the flaws in some
Marxian formulations of culture, he did not intend to argue for the autonomy
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of culture vis-a-vis structure. Cultural activity encourages the rise of particular
kinds of economic and social institutions which possess, in turn, their own
dynamics. Since consequence often differs from intention, gaps often appear
between our will and our institutions-the rise and influence of Protestantism
being a case in point. Structural change presents new challenges which must
then be culturally interpreted. It was the ways those challenges were
addressed as cultural dilemmas that most interested Weber. The causes behind
the creation of institutions interested him in so far as they made more explicit
the cultural problematic of the present. And no modern institution confronted
these cultural dilemmas more sharply than the nation state. For while
economic, military, and technological developments had greatly increased its
power, states confronted ever more challenging problems trying to construct
and maintain their cultural legitimacy and power.
These cultural preoccupations were not esoteric; they connected directly
to his anxiety about the capacity of Germany to confront the political challenge
of his lifetime. And that challenge, while having economic and military
aspects, was fundamentally a cultural struggle. This is most apparent in
"Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany," written in 1917
(1978: 1381-1469), and "Politics as a Vocation," but Weber's concerns about the
political and cultural capacity of Germany's political leadership are apparent in
essays from the 1890s on economic and political development. Keith Tribe has
argued, in the context of close analysis of the earlier writings, that Weber's
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intention was to pursue a "history of the present" in order that the fullest
measure could be taken of Germany's current dilemma and its meaning (Tribe
1989). He could not, for reasons that will be elaborated more fully in the final
chapter, offer a definitive solution. That was the task of the German nation.
What Weber could do was inquire into the kinds of political subjects and
identities most prominent in his present, their genealogy, and their cultural
significance for the future.
Weber's effort to imderstand the construction of meaning reflects
another preoccupation which drove all his work-from the detailed historical
studies of medieval Europe to the intensely personal lectures on vocation: an
effort to infuse the modern political realm with the authority and purpose once
granted religious institutions. He explicitly equated the political quest of the
social scientist with the classical platonic attempt to harmonize the elements of
the soul while recognizing that earlier attempts to reconcile soul and polity
were less available in the modern world as the sources of legitimacy had
fragmented. Weber also understood that in modernity the traditional
distinction between ends and means would be altered because science would
establish means which were absolute rather than relative. In an age when
scientific method was rapidly developing hegemony, he hoped to fashion a
political realm, statecraft, which reconciled science with an individual sense of
purpose and meaning.
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Weber, Nietzsche, and Modern Social Science
In order to approach these matters, and their importance for cultural
analysis a bit more deeply, we might start with an aspect of Weber's thought
which has received increased attention in recent years~the influence of
Friedrich Nietzsche. What is offered by greater attention to Nietzsche? Two
things stand out: important methodological issues about the nature of modern
social science can be fruitfully considered, and the anthropological and cultural
elements of what Weber understood to be the dilemma of modernity come
more clearly into view. How Weber confronted these issues was deeply
informed by Nietzsche and it is there that we must begin.
The material or theme of Weber's sociology is not to be found in
'interests/ or in 'ideas', or in 'images of the world', or above all in
'action'; its sole object is lebensfuhring (life-conduct). Upon this, where
men reveal their particular human qualities (Menschentum) , everything
turns. (1988: 45)
Suppose we begin with this passage in which Wilhelm Hennis locates
the heart of Weber's ethical and methodological preoccupations. The emphasis
on conduct nicely complements Sherry Ortner's observation that earlier
tendencies to interpret Weber within a "idealist vs materialist" orientation have
in recent years been partially eclipsed by a growing emphasis on "practice" and
the question of "where 'the system' comes from-how it is produced and
reproduced, and how it may be changed in the past or be changed in the
future" (1984: 146). Ortner notes that one significant effect of this new
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emphasis was the development of analysis which combined Marx and Weber
around the themes they shared in common rather than presenting them in
opposition. Despite vast differences in style and substance, what each shared
was an interest in understanding the processes by which subjective,
ethically-oriented relations between individuals were transformed by
capitalism into something which appeared objectively given. Marx saw how
this had happened between workers and capitalists but then resolved the
conflict, at least in theory, through a historical telos which posited revolution
as the final resolution of social contradictions. But Weber believed Nietzsche
had accurately spelled out the more radical meaning and implications of these
developments.2
Let us start with the epistemological implications, though we shall see
that they are closely related to Weber's anthropology. His work represents the
continual thinking through of a dilemma which remains central to the study of
political culture. Profoundly aware of the elements of freedom and contingency
in human experience, Weber continually challenged the precision of his
analysis while seeking to account analytically for the diversity of historical
outcomes. He did this, of course, through the use of ideal types, but in a
fashion in which the influence of Nietzsche is apparent.
Weber's methodological essays, particularly "Objectivity in Social
Science and Social Policy," need to be read against the intellectual backdrop of
Nietzsche's The Genealoev of Morals for Weber's vision of social science was
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deeply indebted to the critique of Western reason and science put forward in
that earlier work. While Nietzsche is often viewed as the prophet of
irrationality and nihilism, it is important to remember that his own purpose
was to reveal the fundamental nihilism of modern modes of scientific inquiry.
That element of nihilism was in a sense both the good news and the bad news.
Science was essential in revealing the elements of human construction and
fabrication inside all efforts to establish universal truth claims. This was most
obvious in his discussions of religion, but Nietzsche insisted that the same
scientific resources be trained on other modern truth claims, including the
nationalistic and anti-semitic ideologies of his own time.
There was a darker side to the scientific "will to truth," however.
Nietzsche wrote that he was willing to grant it "...all power...so long as it is
honest." But rather than being content to reveal the underside of claims to
truth, in order that we might become more reflective about the worlds we
construct, science wanted to create new universal truths to replace the ones
which it had previously discredited. Science, according to Nietzsche, would
like to claim a capacity to sustain objective truths and provide values but
instead could only help us reflect upon their contingency and limitations. That
was the sense in which science was fundamentally nihilistic and hence
dangerous to Nietzsche. It could give depth and intellectual force to our value
judgments, but could not tell us what to think. Like Nietzschean genealogy,
science could force us to confront the contradictions in our values by revealing
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their fallacies. But there was "no science without presuppositions" and hence
Nietzsche's disdain for those
...coquettish bedbugs with their insatiable ambition to smell out the
infinite, until at last the infinite smells of bedbugs.. ..these weary and
played out people who wrap themselves in wisdom and look objective
(1967: 159)
Weber's own acceptance of the limits of modern rationalism to provide
for its own legitimacy is evident in his discussion in "Science as a Vocation".
Legitimacy, he argued, is grounded in a feeling of personal and/or communal
meaning, rather than a precise knowledge of how the world operates.
Traditional sources of authority, such as religion, have not so much attempted
to explain how the world works, but rather sought to uncover what it means.
And this was a question which Weber believed was not answerable by science.
Science presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important
in the sense that it is worth being known. In this, obviously, are
contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proven by
scientific means. It can only be interpreted with reference to its ultimate
meaning, which we accept according to our ultimate position towards
life...and still less can it be proved that the existence of the world that
these sciences describe is worthwhile, that it has any meaning, or that it
makes any sense to live in such a world. Science does not ask for the
answers to such questions. (1946: 143)
This was how Weber understood Nietzsche's admonition that science be "hard
with its own heart." It entailed the recognition that it was our fate to live in an
age when we were forced to confront that we are the creators of meaning, it is
not given to us by God, history, nature or any other external power. Nor could
we rely on the power of modern science and reason to resolve the matter;
Weber's account of the limits of weakness echoed Nietzsche's earlier view:
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Let us be on guard against the dangerous old conceptual fiction that
posited a "pure, will-less, timeless, knowing subject"; let us guard
against the snares of such contradictory subjects as "pure reason,"
"absolute spirituality," "knowledge in itself": these always demand that
we should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned
in no particular direction, in which the active and interpreting forces,
through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are supposed to
be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a
nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective
"knowing." (1967: 119, underlined words italicized in original.)
Once the cultural sciences are understood in this fashion, the purpose of
ideal types is clearer. They reflect a construction of history and present reality
according to the principles and interests of the analyst. In this sense Weber
rejected the notion of scholarly objectivity as it is often understood. The facts
must discipline us, but there will always be processes of selection and
judgment which would preclude absolute agreement on the meaning of terms
and concepts. We must consider carefully, therefore, what Weber meant in
calling for clear sociological concepts. Taking a very different view from
modern logical positivism regarding what constituted precision, Weber
stressed the need for concepts which were as culturally precise and rooted in
the meaning of words and ideas in practice as possible. The cultural sciences
were among those "to which eternal youth is granted... (as) the eternally
onward flowing stream of culture perpetually brings new problems" (1949).
Ideal types were transient, destined to be replaced by different-Weber would
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not say definitively whether better or worse-constructs reflecting changing
questions and cultural interests:
As soon as the elimination of ambiguity is sought for, the concept
becomes an abstract ideal type and reveals itself therewith as a
theoretical and hence one-sided viewpoint which illuminates the aspect
of reality with which it can be related....This process shows that in the
cultural sciences concept construction depends on the setting of the
problem and the latter varies with the content of the culture itself. (1949:
104-5)
Those who have been sensitive to this aspect of Weber, most notably
Leo Strauss, sometimes conclude that it introduces an element of ethical
decisionism which amounts to a form of nihilism or relativism (Strauss 1954).
Weber was clearly not of the opinion that one argument was as good as
another. But every time and place was limited by that historical setting and the
cultural questions set forth. There were no timeless, trans-historical philosophic
questions. There was no ultimate standard or realm of truth that could be
invoked to resolve the matter. There was only the force of arguments, the
quality of facts they could marshall, and the cultural values they could express
as well as the context of power relations within which they were embedded.
He argued for the continual need to update our "ideal types" through rigorous
interaction between historical contexts and theoretical frameworks. Weber
rejected:
...the idea that the goal of the cultural sciences, even their remote goal,
is to construct a closed system of concepts in which reality will be
confined according to a definitive order...and from which it can be
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deduced. The course of unforseeable events is transformed endlessly,
stretching to eternity. The cultural problems that move men are
constantly posed anew and from other aspects....The principles of the
cultural sciences will keep changing in a future without limits as long as
the sclerosis of life and spirit do not disaccustom humanity to an
inexhaustible life. A system of the cultural sciences, even if confined to
an area which is systematic and objectively valid for questions and the
domains which these questions are called upon to treat will be nonsense
in itself. An attempt of this type could only reassemble pell-mell the
multiple, specific, heterogeneous, disparate points of view under which
reality is presented to us each time as culture. (1949: 84)
This is where epistemology meets anthropology and we see why Weber
believed that any serious social science must come to terms with Nietzsche.
For the concern with methodology was directly related to Weber's effort to
preserve the capacity to construct a modern sense of character~a capacity to
live in this age. His essays on the subject were animated by what he took to be
a fundamental cultural predicament—how to make sense of structures and
institutions which were continually asserting their power over the individual
and closing off the possibilities for meaning. How could we endure the
onslaught of the myriad forms of modernity and still salvage or construct a
coherent personality? Not a personality without contradictions, but one capable
of taking their full measure with honesty. This is explicit in "Politics as a
Vocation." when he speaks of the need for a sense of "proportion," that ability
to "let reality work upon one with inner concentration and firmness" (1946:
116). This echoes Nietzsche's admonition that we be "hard with our own heart"
in the pursuit of knowledge, and "mistrust our first impressions, they are
almost always too good." Nietzsche believed that science had a potential to
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degrade us. In putting "dialectics in place of instinct," we became master and
slave within an endless series of mechanical processes which are supposed to
reassure us but instead leave us "slipping faster and faster away from the
center into a penetrating sense of nothingness" (1967: 155).
It is this problem of "the disenchantment of the world", and not causal
arguments about the origins of capitalism which animated Weber's study of
the Protestant Ethic. The study is often interpreted as a hypothesis about the
process of rationalization the truth or error of which can be investigated. But
Weber didn't intend it as an hypothesis-it was an ideal type against which
specific histories might be clarified. His goal was to better understand the
cultural significance of capitalism and other forms of rationalization. What
interested him was not capitalism per se, but rather the ethical impulses which
motivated, in various ways, those who held particular beliefs. He was
especially interested in the idea of a "calling" and the imperative it fixed on
"lebensfuhrung," the "conduct of life" according to an idea of rationality. He
was not trying to generalize about the ethical basis of capitalism, or uncover a
generalizable and universal process of rationalization. Instead, he examined a
particular historical instance of a "habitus"-- a style of regulating the various
"life orders"~family, economic life, social community.
Weber did not believe that religions were unchanging in their essence or
their historical impact; Protestantism and the values it engendered emerged at
a particular historical time and was related to both religious and economic
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factors. As noted earlier, Weber wasn't interested in establishing the primacy
of culture. More important for Weber was the gap between intention and
outcome. Protestants had not set out to develop an advanced capitalist order;
they were looking for a sign of their chosenness before God. This is significant
because while cultural and economic systems can converge to create a
particular result, they can as easily diverge at future points, creating new
cultural problems in their wake. The aim of social science for Weber was, in
Merleau-Ponty's words, "...to recover the fundamental choices of the past"
(1955: 24). It was never a question of these choices having autonomy from their
context; the goal of inquiry was to uncover the full human meaning and drama
of the confrontation. Weber wrote that there was no more moving spectre then
when an individual, after taking the full measure of his/her situation says,
with Luther, "Here I stand, I can do no other."
This brings us back to the question of menschentum which the citation
from Hennis earlier set forth, and brings Weber's own ethical preoccupations
into clearer view. While thoroughly cognizant of the influence of institutions
and structures, Weber's real interest was to glean their cultural significance.
What kind of individual and community identities emerged within particular
constellations of institutions, ethic, and practice? What impact did the multiple
processes at work within institutions have on political leadership and
participation? What kind of individuals were privileged and what did this
mean for other kinds of life, other ethical orientations?
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Weber sought, thereby, to convey the cultural predicament posed by
modernity at the level of its meaning for individuals. Lawrence Scaff has put it
another way-'what is the fate of our times?" But what could be posed in
deeply philosophical terms needed to be answered within the realm of specific
life orders and practices. The questions might also be-how did we become
who we are? and what possibilities exist for the future? When understood in
this fashion, an ethic was not a collection of abstract values which had an
"elective affinity" with particular institutions, and a political culture was not
simply a series of attitudes toward the state or a set of roles which emerged.
Weber's "cultural sciences" focused on conflicts over "ultimate values" in a
world of force, contingency, history, and the lack of an ultimate ground for
truth. It amounted to a battle among "gods" with profound cultural importance
(1946: 142-150). In an age when traditional sources of legitimacy had come
under challenge from modern institutions, the task of creating a legitimate
political order was more complex. It was precisely because cultural values
were not autonomous that they were continually reconsidered in the light of
new experiences which posed new problems. By emphasizing the contexts and
processes in which ethical and cultural dilemmas were constructed, Weber
avoided getting bogged down in questions of the relative autonomy of one or
another factor. This kind of analysis can also clarify the ultimate values and
cultural problems which motivate our own inquiry, an issues I shall return to
in Chapter 8.
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Political Science and Political Culture:
Approaches and Debates
Cultural Analysis and Political Legitimacy
While an awareness of the connection between politics and culture had
long been an important question in the tradition of political theory-most
notably in the writings of Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau and Tocqueville-it
was Gabriel Almond's seminal 1956 article "Comparative Political Systems"
which located "political culture" as a fundamental element within emerging
forms of analysis that were remaking the field of comparative politics. If we
wish to understand why political culture became the focus of such attention, it
is necessary to examine more closely the problems in political life to which it
was a response. What did practitioners of this new approach hope to
accomplish and why did they believe that previous approaches were
inadequate? It will be my argument that the weaknesses that emerged from
this approach to political culture were closely related to the mode of theorizing
it entailed and the purposes it was intended to serve. This is what we would
expect if the Weberian assumptions I have set forth have merit. Systems theory
has been convincingly critiqued and this is not intended to be simply another
nail in the coffin. Instead I want to look more carefully at the formation of this
approach to culture so that we might better understand the questions and
problems, fundamentally cultural and political, which analysis of political
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culture seemed to answer. This is necessary in order to offer a fuller reply to
the question raised in chapter 1, What is "political culture"?
The important proponents of comparative politics in the 1950s and 60s
have often been accused of attempting to develop value-free forms of scientific
analysis. Part of the blame for this view can be attributed to the writers
themselves. Gabriel Almond, David Easton, Seymour Martin Lipset, and others
often seemed to make strong claims for the objectivity of their analysis. But it
does not require much digging to find fundamental moral commitments close
to the surface of their work; they are expressed quite clearly and reflect each
analyst's personal response to Weber's realization that social science begins
with interpretive choices reflecting the "ultimate values" of each analyst who
undertakes a particular study. In order to understand some of the values and
preoccupations which informed the literature on political culture in the 1950s
and early 1960s, it is useful to step back briefly into the 19th century. In the
process we shall see that the analysts who developed that literature clearly
understood the problem of legitimacy confronting modern social theory as
explained by Weber, but believed a less agonistic resolution was still possible.
The impact of industrial capitalism was the central concern of 19th
century European social theory. The analysis provided by theorists as diverse
as Pareto, Sorel, Nietzsche, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber shared a common
thread: a belief in the weakness of liberal political institutions and their
underlying cultural ideals to address the problems confronting these societies.
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This was particularly true of Durkheim. He believed that the philosophical
moorings of liberalism-especially the emphasis on an ontology of the
individual in a world of other individuals led to a breakdown of social
solidarity. The positing of man prior to society had no appeal to Durkheim:
From a physical point of view, a man is nothing more that a system of
cells.. ..he differs only in degree from animals. Yet society conceives him
as invested with a character„the powers which are thus conferred,
though purely ideal, act as though they were real. (1915: 259)
Durkheim' s approach to this problem, and his explicit rejection of the
approach taken by Marx, are what made him appealing to Talcott Parsons in
building a theory of social action. The idea that meaning was a socially created
product was, Parsons argued, impossible for utilitarians to understand:
The general effect of the individualistic elements of the European
cultural tradition...has been to emphasize the discreteness of the
different individuals who make up a society particularly with regard to
their ends. The result has been to inhibit the elaboration of certain of the
most important possibilities of the theory of action, those having to do
with the integration of ends in systems, especially those having a
plurality of actors. (1937: 447)
Parsons also borrowed heavily from Durkheim's ideas about religion to
establish the need for a civil religion, but something was missing. Durkheim's
system did not provide an objective basis for affirming one set of values over
another; at heart, it was relativistic, because Durkheim was concerned mainly
with solidarity. He did no make any effort to push the discussion of values
beyond the realm of the subjective preferences of particular communities, and
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hence could not, in Parsons' view, satisfactorily resolve the problem of
legitimacy confronting modern societies and institutions. Parsons wanted to
construct an non-relativistic basis upon which the legitimacy of modern
capitalistic democratic political orders could be objectively constructed; simply
to base it on ascriptive attachment would not be adequate. Weber's analysis of
legal-rational authority, embodied by modern bureaucracy, offered a solution
to Parsons' dilemma. This interpretation was heavily influenced by Parsons'
reading of the analysis of the Protestant Ethic. Seeking a sign of their
chosenness, the believer sought to order the world according to standards of
rationality which transcend particular subjective ends and reflected a
disciplined pursuit of "ultimate values." This was done by ordering the world
in accordance, as closely as could be determined, with the will of God rather
than one's own desires. The exact design of God's plan was not available; what
was important was the capacity to pursue it as diligently and selflessly as
possible. By upholding standards which transcended individual ends, a
synthesis of normative and empirical goals was possible.3
Parsons recognized that this interpretation was not held by Weber
himself, who consistently denied the capacity of the social sciences to uncover
objective laws of social reality analogous to the natural sciences. Ideal types
provided a method for structuring facts-but the issue of legitimacy was
another matter. While we might subordinate our values to the discipline of
hard facts, the meaning created was still our own. As I previously noted in
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some detail, Weber's encounter with Nietzsche left him convinced that science
could not provide for its own legitimacy, and instead tended to continually
undermine it:
The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon
the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are
subjective. (Weber 1946: 138)
The relativistic tone in Weber's analysis deeply troubled Parsons as he sought
a mode of social science which could provide legitimacy to modern American
political institutions. The rationalizing, other-worldly orientation of the
Protestant Ethic provided exactly that.
Parsons' appropriation of Weber in this fashion provided an important
part of the foundation the basis for much of the structural-functionalist
systems theory developed by Almond and others. The development of "pattern
variables" as categories for analyzing tradition and modernity, as well as the
analysis of legitimacy and authority, were direct products of Parsons'
application of Weber's analysis of the Protestant Ethic, and the process of
rationalization reflected in modern bureaucracy and economic organization.
The moral preoccupations which guided Parsons' reading of Weber
were not unique. In the wake of World War II the concerns that had long
haunted European social theory transformed the agenda of American social
scientists as well. Having watched Europe be torn apart by ideological conflict,
many North America scholars hoped that social science might provide
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guidance in preserving social coherence and national legitimacy. Parsons'
pursuit of a normatively committed practice which escaped the fact-value
dichotomy was eagerly taken up by those who sought to reconstitute the
practice of political science. Gabriel Almond's reference to himself as a "laborer
in the vineyard of the Lord" provided a nice echo to Parsons' affinity for the
Protestant ethic (1956: 391). These theorists believed their task was not simply
to analyze; more importantly, it was necessary to create and sustain the
legitimacy of American political institutions by providing a rational basis for
allegiance to them.
In the field of comparative politics, the challenge confronting social
science was understood in particularly fundamental terms; with the United
States engaged in a world-wide competition for influence in the "developing
world," comparativists, it was argued, must move beyond the particularism of
earlier research and construct more generalized theories of order and stability.
Previous research was viewed as either too narrowly institutional, or based on
weak generalizations about "national character." Institutional and historical
analysis tended to emphasize differences and make each context appear sui
generis . Parsons' theory and research provided a rich foundation for the more
systematic and generalizable approach to research. The research which these
political and cultural preoccupations informed engendered in turn studies
which carried clear policy recommendations. Framing the problems which
confronted United States foreign policy in the "developing world" in specific
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ways, they sought to offer policy-relevant analyses which also provided
legitimacy for a world view that would ensure stability and order after the
ideological chaos of previous decades.4
Looking at the literature of the period in even a cursory fashion, these
cultural concerns are not difficult to see. Almond and Verba' s The Civic
Culture, or Seymour Martin Lipsefs Political Man can be read as works of
moral and cultural education. The importance of the two-party system,
carefully regulated participation and limits on the capacity of the
"unsocialized" to enter the political arena, and an aversion to "ideological"
politics are recounted in a manner which very clearly reflects and celebrates
the stability and freedom attributed to the American political system, while at
the same time examining its reproducibility in other political contexts.
The central metaphor upon which much of this analysis was built was
the notion of "system. This reflected another fundamental way in which
Parsons departed from Weber. Whereas Weber had raised serious questions
about the viability of system as a scientific category, Parsons entire theoretical
project relied upon the opposite assumption. The most influential early effort
to apply Parson's mode of system theory was put forward by David Easton.
His approach to system was particularly influenced by the natural sciences and
strove to construct a framework which could eventually yield a general theory
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of politics:
The social sciences have been compelled to face up to the problem of
locating stable units of analysis which might possibly play the role in
social science research that the particles of matter do in the physical
sciences. (1965: 13)
The goal of this theory was to find a level of analysis which most accurately
captured the essence of political life. System did this, Easton argued, because it
provided a level of generalization which avoided the pitfalls of traditional
categorizing. Ideology, governmental structure, constitutions, and other
traditional foci of analysis needed to be transformed by a more
all-encompassing reference point. Easton defined politics as "the study of how
authoritative decisions are made and executed for a society." The political
system was characterized by its ability to turn inputs into outputs in a manner
which ensured its preservation and growth. The conception of a self-regulating
system was illustrated with analogies from biology and economics; the system
tended, generally, towards equilibrium, though not stasis. Demands on the
system were constant and required continual processing and adjustment by
those who managed it.
While Easton's work was frequently cited in the literature of this period,
the level of abstraction involved meant that serious adaptions were necessary
in applying it to the political cultural problems presented by the real world.
This is quite evident in the notion of system developed by Almond. The Cold
War animus of his analysis is explicit: "We can no longer view political crisis
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in France with detached curiosity or view countries such as Indochina or
Indonesia as interesting political pathologies." He proceeded by attempting to
develop a classification scheme for the world's political systems. Easton's
system was preferable to a "process" orientation because it implied a "totality
of relevant units," and allowed for a quantitative approach to "patterned
action." Almond put aside serious consideration of specific officials or
institutions or their historical development, and concentrated on political
"roles." This allowed him to study areas such as political culture and
socialization and, he argued, move further inside the real world of political
action within systems than had been possible in traditional studies of the
formal institutions of government. With the help of emerging quantitative
technologies, attitudes and values could be empirically measured and then
analyzed systematically.
The study of political culture sought to find "linkages" which "reduce
the gap between macro and micro analysis." Almond elaborated his idea more
fully in 1960, in collaboration with James Coleman and other comparativists.
The result was the influential study The Politics of the Developing Areas .
Political culture was "the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations
toward politics among the members of a political system. It is the subjective
realm which underlies and gives meaning to political action." This emphasis on
how individuals related to the overall system placed heavy emphasis on the
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matter of political socialization, trust, and competence, relying largely on
survey data to establish the quantitative presence or absence of each attribute.
The ideal type which oriented this approach was what Almond termed
the "civic culture." Using a variety of new survey techniques as well as
approaches adapted from social psychology and anthropology, Almond and
his associates pursued an ambitious agenda. Using this model of democratic
stability, they carried out a series of national studies hoping to isolate the
factors which were or were not conducive to the establishment of their cultural
model. Almond described this civic culture as a sort of hybrid of two opposite
tendencies.
The Civic Culture argued that this rationality-activist model of
democratic citizenship was one component of the civic culture, but not
the sole one. Indeed, by itself this participant-rationalist model of
citizenship could not logically sustain a stable democratic government.
Only when combined in some sense with its opposites of passivity,
trust, and deference to authority and competence was a viable, stable
democracy possible. (1980: 16, italics in original)
While this cultural model was a clear product of Anglo-American
political traditions, the most immediate policy goal of his approach was the
development of a framework for understanding the process of modernization
and the relationship between tradition and modernity in the "developing"
world. It was not necessarily the case that any given nation was one or the
other. By employing the pattern variables developed by Parsons, Almond
could, he believed, begin to generalize the process of development and locate
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different nations along a continuum which moved towards greater levels of
political "secularization" and stability. Almond, and others engaged in similar
research, sought to locate the political actors--"modernizing elites," middle
classes, professional armies-who might most readily become the bearers of
such a cultural project. When this formulation was criticized for its inability to
account for change, Almond attempted to develop the model further in a 1966
collaboration with Powell which emphasized the need for a political system to
expand its capacity for rationalization thorough increased differentiation and
secularization.
Political Culture Critiqued
These efforts at greater dynamism did not save systems based
developmentalis t approaches from extensive criticism. Reinhard Bendix was
the most prominent of those who criticized the overly simplistic
tradition/modernity dichotomy employed in much of this analysis (1967). The
work of historians such as Barrington Moore (1965) and Alexander
Gerschenkron (1962) challenged the validity of the ideal types of Western
European political and economic modernization, pointing instead towards
great diversity in the pattern of state-society relations in Europe. Political
theorists (Wolin 1969; Maclntyre 1971; Charles Taylor 1971) challenged the
impact of behavioralism upon political analysis. Taylor argued that the effort
to separate facts and values in social inquiry obscured the interpretive, and
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inescapably normative, dimension of the social sciences. Other analysts
criticized what they considered a bias towards "elitist" conceptions of
democracy.5 Various neo-Marxist critics argued that too much emphasis had
been placed on cultural requisites, while the power of global economic
structures, the historical development of capitalism, and the impact of
colonialism were ignored or downplayed.6
Other political scientists, most notably Samuel Huntington, criticized the
optimistic assumptions about modernization often present within this
literature. Order and stability were still the concern but the prognosis was now
much darker. A comparison of Karl Deutsch's 1961 article on mobilization with
Huntington's 1965 piece on political decay clearly points up the change in
attitude. Both stress the importance of institution building~in fact, Huntington
rather overstates the extent to which this was missing from Deutsch and
others. What is quite different is the tone. Deutsch's article implies a faith in
the capacity of United States policy to address the issues, mirroring in many
ways the optimism of the early Kennedy Administration Alliance for Progress
and Peace Corps. By 1965 the Johnson Administration was in a much more
pessimistic mood and so was Huntington. Nor was he alone-the tone of
comparative politics in general turned both more cautious in terms of the
promise of systematic theory as well as the cultural possibilities for democracy
and development in the developing world.7
49
Some of these concerns were given especially concrete voice in an
approach to cultural analysis which emerged among an influential group of
Latin Americanists. These scholars, most notably Howard Wiarda, Glen Dealy,
and Richard Morse, argued that the problem with the previous literature was
its ethnocentricity. Latin America, and other non-Western societies possessed
their own cultural traditions that needed to be understood on their own terms.
Modernization theorists had wanted to read the development of democratic
institutions into the expanding political influence of the newly "professional"
military or the middle classes. Great hope was place on the institutions and
sectors which seemed likely to support progressive liberal modernization.
Wiarda argued that these optimistic expectations often left modernization
theorists disillusioned by the persistence of authoritarian regimes and political
projects reflecting the legacy of thomistic, organicist values deeply rooted in
Catholic social theory. Wiarda further suggested that liberal biases led many
North American scholars to subsequently despair of the region's unstable and
even pathological political tendencies (1983: 3-25).
8
Wiarda, Morse, and Dealy argued that rather than projecting our own
cultural expectations into areas with very different histories, social science
ought instead to take these regions on their own cultural and historical terms.
Once this was done, they argued, it was possible to locate attitudes about
citizenship, political leadership, the role of the individual, and the purposes of
the state fundamentally different from those prominent in more "liberal"
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societies. Wiarda criticized modernization theory for often deploying
metaphors of pathology and dysfunction to describe regions and countries
whose political life disappointed the expectations of North American social
scientists.
A different version of this argument about corporatism was made by
other Latin Americanists who were critical of modernization theory. Alfred
Stepan (1978), Phillippe Schmitter (1973), and Guillermo O'Donnell (1978) each
emphasized the importance of corporatistic political structures but criticized
what they viewed as the overly cultural dimension of Wiarda's analysis. From
this perspective, corporatist political projects reflected the policy needs of state
actors, not a more generalized cultural predisposition towards authoritarian
political structures.
While differing in their view of corporatism, a theme which underlay
most of these criticisms of the political culture literature was the failure to
develop more rigorous and thorough analysis of the state as a political actor.
Alfred Stepan argued that this reflected a general liberal tendency to see the
state as secondary, a reflection of plural social interests, and not as an actor in
its own right (1978). Stepan's argument was reinforced by other analysts
(Evans 1979; Skojpol 1979; Nordlinger 1979); this work gradually coalesced into
an extensive literature on the "relative autonomy of the state."
9 Taking
inspiration from Weber and expanding on earlier work by Gerschenkron,
Moore and Huntington, these writers criticized the lack of attention to the state
51
in the work of both liberals and Marxists. Returning to Weber's historical
sociology in order to challenge the appropriation of his methodological
discussions, they emphasized the constitutive power of the state in shaping
political structures, identities, and outcomes. Earlier "society-centered"
approaches represented, they argued, a form of cultural determinism which
was inadequate to explain the power of the state. Theda Skojpol wrote:
"political development" (itself found to be an overly evolutionist
conception) ended up having more to do with concrete international and
domestic struggles over state building than with any inherent logic of
socio-economic "differentiation." (1985: 5)
In this way, the analysts who emphasized the role of the state built upon and
deepened arguments that previous approaches to political culture had been
ahistorical, culturally biased, overly abstract, and reductionistic with regard to
their assumptions and conclusions.
Assessing the Debates
As I have noted, the rather polemical tone which has often surrounded
discussion of political culture has tended to suggest more theoretical
dissonance than has often actually been present. The original literature did
offer a more rigorous frame of reference than the national character studies to
which they were a response. The emphasis on "culture" encouraged more
inter-disciplinary analysis, and moved the focus beyond an over emphasis on
institutional or constitutional structures. At the same time, the pervasive
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influence of a "systems" approach produced a continual tendency towards
analysis that was too ahistorical and abstract, while over reliance on
quantitative studies often generated superficiality in making cross-cultural
comparisons. The concept of culture was often too focused on norms and
values as systems without adequate attention to how change occurs. It would
be an overstatement to say that these issues were never raised; but, in placing
so much emphasis on stability and working with an overly linear conception
of economic development, this approach clearly had problems explaining
events in specific settings. The centrality of the concept of "development"
brought too much baggage from the language of developmental psychology.
Moreover, the language of political dysfunction and pathology so often
employed in the modernization literature did not provide easy access to how
different political cultures were understood from the inside.
The scholars who argued for the existence of a specifically Latin
American political tradition provided an important contribution. They
effectively pointed up the ideological bias which has often distorted North
American social science and obscured the particular features, and strengths, of
Latin American political culture and institutions. The literature provided,
therefore, important caveats against ethnocentrism and the uncritical
application of frames of reference derived from different historical experience.
Critics of this approach often dismiss it as a "culturalist" and reductionistic
effort to construct a particularly Latin American heritage of authoritarianism,
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corporatism, and paternalism which can then explain the persistence of those
characteristics in present day Latin America. In the hands of less
knowledgeable or sophisticated students of the region, research on Latin
America's political tradition has at times been crudely used in such a
fashion. 10 These dangers not withstanding, this research has provided a useful
corrective to the tendency of some dependency analysis to assign overiding
importance to the influence of external economic actors and forces. When the
charge of cultural reductionism is set forth as a blanket generalization for this
approach, it is surely overdrawn. Wiarda argued that the purpose of this
research was not to attribute a single and overiding character to Latin
American political life. The original model inherited from Medieval
Spain—"corporatist, patrimonialist, and organic-statist"-is, he argues, being
transformed by social and economic forces, including economic dependency
which challenge the potential for social harmony (1982). The real question is,
What is the legacy of these principles and what influence do they continue to
have in the way new political problems are considered? If the dependency
analysts were right to argue that capitalism emerged in Latin America under
very different circumstances than it did in Europe, it is surely equally valid to
inquire into the political traditions which shaped the emergence of state
institutions in the region.
The drawback of this approach is that in putting so much emphasis on a
particular tradition of authority and hierarchy, there is not always sufficient
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attention paid to the ongoing significance of outside influences. The
Enlightenment, the American Revolution, Protestantism, the Cold War, and the
decline of the Cold War are all events which have had a significant impact on
the development of Guatemalan, and Latin American, political culture in ways
which we shall explore. While an authoritarian tradition no doubt exists, so do
others. And they have mattered, even when they have lost the political battles,
because they remain in the political imagination as the winners try to govern
the losers. Moreover, the institutions and culture of "modernity"--capitalism,
industrialization, ideological conflict, nationalism and the nation-state,
communications technology-have all left their particular imprint upon Latin
American societies and "tradition." Again, Wiarda and others have
acknowledged these influences and tensions, but more thorough work remains
to be done with regard to the ongoing relationship between the old and the
new.
Some of these limitations are addressed in the work of those scholars
who have sought to "bring the state back in". While Gabriel Almond has
argued that this literature idealizes the state and adds nothing substantive to
work previously done (1988), research on the state provided very important
correctives to the tendency of both liberal and Marxist analysis to subordinate
the state to social or economic forces. Moreover, heightened attention to the
role of the state has not meant that society has been ignored. In fact, many of
these writers offer insightful discussion of political culture in explaining
55
differing degrees of state capacity. Important examples of this include Merilee
Grindle's analysis of the changing development ideologies at work within state
policy in Brazil and Mexico (1986), and Alfred Stepan's work on the Peruvian
and Brazilian militaries (1973).
The concept of political culture did not, therefore, disappear completely
from state-centered analysis. The political culture of the state itself forms a
crucial element of the research agenda put forth by the editors of the
influential collection Bringing the State Back In . And some of the more
theoretically self-conscious of these scholars have avoided the traps that come
from abstract dichotomies like state-society. Peter Evans made this point well:
Debates over relative autonomy and the capacity of the state to
intervene in the process of accumulation are too often carried out in
terms of categorical theoretical pronouncements rather than focusing on
an analysis of historical variation. (1985: 70)
In studying the Guatemalan military's counterinsurgency as a political
project I will assume the "relative autonomy" of the state and try to build on
the literature which has examined state "capacity." State-centered analysis is
useful in the Guatemalan context because it helps us conceptualize the military
as an institution with its own agenda as the dominant actor within the
Guatemalan state. The emphasis on studying what Evans, Rueschemeyer, and
Skojpol term "the formation of social knowledge" requires combining the
research on political traditions with contemporary investigations which
examine how the state makes use of "trans-nationally available economic
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policy knowledge" (1985: 357-360). The ways in which policy elites receive and
apply new economic or social science methods and doctrines, as well as more
general political ideas such as democracy or human rights, is a very significant
element of political culture and will be discussed from a variety of angles in
Guatemala.
At the same time, state-centered research has tended to focus mostly on
the state's role in the formation of political cultures. By taking rich inspiration
from Weber's historical studies and by drawing out the limitations of Parsons'
application of Weberian analysis, this recent research provides important
correctives to the cross-historical systematizing and incautious use of ideal
types often present in the early modernization literature. Almond's charge that
the "statists" possess a "Hegelian" conception of the state is well off the mark,
but questions remain nonetheless about how states perform some of the
accomplishments attributed to them by these scholars. Despite their
well-developed studies of the "capacities" of various states, state-centered
analysts have often left many unanswered questions with regard to how a
state constructs and maintains legitimacy as well as how other cultural forces
confront it on their own terms. If Anderson's notion of nations as "imagined
communities" is valid, then they must be understood as cultural constructions
and research must examine the relationship between the state and the society it
claims to represent. What factors are most important in the success or failure
of a particular state's efforts to construct a particular vision of national
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community? What is the influence of political symbolism on the capacity of the
state? How are we to think about other forms of social knowledge: religious,
ethnic, political (such as experiences of mobilization or repression)--and how
they intersect with the action of the state?
Those "statists" who approach these questions most fully have often
built upon the concept of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci. David
Laitin has used Gramsci's concept to explain how the British were able to
minimize the impact of cultural cleavages in Nigeria and "foster social control
at low cost," by building on cultural resonances between colonial and Yoruba
symbolic orders (in Evans, et al. 1985: 285-316). While this approach to cultural
analysis is a clear improvement over previous functionalist and Marxist
approaches, its weaknesses and limitations have been persuasively critiqued by
James Scott in his work on the "everyday forms of resistance" which he argues
often characterized class relations. Scott argues that the concept of hegemony,
the Gramscian assumption that "...class rule is effected not so much by
sanctions as by the conquest and passive compliance of subordinate classes"
(Scott 1986: 316), usually emphasizes outward behavior-where explicit
compliance with hegemonic ideologies or cultural norms may seem apparent.
In order to more fully appreciate the ways in which class relations are
constructed culturally, Scott argues that it is necessary to observe
...at the level of beliefs and interpretations.. .the rich in Sedaka can
usually insist on conforming public behavior and get it; they can neither
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insist on private ideological conformity, nor do they need it. (1986-
322) 11
A variation on the hegemony argument might suggest that people
comply with dominant ideas because of the capacity of dominant classes to
"naturalize," that is, make the order of things appear inevitable. But while
systems of domination can often "define what is realistic and what is not"
(Scott 1986: 322), certainly an important instrumental goal of the state,
achieving legitimacy is a far more difficult matter. 12 Scotfs work
demonstrates the need to understand the relation between state and society in
more dynamic and interactive terms. While his argument can in turn be
criticized somewhat for its lack of attention to the way in which state policy
influences the choices made by peasants, it nonetheless provides valuable
lessons in how to study the political culture of daily life and practices.
Scott's approach also helps examine the Weberian questions of meaning,
identity, and political action brought out earlier. Analysts of the state who
invoke Weber too often focus only on the state's role in the formation of "social
knowledge", without giving adequate attention to the fundamental cultural
problem of meaning which underlies all political conflicts. Without adequate
attention to the politics of meaning as such, and not simply the politics of the
state, these studies become divorced from the world of political actors and
their aspirations. For if Weber helps us understand more profoundly the
constitutive powers of the modern state, he also provides powerful ways to
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analyze the relationship between structures of political order and the formation
of political identities.
The tendency of some state-centered analysis to define itself too
polemically points up the danger I discussed in Chapter 1 with regard to the
codification of distinct "approaches". It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that
two of the most insightful works on the relationship between state and society
predate the development of a full blown "statist" approach. I refer to the
seminal works of Alfred Stepan (1978) and Guillermo O'Donnell (1978). The
issues of state power and political identity are examined brilliantly in
O'Donnell's work on bureaucratic-authoritarianism. The political and economic
disruption engendered in part by three decades of populist political projects
created a situation which the militaries of several countries believed could no
longer be controlled by civilian politicians. While some dependency
approaches argued that economic considerations-inflation, structural
bottlenecks in the process of industrialization, the needs of foreign
capital-dictated the need for exclusion of popular groups, state centered
analysts rightly called attention to the political considerations which inspired
authoritarian projects. But when we attempt to understand the lack of public
support which eventually undermined these policies, the problem is more
complex than an emphasis institutional power might suggest.
O'Donnell has argued that the problem was legitimacy. Leaving aside
the economic aspects of his argument, which have been effectively critiqued,
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his work reflects a fundamental grasp of the essential cultural dilemma facing
the state--and the fundamentally political nature of that dilemma. The
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the 1970s often extended the corporatist
metaphors to the limit. In order to remove the cancer that was growing within
the hearts and minds of the some of the population, radical surgery upon the
body-politics was required:
They ["subversives"] are the enemy of the nation, the "not-we" of the
new nation that is to be constructed by the institutions of bureaucratic
authoritarianism. (1978: 296)
Thus, the definition of who "we" is in these regimes has been contracted. At
the same time, a claim of nationalism is being asserted; the interests of the
nation have been linked to the maintenance of the regime. Yet in seeking a
solution founded on exclusion, critical sources of legitimacy are lost.
Citizenship and a sense of popular will have been replaced by an imposed
definition, based on images of sickness and recovery, but the "consensual
mediations" which could provide legitimacy are lost.
Bureaucratic-authoritarianism cannot help but abandon the usual
referrents of legitimation and present itself as the basis of its own
power. It thus abandons the mediations which partially, yet effectively,
transform the private life of civil society into the shared existence of
collective identities through which social actors recognize themselves as
members of the nation, as citizens, eventually as part of the "pueblo",
and included in a state to which they normally grant the right to rule
and coerce. (296)
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O'Donnell's analysis illuminates both the strengths and weaknesses of
the arguments about political culture put forward by Wiarda and others. "B-A"
military regimes clearly share the corporatist ambitions as well as anxieties
about order and conflict that have long preoccupied civilian and military
leaders in the region. Yet at the same time, the military leaders of these
exclusionary regimes were forced to deal partly in the symbols and discourse
of democracy because the authoritarian tradition could not provide adequate
resources to marshall and sustain continued support for such highly
exclusionary projects. The complexity of authoritarianism, corporatism,
democracy, and populism as symbols and as political realities is apparent.
O'Donnell's work is among the best at giving important weight to the state as
an actor while not losing sight of the cultural setting and the fragility it
imparts to a regime's pursuit of legitimacy.13 He provides an especially rich
approach within which to ask questions about state power, legitimacy, and
culture. O'Donnell also provides an effective position from which to analyze
the "transitions to democracy" literature.
Stepan's 1978 work The State and Society remains one of the most
theoretically and empirically substantive analysis of the subject. Stepan shared
large parts of the critique of liberal and Marxist approaches set forth by
Wiarda and others. But he then proceeded to a rigorous analysis of why
corporatist projects emerge. While acknowledging their cultural precedence,
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Stepan puts more emphasis on corporatist projects as "an elite response to
crisis." He argued that political elites
...have found state-directed, nonconflictual corporatist modes of
participation a useful political devise for their crisis response projects of
guided development. All these elites have significant sectors that, for
programmatic reasons rather than for traditional cultural reasons, want
to use the power of the state to reconstruct civil society along new lines
(1978: 56)
These crises are usually characterized by increased political
fragmentation and the emergence of new political actors and identities which
are struggling for representation amidst the decline of older bases of legitimacy
and/or political order. The relevance of this approach will be apparent when
we consider more fully the Guatemalan military's understanding of its political
project and the preoccupations which motivate it.
The most important feature which distinguishes Stepan and O'Donnell's
work from some of the more recent state-centered analysis is their continual
awareness of the dynamic and dialectical relationship between state and
society. In the process they avoid getting trapped in the culture /structure
dichotomy. Valuable approaches to political culture can also be gleaned from
recent work on religion and politics as well as the emergence of new social
movements.14 This research points up that while "bringing the state back in"
has been a very important development, it should not replace but instead
sharpen our interest in and capacity for cultural analysis.
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The same can be said of dependency analysis. As that approach became
increasingly reductionistic, overgeneralized, and open to simplistic caricature
by its opponents, its original insights were reclaimed by applying them to the
study of specific contexts of dependency. Dependency analysis helped explain
why models of economic and political development based on the experience of
Western Europe often had little application to Latin America. But when framed
as an account of the entire global capitalist economy, there wasn't any basis,
other than the imperatives of the global system, to account for the diversity of
outcomes in particular settings. More nuanced research on internal class
relations, state policy, competing social forces, and cross-national factors has
gradually put dependency in perspective: as a condition which needs itself to
be examined rather than an overarching theory. While the earlier formulations
of dependency theory have come in for extensive criticism, the fundamental
reality of dependency and weakness within the global capitalist system
continues to be a given in most research on Latin America. Efforts to prove
dependency either right or wrong are thus somewhat akin to trying to prove
or disprove Weber's analysis of the Protestant ethic as a theory of capitalist
development. Both are much more fruitfully considered in the way Weber
intended his work: as an ideal type to which specific cases could be compared.
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Recent Political Culture Analysis: Renaissance or Retread?
There has been a resurgence of theoretical interest in the topic of
political culture in recent years as reflected in work by Lucien Pye, Ronald
Inglehart, Harry Eckstein, Samuel Huntington, and Aaron Wildavsky. Some of
this work is largely an 1980s retread of the earlier literature and subject to
similar critiques. Eckstein (1988) attempts to revive a modified version of
systems theory, while Inglehart (1988; 1990) offers the kind of overly general
cross-national comparisons, based largely on polling and survey data, which
weakened earlier research on political culture. This is especially true in his
discussion of polling data which measured the level of optimistic and
pessimistic feelings present in a series of European countries. As the data
shows that individual countries manifest consistently similar levels of feeling
over time—the British tending towards optimism, for example, while Italians
incline towards pessimism-Inglehart argues tl t we can empirically validate
the claim implicit in political culture analysis that "cultural differences are
relatively enduring." He then goes on to pursue the links between cultural
orientations and economic achievement and to draw out the implications for
democratic institutions. Put forth in this fashion, Ingleharf s analysis effectively
challenges some forms of rational-choice theory, but it still shares many of the
problems in the civic culture literature of the past. In limiting himself to what
can be established quantitatively, that it is valid to speak of salient attributes
and attitudes which endure over time within specific cultures, his conclusions
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about specific cultures are much too vague and superficial. Perhaps optimism
and pessimism have particular cultural meanings which need to be located and
unpacked. How are they understood culturally? What are their historical
reference points? What forms of political identity do they inspire? How might
they be open to change? Inglehart's analysis contributes little towards
providing any but the most broad answers to such questions.
Among Latin Americanists, an emphasis on discussing political culture
through principally quantitative means has generated similar problems. This is
evident in Mitchell Seligson and John Booth's study of Mexican political
culture (1984), and Susan Tiano's similar study of Argentina and Chile (1986).
In seeking to refute overly simple characterizations of an "authoritarian"
political culture these scholars uncover ample evidence of other more
democratic orientations. This research effectively questions links between
political culture and political structure that are assumed in the "civic culture"
literature. More recent work by Seligson and Booth on Costa Rica and
Nicaragua has extended this further and provides effective empirical challenge
to the attempt by Inglehart and others to blame poverty and Catholicism for
an undemocratic political culture. But Booth and Seligson's conclusions remain
somewhat superficial because they simply replace one cultural label with
another rather than leading the theoretical discussion of political culture
towards more sophisticated conceptualization. The point may not be to decide
whether Latin America is democratic or authoritarian so much as draw out the
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various meanings within each political tradition.The essays in both volumes of
Seligson and Booth's Political Participation in Latin America tend towards a
similarly well-intentioned error: in trying to refute studies which emphasized
the "irrational" political responses of the poor, the authors replace it with a
form of rational choice theory without providing adequate cultural grounding
to understand how conceptions of rationality are themselves culturally
constructed. 15
These are hard issues to address and impossible to answer definitively,
but a helpful start is provided by a recent work by Aaron Wildavsky, Richard
Ellis, and Michael Thompson (1990). Their approach is quite different from
Inglehart; they express sharp criticisms of the civic culture literature and the
structural-functionalism upon which it was founded. They also make several
important theoretical points regarding the multiplicity of cultures within
particular settings, and the sterility of culture/structure dichotomies. But their
subsequent effort to locate and describe five distinct cultures or "ways of life:
fatalism, hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, autonomy is much too
abstract, and their analysis of the cultural construction of risk, in the context of
responses to contemporary issues such as nuclear power, AIDS, and
environmental problems, leans too heavily on psychological explanations
without providing any way to account for the influence of historical
experience. 16
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The recent work of Lucien Pye is also more nuanced and careful in its
approach to cultural analysis. The opening chapter of his 1988 book on China,
The Mandarin and the Cadre, reflects a sophisticated understanding of some of
the methodological issues involved. In focusing solely on China, he avoids
some of the extreme generalizing about a unified "Asian culture" in another
recent work, Asian Power and Politics . He is quite right to argue that "the
intangibles of politics cannot be ignored" and is acutely aware of the
limitations of cross-national surveys. He also warns us helpfully of the danger
of working with an either/or, rationalism vs irrationalism dichotomy. But Pye
still defines culture too narrowly and in a manner which leans too heavily on
psychological explanations. The culture he posits seems to exist prior to the
state or concrete political experience: culture seems continually to structure
experience without it being at all clear how experience, especially encounters
with the outside world, influences culture. In this manner he repeats the
tendency reflected in earlier work, dismissing the impact of colonialism and
foreign domination on the political culture of various lands while attributing
the prominence of those factors in the political rhetoric of Asian leaders to
psychological pathologies. At these points, the adoption of a language
borrowed from the realm of abnormal psychology reflects a crippling level of
cultural bias.
The limits of much of this cultural analysis, as well as the theoretical
stakes which are involved, are clearly highlighted in a 1988 debate in the
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American Political Science Review between David Laitin and Aaron
Wildavsky. Wildavsky argues that the goal of cultural theory is to predict
behavior: "people's position in regard to their cultural context.. .can be used to
make falsifiable predictions about many matters of interest" (596). He is critical
of interest-based explanations which leave aside cultural factors which shape
how conceptions of interest are constructed. Laitin agrees in part with
Wildavsky' s analysis, but is critical of the narrowness and lack of ethnographic
rigor in Wildavsky's categories. He then goes on to argue that the question of
interest is placed so far out of the picture that Wildavsky cannot account for
diverse choices made among people of the same culture. While Wildavsky's
rejoinder argues that Laitin assumes a disembodied pre-existence of interests
existing apart from cultural interaction, Laitin never suggests interests are not
culturally informed. He does reject Wildavsky's effort to establish generalized
categories which can then be used to explain the behavior of particular groups
who fit within that category in different settings.
The debate between Wildavsky and Laitin illustrates one of the central
theoretical issues which has continued to divide analysts of culture.
Wildavsky's categories offer cultural explanations for political outcomes and
preferences and attempts to predict future behavior, while building
value-based cultural categories which cut across specific geographic or historic
settings. These intentions explain his deep antipathy towards what he terms
Laitin's "nominalism" in discussing Yorubaland. Laitin attempts to analyze
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culture as it is "constituted and reconstituted;" he argues that "good research in
political culture should illustrate how debates get formed in other cultural
arenas" (1988: 590-593).
I intend the approach to cultural analysis which I am elaborating in this
work as a contribution towards the research agenda set forth by Laitin. I have
argued that while analysis which emphasizes structural features-most notably
the state and the international economy-is essential to good cultural analysis,
it is also necessary to understand culture more fully as a human practice. The
challenge confronting contemporary analysis is to develop approaches to the
study of political culture capable of making sense of political dialogue and
debate. Cultural analysis should be less concerned with either explaining
culture by reference to other factors, or with using culture to explain political
structures. Instead, we must go much further in asking, What are political
cultures? How are they constituted? Where are their boundaries? and, How do
they shift over time in response to the contingencies of the actual political
world?" It is not a matter of abandoning other approaches; we must instead
deepen their process of questioning.
Another Approach to Political Culture
Having surveyed the contributions of the previous literature, how ought
we to proceed in rethinking the concept of political culture? The initial
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formulation will be rather general and take much of its inspiration from two
sources: recent discussions in anthropology about culture, ethnography, and
interpretation, and interpretive political theory more generally as it has
developed over the last couple of decades. But the resonances with the themes
explored in Weber's work will be apparent. This formulation will offer a fuller
answer to the question with which I began-what is political culture?
Culture as Practice
A culture is not simply a set of attributes, values, attitudes, rules or
orientations which structure a world view embodied in ritual and institutions;
knowing those things is a start, but what is more important is the ongoing
processes and practice in which cultures continually reconstruct their sense of
meaning as individuals and as communities. More than simply one side of a
dialectic between state and society, base and superstructure, structure and
culture or any of the other standard dichotomies, political culture is the site of
conflicts over identity and meaning; it is the point where structure and
meaning collide. It is the setting in which a whole series of questions the past
has left to the present are interpreted and acted upon.
This is not a matter of ideas being autonomous or determinant in some
fashion. As structures of meaning, cultures are continually moving and in flux
as they adjust to the impact of events. Both the products of human action and
the condition of the natural world must continually confront the limits of a
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material world which, in Foucault's beautifully pungent words "is not the
accomplice of our knowledge" (1971). How this gap between intention and
consequence is understood is itself an important element of study within
political culture. Marshall Sahlins put the matter nicely:
In action, people put their concepts and categories into ostensive
relation with the world. Such referential uses bring into play other
determinations of the signs, besides their received sense, namely the
actual world and the people concerned....Having its own properties, the
world may then prove intractable. It can well defy the concepts that are
indexed to it. Man's symbolic hubris becomes a great gamble played
with the empirical realities. (1985: 149)
Daniel Levine's excellent work on religion stresses the dynamic quality
of the relationship between religious reflection, experience, and institutional
structure; by working within the categories of the actors rather than abstract,
generalized categories, Levine analyzes the ongoing relationship between
cultural meaning and political/structural change. When Levine refers to
religion as an "existential" art, the same might be said of culture in general.
Cultures cannot be conceived in abstraction from the world they seek to
explain. They are a response to problems, ever changing, posed by structural,
international, historical, or institutional factors; they represent the ground upon
which political meanings and identities are constructed and renegotiated.
When discussions of political culture become cultural explanations for
political structures, they become abstract and reductionistic. But analyses
which stress the structural forces which constrain actors, or try to interpret a
basis for behavior according to categories foreign to the cultural logic, leave
72
aside an important aspect of the human condition: the need to construct
meaning, not simply achieve instrumental goals. Cultural analysis cannot
replace approaches which examine institutional or external factors; but it can
deepen our understanding of their human significance as part of the world
cultures must struggle to interpret. 17
Culture and Contestation
Cultures are not unified, internally coherent structures with regard to
the meanings that practice creates; while traditions may be held in common to
some extent because of historically common experience and geographic
proximity, the precise cultural meaning of these traditions is the ground for
political debate and discussion. The goal of study is not "what a people think,"
if this is construed as a monolithic set of ideas. The better questions are: How
does a community think together?; Where are the agreements and where are
the conflicts? or, when conflicts is less overt conflict, Where are the points of
divergence? Cultural analysis can reveal historical patterns within particular
traditions, as well as reveal the departures and transformations which emerge
in response to structural change. Sahlins argues that
In their practical projects and social arrangements, informed by the
received meanings of persons and things, people submit these cultural
categories to empirical risks. To the extent that the symbolic is thus
pragmatic, the system is a synthesis in time of reproduction and
variation....acting from different perspectives, and with different social
powers of objectifying their respective interpretations, people come to
different conclusions and societies work out different consensuses
(1985: ix-x)
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If cultures are often not unified, then it is necessary to look at the way
meanings are constructed differently within the same culture-as sources of
authority or resistance, for example. This places importance on language as a
vehicle of meaning and one of the sites where battles over meaning take place.
How terms such as ethnicity, democracy, violence, religion, or politics are
deployed is important. In any given setting the question "what is political
culture?" must be continually re-asked. This points up the importance of James
Scott's critique of hegemony and his insistence that the study of class relations
must look at the everyday struggles which emerge over the meaning of
cultural symbols and practices:
The key symbols animating class relations in Sedaka—generosity,
stinginess, arrogance, humility, help, assistance, wealth, and poverty-do
not constitute a set of given rules or principles that actors simply follow.
They are instead the normative raw material that is created, maintained,
changed, and above all manipulated by daily human activity... .the
objective of a social analysis of class relations is not somehow to tease
out a consensus of agreed upon rules but rather to understand how
divergent constructions of those rules and their application are related
to class interests. (1986: 308-309)
Scott's argument about class relations applies to the study of any social
category-including ethnicity-which is the site of conflicts over power and
cultural meaning.
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Cultural analysis must be sensitive, therefore, to the ways categories and
experience blend and shape cultural and political identities in ways which are
not predetermined. 18 What is true for the community is also true for
individuals, as multiple forms of identity can make claims on thought and
action. While true in any society, this is especially important in Guatemala,
given the complex mix of political, ethnic, and religious traditions. 19 Many
approaches to political culture are too ahistorical and abstract in focusing on
roles or attitudes while neglecting the setting and manner in which they are
constructed.20 Historical patterns do exist; this will be apparent in the
historical discussion in chapter 4. But careful study often reveals that the
specific content of those patterns is continually being reconstructed. How are
political and cultural identities constituted? What combinations of material,
institutional, and cultural factors are at work, and what is their relative
weight? How do multiple sources of identity—based in religion, class, ethnicity,
political and social consciousness, gender, education, patterns of consumption,
or conceptions of political citizenship-interrelate? These are some of the
question which cultural analysis must try to answer. The answers to these
questions will never be definitive, but can help us continue to ask the right
questions of the future.
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Culture, History, and Contingency
A third assumption concerns history: a culture is located within a
specific history which in turn asks certain questions of the present. New ways
of seeing, based in part in new historical experience, never leave the past
behind, but they do change, to varying degrees, the lens through which the
past is viewed and thus adding to the myriad of previous filters through
which we interpret reality. This means using the categories "tradition" and
"modernity" with great care. They are only ideal types; where a specific culture
actually resides is probably somewhere in between. Even when new forms of
social and political identity are set forth they are never wholly new. We shall
see this complex interplay at work time and again in Guatemala, particularly
with regard to religion and ethnicity. Maya culture has been transformed by
outside influences and yet never lost a location within its history—any more
than has the United States. Marshall Sahlins has stated this well: "The more
things stay the same the more they change".
If we are to understand the future possibilities we must understand
how interpretations of history also shape cultural notions of the possible.
Susan Bourque and Kay Warren's analysis of the cultural construction of
democracy and terror in Peru points up brilliantly how possibilities for the
future never exist in the abstract, but are carried in the minds of individuals
and communities and the interpretations they develop of their situation (1988).
Looking beyond simply how the media manufactures images, they examine
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the psychological world, and its historical-structural context, from which
collective conceptions of politics emerge in contemporary Peru. It is an
exemplary study of the tense relationship between the inner and outer worlds
of politics, and helps ask the Weberian questions: What challenge does the
present offer? What questions does it seem to ask, and what are the structural
and cultural elements which shape the framing of the problem and form the
political culture within which conflicts over meaning, identity, and power are
fought out? 21
Taking a culture "on its own terms" may, therefore, need to be given a
much more literal application than has often been the case. It has long been
unfashionable to refer to "national character" studies, and I do not wish to
rehabilitate the works themselves. But the concept might be open to new
resonances in tune with the Weberian frame of reference I discussed earlier.
Viewed in this way, national character might reflect not enduring traits, but
the locus of an ongoing struggle which the past has shaped but not
predetermined and which the present must confront.
Culture and Rationality
If cultures are oriented around issues of meaning and identity,
economistic assumptions about rationality must be deployed very carefully.
Weber is especially useful in keeping the focus on meaning in a world in
which millions of daily decisions are made with various forms of cost-benefit
77
analysis. When we consider, in the following chapter for example, the survival
strategies deployed by the Maya in the face of external domination, it is
certainly possible to argue that a notion of prudence is at work. But these
choices are still located within a cultural frame of reference and priorities we
must untangle if we are to recover "fundamental choices." Otherwise all we
know is what happened without knowing why. If we then ask why without
taking the cultural context of the Maya seriously, we are likely to attribute
specific actions to self interest without knowing what it means to say that.
Why, for example, have millions of Guatemalans converted to Protestantism?
Is it that they will make more money? Be safe from the army? Or, maybe
Guatemalan reality has created an even stronger need to order one's life in a
disciplined manner and seek some sign of chosenness. What is considered
rational is always culturally constructed; it doesn't exist a priori .22
Culture and Otherness
Cultures are by their nature framed partly in relation to something
outside themselves. Hence an understanding of the trans-cultural influences
upon specific cultural identities must be taken into account. When it is argued,
for example, that the Maya have managed to retain some control over the
direction of cultural change and in so doing preserve a cultural basis for
resistance to external domination, this does not mean the Guatemalan state has
not partly succeeded in its effort to subordinate the Maya. Nor can we deny
78
the enormous impact upon Guatemala of the expansion of a global capitalist
system. It is for this reason that we must employ the category "tradition" with
such caution. Studying the changing historical forms of ethnic identity and
relations is the way we examine this process. Cultural boundaries provide a
rough set of parameters-with shifting borders-within and across which
change occurs and external worlds are imagined, understood, and often
resisted. Interpreting cultural responses necessitates understanding the shifting
internal and external environments within which they are formed.
Taking a culture "on its own terms" must therefore be done with
attention to what is pointed to outside that culture's apparent
boundaries—sometimes cryptically, sometimes explicitly, sometimes from
choice, sometimes from necessity. In Guatemala we shall see frequent
examples which illustrate how practices do not simply reflect a closed value
system but also mediate and provide an account of inter-ethnic social relations.
There are also many ways in which American and global political culture has
shaped the structure and terms of Guatemalan political culture. This does not
argue for either convergence or dependency, but points instead to the complex
blend of internal and external forces influencing each other within any given
political culture.
Clifford Geertz has referred to this cross cultural dimension as the
"moral imagination": the dialogue, sometimes explicit, sometimes not, which
takes place between different cultural traditions at work in the same place. His
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examination of a 19th century account of Balinese culture and ritual written by
a Danish observer draws out the dialogic element of this process, the way an
"other" is constructed from the projection of cultural fears and anxieties, which
in turn reinforce particular cultural notions of civilization, order, and morality.
Geertz suggests that culture is a process helpfully understood as a story about
the world, a way of rendering experience, making sense of contrast, and
reflecting, consciously or not, the presence of another. This practice has
obvious instrumental goals, but should also be seen, in Weberian terms, to
reveal fundamental ethical orientations which shape individual and group
identity. Thinking about this process in the context of Guatemala also reminds
us that conflicts over cultural meaning are usually about power and often
shaped by political violence. Michael Taussig's work on political terror has
clearly demonstrated how the application of violence and terror are not simply
instrumental practices. Torture, disappearances, and other forms of political
violence reveal Geertz' "moral imagination" at work implementing deeply
embedded cultural assumptions about necessity and order while attempting to
impose cultural identities on the victims of violence as a way of justifying its
23
use.
Culture and Social Science
If cultures are fragmented, porous, and continually beset by
contingency, then we must be sensitive to the role of social science and writing
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practices in the representation of what is described. If we wish to think about
political culture in Guatemala, or anywhere else, it is important, finally, to
recognize the force of our own constructions of other cultures, both in the past
and present, and subject them, and the problematics they pose to greater
scrutiny. Max Weber confronted this interpretive tension squarely in his
discussion of ideal types. Weber argued that constructing an interpretation free
of the presence of the analyst was impossible. Specific analytic "interests"
would inevitably shape and guide the process by which questions were asked.
In that sense, no culture we might describe exists solely on its own terms. In
Weber's words:
Order is brought into the chaos only on the condition that in every case
only a part of concrete reality is interesting and significant to us because
only it is related to the cultural values with which we approach reality.
(1949: 78)
This interpretive dilemma is inevitable, but a reflective awareness of what is
revealed and concealed by particular analytic choices and practices is also
necessary. This will be especially evident in Chapter 3 when we examine the
theoretical issues raised by the study of ethnicity in Guatemala. The ways in
which indigenous communities have been studied and understood has
changed over the past several decades. These changes have only partly to do
with the quantity and/ or quality of facts known; they are also the product of
new ways of thinking and asking question about culture, ethnicity, and
identity which have become prominent over that period. When the terms and
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methods are changed, the reality shifts somewhat because it is partly mediated
by language.24 We may try as much as possible to work within the
self-understandings of those being studied, but the questions we bring help
shape the way we construct those self-understandings in important ways.25
One of the dangers in the use of ideal types was well explained by
Barrington Moore in his classic work The Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy . While framed as a critique of behavioralism, his observation that
arguments that posit cultural continuity always carry with them an assumption
of social inertia can be carried over to many other forms of argument.
Culture, or tradition—to use a less technical term-is not something that
exists outside of or independently of individual human beings living
together in society. Cultural values do not descend from heaven to
influence the course of history. They are abstractions from an observer,
based on the observation of certain similarities in the way groups of
people behave either in different situations over time, or both. (1965:
486)
What still remains, though it is obscured by these analytic practices, are
the myriad ways these "cultural systems" are endlessly challenged and
reinvented in daily life. This points to the problem previously noted in Lucien
Pye's discussion of political culture. A set of psychological dispositions can be
a useful starting point, but we must still look at the complex world of practice
through which the concrete meanings and boundaries of our analytic
categories are continually revealed. In Moore's words once again:
We cannot do without some conception of how people perceive the
world and what they do or do not do about what they see. To detach
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this conception from the way people reach it, to take it out of its
historical context and raise it to the status of an independent causal
factor in its own right means that the supposedly impartial investigation
succumbs to the justifications that ruling groups generally offer for their
most brutal conduct. (1965: 486-7)
Conceptual precision must be conceived carefully, for in many political
conflicts the meaning of words, and histories, as well as questions regarding
whose words will count for what, are on the line.26 This is quite evident, for
example, in any discussion of religion; what is partly at stake is the meaning of
words like religion, science, the popular, and church. The theologian can
perhaps take strict views of these matters~but the social scientist, as Weber so
clearly realized, must try to understand the diversity of meanings at work and
the world views they set in motion in the political world. The art is in giving
each its proper weight rather than forcing arbitrary closure. When we seek to
find new terms and meanings to better explain social structures, we must also
bring forth analysis which reflects the points of grey.
The Primacy of Interpretation
In Chapter 1, 1 noted that academic debates continually generate new
labels, and one of the most popular current catch-all containers is
"post-modern." My understanding of modernity will receive greater attention
in Chapter 3 and then again in Chapter 8. But the principle reason I began
with Weber was because his work illustrates so well the ways in which
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contemporary debates over epistemology, positivism, and interpretation are
not new. It is for that reason also that the term "post-modern" seems to me too
limited; deep conflicts have long existed within the heart of modernism itself.
Parson's interpretation of Weber was one attempt to resolve the matter, but we
have seen why that effort proved unsatisfactory for many. Weber's analysis of
the interpretive tensions and ambiguity in the social sciences has also been
mirrored in the "interpretive turn" which has emerged in recent years in
literary theory, anthropology, history and political philosophy.27 A generation
of debates about epistemology have inspired greater reflective awareness about
the relationship between our forms of knowledge and forms of life. William
Connolly, Charles Taylor and other political theorists have rightly stressed the
expressive capacity of language not simply to convey reality but to set forth a
fundamental human capacity to interpret. Their work has challenged the form
in which truth claims are put forward by the quantitative social sciences while
undermining the pursuit of modes of social analysis based on an objective
account of the systems, structures, or rules underlying social orders. Behind
claims of detachment and neutral observation, deeply political cultural
commitments have been located.
Clifford Geertz' "ethnography of thought" moves in a similar direction
and reflects an extremely ambitious attempt to reconstitute social science
around a focus on the problem of meaning as a cultural artifact. The task of
the ethnographer-whatever her particular discipline-is to "render obscure
matters intelligible by providing them with an informing content....that is, by
describing the world in which it makes whatever sense it makes." Geertz has
demonstrated how symbols don't simply designate, they play an active role in
constituting the political world. This has often been hard to accept for those
oriented towards finding the logic of human institutions:
Like bees who fly despite theories of aerodynamics which deny them
the right to do so, probably the overwhelming majority of mankind are
continually drawing normative conclusions from factual premises, (and
factual conclusions from normative premises for the relation between
ethics and world view is circular) despite refined, and in their own
terms impeccable, reflections by professional philosophers on the
naturalistic fallacy. (1973: 141)
Geertz' observation points up why the language of pathology and dysfunction
which pervaded modernization theory so often led to flawed analysis.
The work of other contemporary thinkers has promoted more historical
and cultural self-consciousness. Thomas Kuhn demonstrated how scientific
paradigms change and in the process transform our conceptions of rationality
by altering the categories with which we constitute reality for ourselves (1962).
The work of Michel Foucault has revealed even sharper tensions between our
forms of social theory and social and political institutions. In his "histories of
the present," Foucault has convincingly shown the influence of contingency
and conflicting claims within what have appeared to many analysts as the
products of a cumulative process of calibration and refinement in our
institutions and knowledge. In analyzing the complex relationships that link
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forms of knowledge and structures of power, he has given rich and concrete
accounts of the constitution of modern forms of identity. His genealogies of the
modern subject expose the gap between our self-understandings and the
practices constituted by our institutions and their discourse. In that way,
Foucault asks and tries to answer the questions about cultural meaning,
identity, and fate which interested Weber.
It must be quickly added that even among the writers just mentioned,
enormous differences of style, interest, and method remain. By reconsidering
Weber, I have tried to show that questions about political identity and the
construction of cultural significance are not new, that they have a long
tradition within political inquiry though it has been cUminished by the
emphasis on quantitative methods and overly rigid conceptual precision.
Studying political culture in this way allows us a view—however imprecise at
times—of aspects of the political world that would be unavailable if our tools
were only quantitative. But this is not an either/or proposition, and
interpretation is not the opposite of empiricism. We are forced to confront
continually the aspect of studying culture which Weber described so well:
The course of unforseeable events is transformed endlessly, stretching to
eternity. The cultural problems that move men are constantly posed
anew and from other aspects...The principles of the cultural sciences will
keep changing in a future without limits as long as the sclerosis of life
and spirit do not dis-accustom humanity to an inexhaustible life. (1949:
84)
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One of the most sensitive readers of Weber, Maurice Merleau-Ponty put the
matter more succinctly still—"the curse of politics is precisely that it must turn
values into the order of facts" (1947: xxxv). That is the problem that informed
Weber's work and it is the central political dilemma which the study of
political culture must try to interpret. Writing in a setting in which he has no
doubt learned from harsh experience, Chilean political scientist Norbert
Lechner offers a similar conclusion and points us toward the task at hand:
The political struggle is forever also a struggle to define the
predominant conception of what politics is understood to be. What does
it mean to act politically (hacer politica)? What is the field of politics?
These questions bring us to the political culture. (1988: 113) 28
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Notes
1. The literature on Weber is vast and continually expanding. An excellent
sample of current perspectives on Weber can be found in Sam Whimster and
Scott Lash (1987). Wilhelm Hennis (1988) considers the significance of Weber's
past canonization as a "founding father of sociology," and offers a provocative
reassessment which locates him within the tradition of political philosophy and
history. Weber's understanding of the cultural problem of modernity is discussed
by Lawrence Scaff (1989), while Sheldon Wolin (1981) considers Weber's view of
modern social science.
2. The influence of Nietzsche on Weber's understanding of his project has been
explored in recent years by political theorists; see Sheldon Wolin (1981), Lawrence
Scaff (1989), Mark Warren (1988), Wilhelm Hennis (1988), and Robert Eden (1983).
An earlier exploration of this aspect of Weber was made by Leo Strauss (1953).
The implications of this Nietzschean influence have not been considered
adequately by those attempting to apply Weber to comparative political analysis.
3. A persuasive interpretation of the uses of Weber which developed under the
influence of Talcott Parsons is put forward by William Buxton, (1985). His
analysis is especially strong at elaborating the cultural problematic (in the
Weberian sense I am describing here) which shaped and motivated Parsons'
construction of social theory, as well as the application of that approach by
Gabriel Almond and Seymour Martin Lipset.
4. A thorough elaboration of the foreign policy perspectives of these writers is
presented by Buxton (1985).
5. Taylor's argument clearly echoes Weber, and will be taken up in more depth
later in this chapter as well as in chapter 8. The critique of democratic elitism was
set forth by Lukes, Bachrach, and Jack Walker.
6. The literature on this subject is vast. Baran (1957) undertook the first major
effort to revive Marxist-Leninist categories on this subject. Frank (1967) provided
the most influential early statement of dependency, to which Amin (1974) and
Wallerstein (1974) provided expanded versions. Wallerstein's conceptualization
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of a "world-system" approach has been especially controversial among other
Marxists and was criticized by Robert Brenner (1976). Ernesto Laclau (1971)
initiated the "modes of production" debate in challenging Frank's construction of
capitalism. Frank's notion was further challenged in the concept of "dependent
development" by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1979). This
concept informed Peter Evans' case study of Brazil (1979). All of these authors
took issue in one way or another with Frank and Wallerstein's lack of regard to
the dynamics of internal class relations in specific countries. Cardoso's approach
is applied to analyze the political economy of industrialization in Guatemala by
Paul Dosal (1988). An excellent roadmap for these debates is provided by Martin
Carnoy (1984).
7. Almond's discussion in the final section of A Developmental Approach carries
this tone. The situation of the developing countries, he conceded, did not look
good. They didn't have the ability to do what the Europeans and Americans had.
It wasn't really surprising that Marxism looked attractive. Was there a way that
democracy and economic development could be theorized together into a
coherent strategy? This challenge renewed Parsons' quest for a normative model
which could be objectively legitimated rather than having to resort to ideology.
When Almond later criticized dependency approaches, their greatest sin from his
perspective was their "ideological" character.
8. The most influential of these critiques can be found in the edited collection by
Howard Wiarda (1982). See especially the essays by Wiarda, Richard Morse, and
Glen Dealy. It is the latter who argues that neither the Enlightenment or Lockean
political ideas had any significant effect in the region, an argument that is given
further consideration in chapter 4.
9. This literature is much to vast to attempt even a brief list of citations. The
theory and practice of state-centered analysis, as well as an extensive bibliography
are well represented in Evans, Skojpol and Rueschemeyer (1985).
10. Recent examples of the kind of sloppy analysis which can emerge include
works by Lawrence Harrison (1985), Michael Novak (1982), and Jeane Kirkpatrick
(1979). Each grew out of the Central American policy wars of the late 1970s and
1980s as efforts to blame poverty and oppression on Catholic political traditions
while minimizing the impact of United States policy and the expansion of
capitalism in the region. Harrison argued that political cultures determine political
outcomes without any of the qualifications and nuance offered by Wiarda. Novak
argued that capitalism had yet to really come to Latin America, while
Kirkpatrick's famous distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes
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22. On this point, I agree with Wildavsky's critique of rational choice theory
(1988). The dangers which come in employing categories too far removed from
the self understandings and categories of the actors themselves are well expressed
by Levine (1981) in his critique of previous approaches to the study of religion
and politics. The ways rationality is culturally constructed are elaborated very
well by Clifford Geertz (1973: 22.126-141) and given extraordinary grounding in
the daily life of a Malaysian village by James Scott (1986). His analysis makes
clear how notions of self interest are always expressed through cultural
frameworks from which they cannot be divorced and still understood. Notions
of rationality uphold a worldview, they do not simply maximize one's position.
For further development, see the discussion of Protestantism in Chapter 6. Scott's
analysis of the ways cultural meanings are often sharply contested is pursued in
Chapter 3.
23. Geertz develops this in "Found in Translation: On the Social History of the
Moral Imagination," (1983: 36-54). Michael Taussig (1988) offers an highly original
and insightful account, inspired partly by the work of Walter Benjamin, of the
role that violence often plays in the conflict over "otherness". He also
demonstrates persuasively the ways in which cultural practices—in this case,
shamanism-are deployed to resist efforts to impose subjugating forms of identity.
Taussig argues that these counter-cultural practices can help keep alive a sense
of estrangement and alienation from dominant practices and the social relations
they attempt to objectify. It is an extraordinarily creative and supple application
of the Marxian concept of commodity fetishism. A more accessible, but equally
stunning account of the moral imagination at work is offered by Israeli novelist
David Grossman's report from the Occupied Territories. In trying to find ways
that each community might learn to see the other as human and not wholly
"other", Grossman brilliantly reveals the ways each community's construction of
its own identity is shaped by the other.
24. Tzvetan Todorov's account (1984) of the encounter between the Spanish
conquerors and the cultures of the New World provides an interesting
examination of this interpretive issue. But his analysis is marred by a rather
moralizing tone and a lack of attention to forms of cultural resistance that were
deployed especially by the Maya. Chapter 3 will examine the work of historian
Nancy Farriss and others who have persuasively demonstrated the capacity of the
Maya to maintain something of their cultural identity amidst the devastating
succession of conquests by colonial and national governments. William Connolly
(1991) has defended Todorov's lack of attention to the indigenous perspective by
arguing that such any attempt to interpret will always be interested in some
fashion. But the work of Farriss and others suggests that Connolly and Todorov
overstate the difficulties in approaching "the other," and leave the matter too
abstract. Carole Nagengast and Michael Kearney argue similarly.
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Despite good intentions, Todorov reduces a complex historical reality
inextricably bound up with the exercise of power to a set of
predetermined binary oppositional characteristics attributed to Spanish
and Indian. (1990: 67)
25. Once again, those who argue for taking a culture "on its own terms," often
need to be a bit more reflective about their place in the interpretive process. While
Howard Wiarda inquired into the interpretive starting point and "sociology of
knowledge" of other approaches such as modernization and dependency, he
appears to assume that his own perspective does not entail the same questions.
Why is the question framed in these terms and not another? What political
orientation might be reflected? The questions that are asked of that culture reflect
the imagination of the questioner, and that in turn is a partly shaped by the
location and cultural problematic within which the question is formed. Raising
these issues can never be adequate to disqualify another interpretation but they
must be asked nonetheless.
26. The case for rigorously consistent conceptual definitions in political analysis
was made most notably in a famous article by Giovani Sartori (1968). But the
myriad of problems which this kind of effort inevitably encounters were well
established by William Connolly in his critique of Felix Oppenheim (1983).
Connolly argued that any attempt to fix the meaning of particular terms cannot
avoid carrying baggage which shapes the kinds of questions to be answered.
Oppenheim ran into trouble when trying to suggest that his definition could
obtain agreement across political lines and prove useful to all points of view. The
notions of responsibility and agency which Connolly wants to affirm cannot find
space within the constricted definition proposed by Oppenheim: "The
differentiation he affirms subjugate the norms of responsibility and agency to a
technocratic conception of social life...he convinces himself that this concept
describes fundamental realities when it in fact describes an ideal to which he is
wedded" (1983: 224). Deconstructed in this fashion, Oppenheim's "neutral"
definition reveals deep normative commitments. Connolly argued that this aspect
of political analysis was inescapable: its terms are "essentially contestable."
27. "The Interpretive Turn" is the title of the introductory chapter by Paul
Rabinow and William Sullivan in their outstanding edited volume which includes
some of the most important essays by among the most influential social theorists
of the post war era including Habermas, Foucault, Gadamer, and Geertz (1987).
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28. This passage begins an essay in which Lechner discusses the concrete
problem of constructing a democratic political culture in Chile in an international
political context which he terms "post-modern."
CHAPTER 3
ETHNIC IDENTITY AND LEGITIMACY:
THEORETICAL ISSUES
In the previous chapter, a general approach to the study of political
culture was put forward, but it is necessary to apply that analysis to issues
specific to the case at hand. I made the argument that political culture offers a
shifting field of study; the questions which cultures ask themselves change in
response to new structural conditions, political events, contingency and
experience. In the chapter to follow these questions will be examined
historically: how has the problem of political community been interpreted by
diverse political actors over time and how have these conceptions converged
or come into conflict? How have new structural conditions been interpreted
culturally? How have political actors understood the challenges facing them
and what have they proposed to do? And then, in practice, what relations of
power have they set forth, and what political responses have they engendered?
Before examining the diverse responses and actions which reflection
upon these questions has inspired, it is important to begin with a clear
understanding of how to approach the issue of legitimacy in a study which
sets out to describe the pursuit of a "legitimate political order." I began this
work by invoking Benedict Anderson's "imagined community," as an ideal
type which described the intentions of political elites in Guatemala, but I noted
that the Maya generally have viewed the notion of nationality quite differently.
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Hence, the concept of legitimacy cannot be understood without paying
particular attention to the politics of ethnic relations between the Maya and
ladinos. The analysis presented here is, in turn, built around premises
regarding the nature of that relationship which must be made explicit and
clarified theoretically before moving directly to a discussion of Guatemalan
history.
Perspectives on Ethnicity and Culture in Guatemala
Weber described the social sciences as those to which "eternal youth
was granted," and scholarship in the field readily attests to the ways in which
our understanding of Guatemala has changed with the emergence of new
modes of inquiry reflecting new questions and preoccupations. How ethnicity
in Guatemala is understood and studied has changed significantly in recent
years as scholars have sought more dynamic ways to understand relationships
of power and domination. While there is no question that the conquest and its
aftermath fundamentally transformed Mayan society and culture, the nature of
that alteration is complicated to assess and has been viewed differently by
various analysts.
The relationship between Guatemalan indigenous communities and the
state was not given great attention in many of the classic ethnographic studies
carried out between 1930 and 1960 (Wagley 1941; Gillen 1945; Tax 1941). These
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works tended to define and study indigenous cultures as wholly distinct
systems of behavior and practice; in the process they provided a wealth of
valuable ethnographic data on community social structure and institutions
which has facilitated comparative analysis across space and time. This research
brought improved understanding, as reflected in the gradual emphasis on the
municipio rather than language groups as the locus of Maya identities. At the
same time this literature carried conceptualizations of culture which share
many of the theoretical limitations of political science discussions on the
subject. Most notable of these limitations was the tendency to view indigenous
cultures as distinct systems of thought and practice, without adequate attention
to the larger setting or the shifting relationship between cultures in Guatemala.
While recognizing that Maya culture and practice were part of a "heritage of
conquest" (Tax 1952), John Hawkins argues that most often they shared Robert
Redfield's formulation in which culture "implies an integral...traditional way of
life in which all members of a self-sufficient society participate" (1983). By
focusing on specific traits and cultural separation, these studies had a
propensity to isolate particular Maya communities as atavistic folk cultures
wholly distinct from other "western" or "ladino" cultures, rather than seeing the
larger cultural setting in which meanings were formed and transformed. These
analysts also tended to understand cultural change as a process of gradual
assimilation. 1
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Other perspectives emerged which sought to view cultures from a larger
and more interactive perspective. Perhaps the most influential formulation of
ethnic relations was Eric Wolf's concept of the "closed corporate community"
(1957). While generating extensive commentary and critique, Wolf's notion was
put forward as an ideal type rather than a precise formulation. He stressed the
community's importance as a vehicle for preserving local control of land while
maintaining "barriers against the entry of goods and ideas produced outside
the community." Wolf's analysis provided a very important impetus for
widening the perspective within which cultural change and ethnic relations
were studied. To the extent that his framework took seriously local efforts to
preserve autonomy, it moved well beyond approaches which focused largely
on the internal coherence and unity of community social structures without
understanding the larger social, economic, and cultural influences and
pressures which shaped Mayan cultural responses.
In recent years Wolf has argued that cultures can never be viewed "as
integrated totalities in which each part contributes to the maintenance of an
organized, autonomous, and enduring whole" (1982: 390). It is not clear that
his original model involved such as assumption, but it is apparent, as Jim
Handy writes, that
...at various periods in Guatemalan history communities "opened" and
"closed" depending on their relations with the broader political and
economic system and in response to the demands placed on their
community from outside. (1990: 164-165)
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And to the extent that Wolf's formulation has "largely crystallized in the
established wisdom as either a refuge of Mayan traditionalism or a refraction
of Hispanic hegemony," John Watanabe suggests that it has needed to be
pushed forward by recent ethnographies which reveal that Mayan
communities
...can undergo apparently sweeping cultural changes yet retain an
intense ethnic localism that while no longer "closed" or "corporate" still
makes them unquestionably communities. (1990: 184)
Another influential approach to inter-ethnic relations stressed the ways
that Mayan communities have been determined by the actions of colonial,
national and transnational political and economic forces. Pelaez (1971) argued
that Mayan culture as it has existed since the conquest was a creation of
colonialism and bore no resemblance to Mayan culture prior to the arrival of
the Spanish. Stavenhagen (1970) described a system of internal colonialism in
which ethnic relations closely paralleled class relations, though he argued that
this had begun to grow less clearly divided as economic expansion led to
greater emphasis on class relations and identity. Ethnic identity was viewed
principally as an imposition of colonialism which had served ideological goals
but was gradually being broken down by the process of proletarianization. As
such, indigenous cultures received little study on their own terms as systems
of meaning.
Ethnic Identity and Cultural Resistance
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Analysis which focused on the larger structural factors shaping the
articulation of ethnic identity went part of the way towards addressing the
limitations of earlier studies of Mayan communities and cultures. But at the
same time, they provided little insight into the ongoing process of cultural
construction and transformation in which larger economic and political
changes were interpreted by the Maya. Efforts to construct structural
paradigms of economic, social, and cultural features can provide valuable data,
but their level of analysis does not adequately consider how impositions of
power are interpreted and acted upon by groups who, while not equal, are not
simply objects-even when that is how they are viewed by others. This is
especially important in a setting where so much violence has been visited
upon the politically weak. Meso-American scholarship in recent years—led by
the impressive work of Nancy Farriss—has offered a compelling way to think
about this experience of cultural confrontation. While drawn from analysis of
colonial society, the lessons have relevance into the present (Clendinnen 1987;
Farriss 1983; Jones 1988; Lovell 1988; Smith ed. 1990). It is clear that we cannot
begin to talk of Mayan culture without understanding the pervasive ways it
was transformed by conquest. Contemporary Maya culture has grown from
traditions which were constructed in the context of colonial and national
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programs designed to assimilate, dominate, subjugate, exploit, and even
destroy their communities.
Yet, Farriss and others have been equally insistent that we view the
Maya as "subjects of their own history," rather than passive objects of conquest
and colonial imposition. The object of colonialism was certainly the creation of
a particular form of Indian subject. As we shall examine in more detail, that
was not a consistent project. What the original conquerors, church orders,
Habsburg administrators, Bourbon reformers, and post-independent
Conservatives and Liberals wanted differed greatly over time. Law, discourse,
violence, and fiscal policy were all part of the terrain upon which the
administration of political subjects was carried out.
The question which recent scholarship has compelled us to ask is: how
did the Maya—in the most constrained (a dangerously sanguine word in this
instance) circumstances—respond to coercion, violence, evangelization, and the
myriad intentions of others with power to compel a response? One of the
underlying themes of this and later chapters will be the necessity to
distinguish between the intentions of those who exercise power and how it
actually operates. Guatemalan political history cannot be understood without
an account of inter-ethnic relations which takes seriously how the actions of
Indians constitute self-conscious forms of political action and strategy which
are themselves culturally constructed as modes of survival amidst externally
imposed pressures. They entail what James Scott has referred to as "weapons
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of the weak" and "everyday forms of resistance." Scott argues that these forms
of resistance can appear in an immense variety of seemingly non-political
activities: foot dragging, non-compliance, silence, subtle or disguised cultural
expressions of mockery towards dominant classes, and the invocation of
shared traditions of reciprocity which groups in power appear to be
abandoning. Scott draws upon a large body of literature, particularly from 18th
and 19th century historiography, and presents a convincing and detailed
analysis of how Malaysian peasants have tried to resist Green Revolution
technologies which leave their position more precarious.
Scott's analysis clearly mirrors the insights of Farriss. Both stress the
need to go beyond seeing violence as the only mode of resistance. Where
others have asked why Indians didn't resist more, Farriss offers revealing
explanations of why they chose, more often than not, indirect and non-violent
forms of resistance. She argues that the Maya were in a better position to resist
than the Aztecs because of geographic and cultural factors. They certainly
lived in areas that were less prized by the Spanish, but she also argues they
were better prepared psychologically. Tzvetan Todorov has argued that the
Aztecs were in many ways incapable of understanding or making sense of the
Spanish except within frames of reference which rendered the newcomers as
gods (1984). This incapacity to envision an "other" and its wholly different
cultural categories caused a breakdown and paralysis of their capacity to act
and resist. While Todorov' s analysis is provocative and interesting when he
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applied it to the Aztecs, it immediately runs into serious problems when we
try to use it to interpret the Maya. Having been previously conquered, they
were not susceptible to the kind of "shock" that befell the Aztecs, and had the
capacity to adapt in ways which have remained distinctly Mayan. Changes
could be understood and responded to within their own categories of order.2
This points up the necessity to view cultures as looser and more adaptable
than structural accounts sometimes imply:
Each culture or cultural configuration contains a core set of ideas about
the way things are or ought to be~in other words a core of general
explanations around which the shared cognitive map and the social
order are organized. These ideas comprise the most stable part of the
system both because they are general and because, being general rather
than specific, they are open to varying interpretations in the ancillary
concepts that flow from them and in the way they are expressed
through social action. As core concepts they provide not only the
principles according to which change will take place, but also the
measure of its extent; they indicate whether we are dealing with
variations on a theme or an altogether new theme. (Farriss 1984: 8)
What characterized Maya responses to the various waves of conquest
and oppression was a capacity to culturally interpret what was happening
within their own cultural conceptions, continually moving and adapting, of
cosmology and history. That this occurred amidst enormous violence, misery,
and cultural destruction is undeniable; it simply does not completely eliminate
human agency. Inga Clendinnen's study of the initial conquest between Maya
and Spaniard in the Yucatan reveals a capacity for "calculated accommodation"
(1987: 58). The process of reading these events in the light of their own
traditions was grounded in the ways that the Maya Books of the Chilam Balam
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did not have static meanings. The texts were partly performative: subject to
interpretation within a particular setting. That kind of process is bound to
create what seem contradictions-but the enduring power of these traditions is
in their capacity to make sense of ambiguity. It is within that capacity for
cultural survival and resistance that a space of autonomy has been preserved.
Ethnic Identity and the State
If we are to consider the challenge that ethnic identity presents to efforts
to create Guatemala as an "imagined community," three points must be made
clear. The first concerns the relationship between ethnicity and the state. I have
already noted that post-colonial forms of indigenous cultural identity have
been constructed largely in response in one way or another to the actions of
the state. The state has always been the reference point, in terms of political
power, for indigenous communities; it has forced Indians to continually
renegotiate their sense of identity in response to direct and indirect economic
and political pressures that reshape the structural context. What it means to be
an Indian or a ladino has changed over time also as a result of state policy.
Emphasizing the role of the state also reveals the danger in speaking of
the Maya in Guatemala as if they were a monolithic group. It is only in
relation to the Guatemalan state they have been so unified; Maya imagined
communities have generally been much more localized. The emergence of
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national indigenous organizations in the 1970s was, as we shall see, new, and a
response to repressive state policies which viewed Indians as a unified mass of
"subversion" (Smith 1990).
The continued political salience of ethnicity in Guatemala illustrates a
point about state-society relations which has been noted by students of the
subject in other areas of the world. Prior to at least the 1970s, ethnicity was
often viewed as an element of "tradition" which would gradually become less
significant as the process of modernization and development promoted new
forms of identity based on rational and non-ascriptive foundations.3 As
Weiner noted, it is now apparent that "there has been far less nation-building
than many analysts had expected, for the process of state-building has
rendered many ethnic groups devoid of power or influence" (1987: 36). States
were not neutral and ethnicity was not simply part of a static cultural
tradition—the relationship was dynamic and on-going, and the political-cultural
significance of ethnicity was subject to change in its character in response to
the actions of the state. However grounded in a long history a community may
be, its modern identity is partly a product of the modern world. In this way,
the continuing strength of ethnic identity clearly is linked to the cultural power
of self determination as a modern political claim. The important point is to
recognize this without falling into linear views of historical development.
Contemporary Maya culture is saturated with the impact of "modernity," yet
deeply grounded in an ethnic identity whose form and content have changed
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and yet remained fundamentally Mayan. This point also has a very important
practical meaning in Guatemalan politics; groups across the political spectrum,
and particularly on the left, have generally been disposed to discount ethnicity
and assume assimilation was inevitable in the national communities they
imagine (Smith 1987; 1991).
Culture as Practice
The second point that must inform analysis of ethnicity is that we must
avoid too closely linking the preservation of ethnic identity with particular
institutions, practices, or strategies. From such a point of reference, the decline
of particular institutions is often posited as inevitably leading to loss of the
identity. Changes in religious practice, landholding, or internal political
structures have been continual and yet ethnic identity-as Maya—has remained
important. John Watanabe's study of Santiago Chimaltenango illustrates this
point with great sensitivity (1984); he argues, for example, that declines in the
political significance of local cargo based systems, or increased involvement in
the cash crop production of coffee, reflect adaptions partly created by the
Chimaltecos in a context of contingency and external events they do not
control. As he carefully unpacks some of the conventions through which
community members construct themselves as ethical subjects, Watanabe is able
to analyze continuity by focusing on the ethical relations and boundaries of
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those conventions rather than their particular content or institutional
embodiment at a point in time. The conventions create the boundaries for
ongoing choices; there is no real essence to ethnic identity other than in the
sense of a "we who are here." Watanabe's study illustrates the concrete ways in
which culture, as previously noted, is a practice--a continual reconstruction of
experience and contingency by a world view. By actively shaping local
responses to broader changes in Guatemalan society, these conventions
"reaffirm an enduring community while simultaneously sanctioning the very
forces that transform it" (1984: 154).
These insights reinforce the point made earlier about the cultural
capacity of the Maya to make sense of events within cultural traditions which
made room for ambiguity. This is necessary to bear in mind when considering
the long record of religious syncretism which is discussed in chapters 4 and 6.
Barbara Tedlock has argued that syncretism is often misunderstood as a sort of
naive melding or fusion of symbols and institutions which usually involves
little historical self-consciousness (1983). The error is compounded by the
tendency to give to syncretism a kind of structural unity and distinctness
which mistakes the ideal type for a reality which is more unruly and in
continual, and conscious, dialogue with the world around it.4
The third point is that ethnic identity in Guatemala is sometimes viewed
as an "inverse image," of the dominant cultural discourse of conquest
(Hawkins 1984). This attributes too much power and authority to dominant
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notions of ethnicity without seeing the ways in which they are unstable and
built upon constructions of self and other which assume what the previous
paragraphs have challenged-that rival identities can be tidily separated. At the
national or state level in Guatemala, this has presented a continual cultural
problem which is reflected in the ambiguity with which Guatemala constructs
its identity internationally as a nation with an Indian past which it celebrates,
while at the same time practicing near genocidal violence upon its living
Indians.5
Each of these points reinforce the notion that cultures are not fixed
systems; they provides interpretive possibilities that are continually reworked
in practice. Kay Warren argues that many analysts of ethnicity have tended to
view it as an all or nothing choice of mutually exclusive identities; hence
cultural change equals the permanent loss of a particular cultural identity. This
assumes in turn that ethnic identities exist independently of human
constructions as choices with their own inherent logic.
This construction of polar, mutually exclusive choices-Indian or ladino-
steers us away from overwhelming evidence that individuals continually
manipulate identities...there is no ladino or Indian except as those
identities are constructed, contested, negotiated, imposed, imported,
resisted and redefined in action. The process is never ending; identity
never quite coalesces. (1988: 4-5)
Warren's argument reinforces James Scotfs discussion of the concept of
hegemony and its limitations, particularly with regard to the assumption that
people comply with dominant ideas because of the capacity of dominant
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classes to make the order of things appear inevitable. There appears little
reason to imagine-based on the ethnographic data-that the Maya, any more
than the Malaysian peasants studied by Scott, have ever confused justice and
reality.6 So legitimacy has always remained a problem for colonial and
national governments given the force of competing cultural orders. During
those few periods when a legitimate political order can be said to have existed
in Guatemala since the conquest, it has been a fragile and ambiguous
achievement. This history provides much ground for skepticism about the
success of an project of national integration. The Maya appear in no hurry to
make good the predictions of modernization theorists of the left, right, and
center regarding their inevitable assimilation.
The Problem of Legitimacy
This long history of cultural resistance and renegotiation in a context of
external domination clearly indicates why the pursuit of political legitimacy
has remained so problematic, and why it is such an important element of the
current military political project. In the following chapter, I argue that there
have been only a few periods in Guatemala since the Conquest when a
legitimate political order could be said to exist. But before turning to an
historical analysis, some more general points about the nature of legitimacy
remain to be made.
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Trying to offer a precise definition of what constitutes legitimacy in
practice is difficult, for like many of the concepts upon which the study of
politics is founded, its meaning has changed over time. Weber's famous
typology of the three sources of legitimate authority-tradition, charisma, and
rational-legal principle-has influenced the terms of the debate, but not offered
much resolution. The acceptance of these categories has generally carried with
it the assumption that rational-legal authority, in some manifestation, was
inevitable, and normatively desirable, once modernization reached a certain
point. As with so many of Weber's categories, however, these were intended
as ideal types, even though much of his analysis indicates a strong assumption
that modern forms of rationality were growing more dominant. 7
But we have also seen that Weber's encounter with Nietzsche, in the
context of epistemological reflection about social science, left him deeply
skeptical about the capacity of rational /scientific modes of thought to
demonstrate their legitimacy:
Science presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important
in the sense that it is worth being known. In this, obviously, are
contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proven by
scientific means. It can only be interpreted with reference to its ultimate
meaning, which we accept according to our ultimate position towards
life...and still less can it be proved that the existence of the world that
these sciences describe is worthwhile, that it has any meaning, or that it
makes any sense to live in such a world. Science does not ask for the
answers to such questions. (1946: 143)
Weber believed that the issue of meaning still revolved around personal
choices based on faith, whether religious or secular. While he did not believe
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that rational authority could provide a stable basis upon which to construct a
legitimate political and cultural order, he could also not imagine what other
forms of authority could survive in modernity. His own struggle to invest the
modern political realm with legitimacy indicate his own personal response to
an age when the sources of legitimate authority has grown fragmented and
diffuse. As we have also seen this was a problem well understood by many of
the analysts who developed the influential conceptions of political culture in
the 1950s and 60s.8
Weber's dilemma reflects the limits of his own categories for analyzing
legitimacy. It also provides a partial explanation for Benedict Anderson's
argument that the power and legitimacy of nationalism has grown from the
capacity, when achieved, to recast the problems of fate, contingency, and
mortality-questions to which religion also responds-and to offer a kind of
secular redemption by constructing a community which links the dead, the
living, and the unborn. While the ideologies of modernity-liberalism,
Marxism, humanism-tend to look ever forward, it is as communities of
remembrance and redemption that nations gather their power. As previously
noted, the cultural achievement of modern nationalism is to take a new idea, a
national community consciously constructed within a specific historical setting,
and endow it with a sense of mythic origins which "loom out of an
immemorial past, and still more important, glide into a limitless future" (1983:
19). For many modern states this has been no easy task as the concept of
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self-determination and the idea of nation which it has fostered have
continually challenged the legitimacy of those states.
This problem reflects the ways political legitimacy in "modernity" is
built on a complex combination of old and new forces within diverse historical
and cultural settings. We must not overstate what William Connolly has
referred to as "the retreat of God from the world"; while traditional sources of
authority may have grown problematic in many places, they have not
disappeared, reflecting the ways changes within cultures do not leave the past
behind so much as they change the perspective through which it is viewed.
Traditional sources of authority and legitimacy have been forced to address the
cultures of western modernism and rationalism. But there is nothing
predictable about the myriad of diverse responses-whether Chinese
communism, Islamic modernism and fundamentalism, liberation theology,
evangelical protestantism, or Asian capitalism, to name the most prominent.
Modernity is in this sense an ideal type that gathers within it many
characteristics and tendencies, but exists in reality only as a multiplicity of
specific historical settings in which older and more recent forms of knowledge
attempt to render new experience. It can perhaps be best characterized as a
world in which authority is contestable, but without making any assumptions
that particular kinds of "traditional" responses are "no longer available to us."
9
We can assume that those traditions-religious, ethnic, national-are in some
way modern achievements which in the process of confronting new structural
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and cultural forces have been reshaped in some distinct but not predetermined
fashion.
In an age when the sources of legitimacy have fragmented, even as the
administrative power of the state has increased, it is not surprising that
challenges to the legitimacy of states-particularly, but by no means
exclusively, in the "non-Western" world-remain a central element of world
politics. This in turn suggests that legitimacy ought not to be defined so much
as analyzed historically. What we can ask of a particular order is: How did it
attempt to legitimate itself? What were the sources of legitimacy which were
invoked by political rulers and how were they received by the governed? To
what extent, if any, was or is the order legitimate? Those are the questions
which will be taken up in the following chapter.
113
Notes
1. The passage by Redfield (1940) is cited by John Hawkins in a helpful survey
of the concept of culture which informed the work of Redfield and his
contemporaries. Hawkins' own approach views Guatemalan Indian and Mayan
cultures as "inverse images" within a overarching cultural system. This is heavily
influenced by the linguistic structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure and is
criticized later in this chapter (see page 13).
2. For two fascinating and well documented discussions of this process see Inga
Clendinnen (1987) and Grant Jones (1989). Both point out that Maya notions of
cosmology, time, and history all provided a basis for interpretation of the arrival
of the Spanish, as well as their new political and religious institutions. In doing
so, the Maya were able to preserve a basis for community continuity amidst
enormous political pressure.
3. This was a view shared by analysts with radically different assumptions about
the process of modernity itself. What we might term a liberal perspective believed
that ethnic identities would gradually become depoliticized and largely private
sources of identity~as reflected, for example, in the attachment of many
Americans to the ethnic heritage of their parents. Citizenship within a modern
state grounded in rational-legal forms of legitimacy would become the principle
focus of political identity. Marxist analysis also believed that ethnicity would
become less salient as economic and political transformations created the
conditions for class consciousness to emerge. Both viewed ethnicity as something
that would disappear under the onslaught of modernization. Each perspective has
promoted political models which in some ways have exacerbated ethnic tension.
This is most obvious today in Central Europe and the former Soviet republics, but
it is also apparent in many of the African and Asian nation states whose political
development prospects were the focus of so much policy analysis by
comparativists and where attempts to develop western style state institutions
have magnified the fragmentation they were an effort to limit. Examples of more
sophisticated analysis include Walker Connor (1987); Paul Brass (1990); Donald
Horowitz (1985); Cynthia Enloe (1973). For a discussion of the ways class analysis
deployed by ladino intellectuals has obscured understanding about ethnicity in
Guatemala see Carol Smith (1987).
4. If we think about Christianity and its encounter with "modernism," the point
is perhaps clearer and more obvious.
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5. This point has been influenced by a recent analysis of the study of ethnicity
put forward by Kay Warren (1988). Permission to quote from the article was
granted by the author.
6. See Warren's (1978; 1985: 251-276) analysis of the cosmology of residents of
San Andres Semetabaj. She describes the ways their conceptions explain the gap
between their treatment by the Spanish and their sense of justice. While these
cosmologies did not usually generate a prescription for resistance and tended to
reinforce "a deterministic world where Indians are cast as passive victims of an
unchanging social order," they were grounded in a moral framework that
permanently challenged the moral legitimacy of Spanish and Ladino domination.
Moreover, Warren argues that community narratives (1985: 257-261) also created
space for individual moral initiative within the local cultural institutions.
Catholicism as a source of legitimacy is explored more fully in the following
chapter.
7. The difference between modern political science and traditional definitions of
legitimacy and what is at stake is drawn out beautifully by John Schaar (1969).
Starting with the definition offered by Webster's unabridged dictionary:
Legitimate: 1) lawfully begotten. ..2) real, genuine; not fake, counterfeit or
spurious. ..3) accordant with law or with established legal forms and
requirements.
Schaar argued that this definition reflects an older notion of authority in which:
...a claim to political power is legitimate only when the claimant can
invoke some source of authority beyond or above himself. History shows
a variety of such sources: immemorial custom, divine law, the law of
nature, a constitution.... [whereas] the new definitions all dissolve
legitimacy into belief or opinion. (1969: 284)
Schaar offers Seymour Martin Lipset as an example of the approach taken by
political science: "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and
maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate
ones for that society." The weakness of defining legitimacy solely in terms of
opinions is that it tends to measure acquiescence rather than the actual legitimacy
possessed by political authority. It assumes that the legitimacy of a "system" is
what is foremost at stake-which leaves the question of the cultural and
ideological setting aside. As Lipsefs own analysis focuses heavily on the
conditions by which legitimacy in democratic states can be preserved, his
emphasis is on stability and the maintenance of attitudes towards the "system"
which do not provide excess variance. In this sense, and built on the experience
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of the United States as the "first new nation/* Lipset emphasizes the development
of a particular form of modern state in which ideological and parochial
attachments are kept carefully checked-by "cross-cutting cleavages"~or eliminated
by education and the inculcation of new values. But the problem which Weber
recognized with modern sources of legitimacy is more clearly spelled out by
Schaar-legitimacy is now something which political regimes attempt consciously
to fashion and then transmit to a populace through cultural symbols and ritual
which generate support. And that means that
...order will now be seen as artificial, the result of will and choice alone, as
vulnerable to change and challenge as will itself is. (1969: 295)
8. The tension between science and political legitimacy arose for Weber in
examining the tradition of democratic rights and governance. Science cannot make
sense of concepts such as equality or rights, for they conflict with the norms of
rationality. The orientation of science is towards solving a problem in the most
orderly manner available. Weber is quite explicit that
Democracy as such is opposed to the rule of bureaucracy, in spite of and
perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of
bureaucracy. Under certain conditions democracy creates obvious ruptures
and blockages to bureaucratic organization. (Connolly ed. 1984: 47)
Democracy promotes bureaucracy in seeking an even-handed and neutral
approach. But charged with the task of managing in the interests of all, the
principle of rationalization is unlikely to tolerate the chaotic impulses it will no
doubt find within democracy.
9. Modernity as an historical, epistemological, and ontological condition has been
the subject of extensive discussion. As regards the problem of legitimacy, an
excellent collection of diverse perspectives-including Weber, Lipset, Habermas,
Foucault, and Sheldon Wolin-can be found in the edited collection by William
Connolly (1984). Much of this discussion focuses largely on the "legitimation
crisis" in the advanced or "late" capitalist world. Within that setting, Connolly's
essay is particularly persuasive in its discussion of the relationship between
institutional structures and the formation of identity; at the same time his analysis
is weakened by overly general assumptions about the decline of religion. My own
understanding of the matter has been most influenced by John Schaar's essay in
the same collection. While Connolly criticizes Schaar's attempt at "restoration," I
think the latter comes closest to appreciating the continuing power of traditional
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sources of authority. In the process his argument moves along lines which parallel
Benedict Anderson.
CHAPTER 4
LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE IN GUATEMALA
The Conquest of the Mava
In the discussion of nationalism which began this work, it was argued
that while every nation claims to represent an immemorial past, each is a
historically constructed community which has usually reflected, at least in part
if not entirely, the particular interests of political elites and the outcomes of
concrete power struggles. The feelings of belonging which nationalisms
promote have to be instilled; they don't exist apriori . Guatemala has long been
a problem as a "nation." For its inhabitants, the sources of political identity
have been multiple, fragmented, and shifting. As the structural context has
been altered by local, regional, and global changes, new and old forms of
cultural meaning and knowledge have come in contact-sometimes melding,
sometimes colliding in conflict. What kinds of communities have been
"imagined" in Guatemala? This chapter will examine the ways in which
Guatemala has been understood as a political community. The Weberian
questions set forth in the previous chapters, What are the new problems which
structural changes present and how are they interpreted culturally? must now
be examined historically. This analysis will focus particularly on the terms by
which political and cultural legitimation was sought in the past. How did
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Guatemalan political actors attempt, at different times, to legitimate their
political projects, and to what extent, if any, did they succeed?
Conquest of a Fragmented Civilization
While Guatemala was "discovered" by the Spanish in 1524, its human
history began more than 10,000 years before. A recognizably Maya culture
began to appear in the 3rd millennium B.C.; most Mayanists locate its zenith
during the Classic Period from roughly 300-1000 A.D., achieving its greatest
expression as a civilization in the ceremonial centers in the lowlands of
Chiapas and the Peten. While Maya civilization never expressed itself in large
centralized kingdoms as in Central Mexico, it achieved a level of cultural
sophistication perhaps unmatched in the Americas. After a few centuries of
conflict and decline, these centers were gradually abandoned as the population
dispersed to the north and south. Between roughly 1250 and 1475 the western
highlands of what would become Guatemala were dominated by the Quiche
Mayans after being "Mexicanized" by Toltec immigrants who quickly
established themselves as a new political elite through a process of
administrative and military expansion (Lovell 1985: 38-40). At the same time,
Mayan culture was able to assimilate the Toltecs and retain predominance
(Handy 1984: 18). Quiche control over other Mayan groups came unraveled by
the later part of the 15th century as first the Cakchiquel and then the Ixil and
Mam peoples revolted. There is historical speculation that the power "vacuum"
in the area may well have been filled by the Aztecs if the Spanish had not
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arrived. Other evidence suggests that the area may have faced imminent
demographic pressures (Macleod 1973: 37).
The Spanish conquest of what is contemporary Central America
occurred piecemeal. Columbus explored the Atlantic coast between the Gulf of
Honduras and Panama, but attempts to colonize the area from settlements in
the Caribbean were not made until 1513. Around the same time another group
of Spanish forces arrived in the Yucatan, and an unsuccessful effort was
launched from Cuba in 1517. But it was not until Spanish forces under the
command of Cortez defeated the Aztecs in Central Mexico that a coordinated
and concerted effort, led by Pedro de Alvarado, was made to conquer Maya
groups and bring the area more firmly under Spanish rule. The Maya were
already aware of the presence of the Spanish on their continent, some from
direct experience or word of mouth, while many more had begun to be
exposed to the myriad European diseases which preceded Alvarado's forces.
While this setting of fragmentation and war, augmented by the advance work
of disease, might suggest the area would have been even easier to conquer
than Central Mexico, the opposite was true. The Spanish had to conquer and
subdue each independent group-there was no center which when captured
caused the rest of the area to fall. Alvarado was able to conquer the Quiche
with the assistance of the Cakchiquels, but then faced a revolt by the latter.
The nature of the land and the personality of the conquerors also played
a role in slowing down conquest of the area. Since the prospects for immediate
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wealth were much more limited than was the case further to the North, some
areas had to be reconquered after the initial invaders moved on. It was
therefore only gradually, and often after several entradas, that the area came
under administrative control. The lack of wealth partly explains why it
eventually took the appearance and energies of the religious orders to
effectively bring colonial structures into place in many areas. Murdo MacLeod
argues that, with Cortez being a notable exception, these were men with little
interest in administration; rather they were motivated by a restless energy and
the hope of fortune and adventure:
They thought of it (Central America) as a staging area, or an asylum, or
at best as part of a whole complex of interlocking source materials
which if fitted together in the proper conjunction might produce
capital...there men were entrepreneurs, not administrators and certainly
not statesmen. (1973: 102)
With gold and minerals lacking, wealth was associated with land, control of
labor, and the right to demand tribute from Indians, all of which were granted
under the system of encomienda which transferred the Crown's right of tribute
to the early conquerors as reward for their accomplishments.
The Colonial Order
It was not until the 1540s that a political order was institutionalized.
With the passing of much of the first generation of conquistadores and
adventurers, important posts were filled by royal officials appointed from
Spain who were more interested in administration than warfare and
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exploration. The Audiencia of Guatemala, as a part of the larger colony of
New Spain, covered all of present day Central American except Panama, and
Chiapas in Mexico. The post-independence history of Guatemala is deeply
rooted in its colonial status. As the capital of the Audiencia, it was the most
politically and economically developed area. It was also where Crown laws
which sought to protect Indians from settler exploitation and abuse were most
fully implemented. This partly explains why a much larger percentage of
Guatemala's indigenous population survived. From the beginning, the Colonial
Administration placed high priority on the maintenance of Indian communities
as sources of labor and revenue (Smith 1990a: 73-76).
This was never a simple matter, however; conflict and debate emerged
over the proper treatment of Indians. The ideas which animated Spanish
colonialism-including the notions of political community—were inherited from
medieval social theory (Wortman 1982; Wiarda 1982). But these forms of
thought were never able to account fully for what existed in the "new world."
The debates which took place among the Spanish were an effort to make sense
of and explain to themselves the purpose of their rule over the Indians. This
was played out at the level of philosophy and legal doctrine in the great
debate between Las Casas and Sepulveda over the proper status and treatment
of the Indians. These discussions were not esoteric; they reflected intense
political conflict over who had the right to administer the Indians as colonial
subjects.
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While these debates are important in terms of the cultural categories
and modes of thought they reveal, most of the historical analysis of the period
has argued that reforms such as those sought by Las Casas were always part
of the legal discourse of Spanish colonialism. The New Laws of 1542 were the
first of many efforts to protect the Indians from being endlessly at the mercy of
settlers. But the effect was often moderated by the hesitancy of administrators
and the capacity of Guatemalan encomenderos to work around restrictions.
MacLeod argues that treatment of the Indians was often related to economic
and demographic factors. When populations declined, care was taken, but
"whenever boom conditions existed and whenever Spanish entrepreneurs
found a profitable export product, pressure on the Indian population
intensified and the old abuses returned" (1973: 118).
The inconsistent manner in which indigenous communities were treated
reflected more than simply the vagaries of shifting interests. From the
beginning, and for the first two centuries of its rule, Spanish colonialism was
animated by economic and religious goals that were not totally consistent in
practice. The role of the Church in the "spiritual conquest" of Guatemala
reflected that this was not simply an economic enterprise. The spiritual and
material energy unleashed by the reconquista, when the Moors were drive out
of Spain, was also a powerful animating force.
It is also important not to grant this enterprise more coherence or clarity
than it possessed. 16th century colonialism was less calculated and assured
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than its 19th century counterpart. While the greater centralization of political
authority under Isabella and Ferdinand permitted a more effective exercise of
power, the state still had much less power, and the world it conquered was
more new and strange; continual innovation was required in response to
situations for which previous experiences provided weak preparation. This
aspect of the Conquest illustrates the way cultural categories are often
stretched by new realities which force a community to adapt those categories
and explain anomalies. 1 And, as Adrian Van Oss has noted, this was not a
world in which spirituality and realism were two mutually exclusive ways of
thinking~as was perhaps the case three hundred years later. Colonial
administrators confronted an immediate challenge: the Indians were dispersed
and therein hard to either administer or convert. The Missionaries played a
central role in the process of reduction which sought to move the Indians into
towns in which tribute and prayers could be more easily gathered.
The grand theory of Spanish colonialism sought to create separate
republics-Indian and Spanish-with their own leaders, but under Spanish rule.
The mediating force was the local Indian cacique; through the paying of
various gifts-machetes and other tools, the colonizers sought to "reinforce the
power and reputation of such caciques as took the Catholic faith as their own"
(van Oss 1986: 16). But the actions of settlers quickly reduced the authority of
caciques . In theory these Indian leaders ruled by natural law; in practice they
were frequently removed from power and even killed by settlers who the
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Crown often had little effective control over despite orders from the King on
behalf of the Indians. Hence, to view the caciques as a nobility in either an
economic or political sense cannot be squared with reality. Between the actions
of encomenderos and the religious orders, they were caught in the middle;
without real power, Mayan leaders were often forced to do the bidding of the
settlers, alienating their own community while offering little economic benefit.
The result in structural terms was the breakdown of autonomous Indian
communities, the beginning of a cash economy, and the gradual
"transformation of a various and tribal people into a kind of peasantry"
(MacLeod: 142).
While immediate economic interests shaped the character of Indian rule,
we should not conclude that they were always dominant or that Indians
everywhere faced equal levels of cultural destruction and economic
subjugation. The conflicts between economic, political, and religious goals
produced varied results. MacLeod argued that clear socio-economic differences
existed between the Western Highlands and the Eastern regions of what is
present-day Guatemala. Christopher Lutz and W. George Lovell (1990) have
recently extended this analysis, arguing that the division was a reflection of the
ways the Spanish viewed the economic potential of the two regions. The lack
of commercial interest in the highlands put less direct pressure on the
indigenous communities of the area. At the same time, colonial administrators
viewed Indian communities as important sources of labor and revenue, and
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exercised more control over encomendero abuses than in more distant part of
the Audiencia. The bulk of the colonial population settled in what Lutz and
Lovell term the "highland core" near the capital of Santiago. Other settlers
moved into the Pacific Coast; while the western Highlands remained largely
Indian and while some commercial ventures did appear in that region, they
did not put extensive pressure on Indian lands.
Catholicism, Syncretism, and Legitimacy
As important as these economic and political considerations are in
understanding colonial Guatemala, they do not answer the question, how
legitimate was this order? Attention to the history of what Adriaan van Oss
has called "Catholic colonialism" provides an essential vantage point from
which to understand the deep tensions between theory and practice, as well as
spiritual and material concerns, and analyze their significance for the issues of
cultural legitimacy and political community.
The ways in which Catholic missionaries and priests helped to colonize
Guatemala were very much influenced by which groups were doing the work.
Early missionary accounts report that priests were lacking in quantity and
quality, a problem which led Bishop Francisco Marroquin to request the
assistance of missionaries from the monastic orders. As van Oss notes:
The American dioceses, including Guatemala, served as a sort of escape
valve for unemployed and perhaps unqualified members of the
peninsula's spiritual proletariat. (1986: 13)
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The arrival of the Franciscans, Dominicans, and others brought solutions and
new problems. The new missionaries brought with them a degree of learning
and spiritual conviction that gradually put them at odds with the "secular"
(non-monastic) clergy. The religious orders were dominant in the Western
Highlands, while the secular clergy tended to end up in the lowland centers
where the populations was less indigenous.
The dominance of the religious orders had a significant impact on
creating the political and cultural legacy of non-assimilation in the highlands.
The process of reduction put limits on the growth of encomiendas in the
region. When a clash of jurisdiction emerged between congregation and
encomendero, the missionaries usually won out. While the formation of
congregations brought some changes in the territorial basis of Indian
communities, many were still able to survive relatively intact.
W. George Lovell reports that in the Cuchumatan region in Western
Guatemala the process of gathering Indians often did not create a genuine
sense of community among the disparate groups brought together. "Far from
being homogeneous entities, many a congregation was a mosaic of small
groups that touched, but often did not interpenetrate" (1985: 80). These efforts
were carried out so that "Indians should be reduced to villages and not
allowed to live divided and separated in the mountains and wilderness where
they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal governments." The Spanish
strove to impose a new spatial order in the assumption that a cultural
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transformation would follow. Spanish-style towns-which van Oss notes were
an important element in the strengthening of the medieval church and
polity-sought to draw the Indians out of what seemed anarchical patterns of
inhabitation in remote, inaccessible areas. Sometimes, Spanish goals could be
satisfied within pre-colonial settlements; Huehuetenango was an example. This
had important cultural advantages:
It was frequently possible to establish congregaciones in which a
Catholic church was built on or adjacent to a native ceremonial complex,
thus giving Spanish power over the Indians a strong and overt symbolic
expression. (Lovell 1985: 78)
But for the most part, the success of congregaciones as vehicles of
cultural transformation was more apparent than real. Two different ways of
thinking about land were in opposition-one instrumental, the other spiritual.
Right was also motivated by economic concerns and
...a complex interplay of cultural preference and existential
circumstances constantly eroded Spanish notions of orderly, town
focused living. (Lovell: 83) 2
The methods of evangelization employed by the orders tended to
readily reinforce the inclination to not assimilate. In theory education,
especially in Spanish, was always a centerpiece of Crown policy. But in
practice neither the Indians nor the religious orders had any real interest; van
Oss suggests that the missionaries sought to create a permanent need for their
presence as missionaries, and in the process maintain their position and
privileges. This is also evident in the total disinclination to ordain indigenous
priests (1986: 161). The gradual lose of interest in the "uplift" of the Indians
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illustrates what Woodward (1985) describes as a pervasive colonial
attitude-that the Indians were happy living in poverty and idolatry. Van Oss
notes that the Spanish continually viewed the Indians as pagan idolaters, but
he argues that among the Indians themselves Catholicism, as they had
constructed it, was a powerful focus of loyalty and reverence (1986: 150). In
this way, Catholicism provided a kind of cultural legitimacy, but its terms
were fragile, grounded in non-assimilation, cultural ambiguity, and indirect
resistance.
The nature of this peculiar and ambiguous cultural order indicates that
while the institutions of Catholicism certainly transformed indigenous religious
practice and community structure, the result was not hispanicization. The
political, economic, and religious institutions of Spanish colonialism so quickly
imposed their imprint upon the life of the Maya that it is understandable why
some argue that Maya culture quickly disappeared under the institutions of
conquest. Systems of land tenure which held together an array of
cultural-political institutions were transformed by encomienda and reduccion .
At the same time, the broad contours of colonial intent and Maya response
took on shape and meaning in specific, diverse sites, and the impact and
results were by no means consistent. Community cultures and institutions
were transformed, but in ways which did not always reflect the intentions of
colonialism. What can perhaps be most safely said is that by the end of the
17th century, the structures of colonial rule-beset by inconsistency, lack of
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local compliance by settlers and Maya, and economic stagnation-were
increasingly unsatisfactory from the perspective of Spain. With the
displacement of the Habsburgs by Bourbon rule, the effort to construct and
new political and economic order was gradually enacted.
Bourbon Reform
The Spanish Enlightenment
Colonial policy underwent a fundamental reordering under the Bourbon
rulers of the 18th century. While these policies eventually contributed to the
development of an independence movement and the end of Spanish colonial
rule, the spirit of Bourbon intentions was to live on in many of the national
elites who ruled Guatemala in the 19th and 20th centuries. Economic
stagnation in the colonies and debts incurred through wars in Europe
compelled Spain to pursue economic expansion through the development of a
more capitalist, export-oriented economy. The Bourbon political goals
paralleled those of other modernizing European states: greater efficiency,
political centralization, rationalization and wealth-generating capacity. In the
accelerating climate of economic and military competition of 18th century
Europe, modern nation-states, as well as the "system" in which they pursued
their national interests, gradually began to emerge in Europe. This process
bore the influence of enlightenment ideas and principles, but as Paul Kennedy
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has recently argued, it was economic competition and sustained military
conflict that moved political leaders towards rationalization (1987: 31-73).
Gradually these developments were further transformed by nationalism, but:
It was war, and the consequences of war, that provided a much more
urgent and continuous pressure towards "nation-building" than these
philosophic considerations and slowly evolving social tendencies. (Ibid-
71)
In this way, La Ilustracion influenced Spanish culture and politics in the
same way as in other European countries--not as a series of philosophical
abstractions, but rather in the context of specific and pressing demands placed
on emerging nation-states trying to confront an array of problems with the
resources their political and cultural traditions offered. Hence the particular
features of Spain's encounter with the enlightenment were deeply rooted in its
medieval, Catholic political traditions.3 The Bourbons were forced to confront
the cultural significance of the Enlightenment because it came to them
embedded in a series of economic and technological changes which, as
Woodward notes, they could scarcely avoid confronting:
Reduction of taxes on commerce, freer trade, increased incentives to
production, expansion of African slavery, encouragement of new
technology, improved roads and navigational aids, more liberal credit
and capital accumulation laws, easier acquisition of land for agriculture,
and authorization of new commercial organizations all promoted
capitalist growth and a trend away from subsistence agriculture towards
plantation production for exports. (1990: 53)
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Reform
The Bourbons viewed strengthening the administrative and fiscal power
of the state as essential to their political and economic survival. That goal
required weakening the local power of the Catholic Church which had held up
the Habsburg system. As Miles Wortman noted:
If the Bourbon state were to stimulate private economic development
with ties to the metropolis, the Church's control of local capital had to
be broken. If taxation to develop state power was to be increased, the
ecclesiastical credit institutions had to be destroyed and replaced by
private individuals whose primary aim was to profit from an increase in
commerce. (1982: 133)
But the struggle between state and clerical power was not resolved quickly for
much was at stake. Spanish state power gradually won some
victories—particularly after the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1766~as the state
became the center of finance, and religious influence remained strongest in the
realm of education. Still, the financial power of the Church was not effectively
broken until the late 19th century.
The Crown also sought to expand its capacity to tax local merchants and
communities. In order for fiscal reform to succeed, administrative reforms
were necessary which brought the Crown into localities which had previously
seen it as a distant and not immediately relevant force in their lives. This was
the purpose behind the creation of four intendentes within colonial Guatemala:
Leon, Chiapas, Salvador, and Comayagua. This new administrative structure
had long-term significance as new military and financial institutions provided
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more power and autonomy to provincial elites who had long resented the
economic and political power of Guatemala. These tensions gradually created
increasingly separate notions of political interest and identity.
While the process of economic and political reforms in Spain was not as
extensive as in some other European states, it brought enormous changes in
economic structure. Subsistence and barter economies were gradually being
altered by the increased links to a expanding global capitalist system.
Inconsistency, the lack of adequate bureaucracy, and local conflicts all hindered
the success of reforms. New commercial possibilities for some threatened the
status of others; these changes thus sharpened the political schisms which
divided colonial elites during and after the movement for independence.
Stronger State, Weaker Legitimacy
By the end of the 18th century, reforms undertaken by the Bourbons
had begun to weaken the political authority and legitimacy of the Catholic
Church both in Spain and in her colonial empire. Medieval political traditions
had been forced, by political necessity, to grapple with the Enlightenment and
its often contradictory language of reason, freedom, and rationality.4 The
emergence of new forces such as capitalism and republicanism did not destroy
Spanish traditions, but they did loosen some of the fundamental cultural
moorings of the colonial world. Church and State were never again to exist in
so culturally close a fit in Guatemala, except in a more limited way during the
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Conservative rule of Rafael Carrera from 1837 to 1865. While maintaining
strong support among traditional elites, the Catholic Church was increasingly
at odds with important emerging groups.
In the next section, I examine the ways these changes shaped elite
conflict and the movement for independence. But the weakening of the
temporal power of the Church by new ideologies of state modernization
brought profound changes to indigenous communities that were resisted by
many. Clearly the Indians had viewed the Church ambiguously; but it was the
only Spanish cultural institution which ever came close to possessing
legitimacy. To the reformers that legitimacy was useless, grounded as it was in
distance and difference rather than assimilation. As the economy had grown
more complex, the loose administrative spread of the clergy was inadequate.
Van Oss describes their dilemma well:
[Whereas] it was the clergy who provided the nerves and sinews
guaranteeing continual colonial presence. Royal officialdom relied on the
parish priests to fulfill many basic functions besides the care of
souls. ...no official policy could be executed at the local level without
recourse to the parochial office. (1986: 152-154)
While economic change and enlightenment ideology had their own
momentum as historical forces, they could not readily generate a new cultural
basis for legitimacy and instead provoked increased fragmentation and open
resistance in many indigenous communities. Carol Smith has argued that the
pattern which had previously developed in Guatemala--a degree of corporate
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autonomy for indigenous communities-meant that when first the Bourbons
and later post- independence Liberal governments moved to strengthen state
administrative and fiscal power, they confronted resistance. Reforms altered
"the rules of governance without developing a legitimate ideology for popular
consumption" (1990a: 260). What existed instead was a fragmented world of
enlightenment, Catholic, Iberian, and Maya cultural forms and enclaves; none
was wholly separate and all were shaped by the particulars of the colonial
experience. This conflict and confusion exposed just how tenuous and
internally contradictory the previous cultural order had been while deepening
a legitimacy problem which has never been resolved. 5
Independence and Federation
Conservatives, Liberals, and Independence
Miles Wortman has noted that the power of the Spanish monarch "was
greater in 1790 than any time since the Conquest and yet within twenty years
most of the accomplishments were destroyed" (Wortman: 156). Bourbon
reforms and economic expansion had brought the region more fully into the
world economy than every before. Subsistence economies that had depended
upon nature for prosperity became dependent on European demand for dye as
well as fluctuations of nature in their regions and the indigo zone. Trade was
increased, though monopoly was still the rule, as was the case throughout
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Europe and the Americas in the 18th century. The Spanish were forced to
confront their rivals in the Isthmus-particularly the British-providing further
impetus for revenue generation and economic development. But while at times
able to take advantage of particular products-indigo, most notably-the
Spanish economic position was precarious within the emerging world market.
The fundamental weakness of Spain's position internationally was
multiplied by the impact of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars.
Discontent with Spanish rule grew within Guatemala among the 4% of the
population of the Audiencia in 1810 which was white and dominated political
life. But within that small group were nasty cleavages and resentments,
particularly between penisulares and criollos . The latter group generally
believed that Crown policy had systematically privileged the former at their
expense; this split was to color many of the policy disagreements and party
divisions which grew deeper and more violent after independence in 1823. In a
new structural environment, new questions challenged and altered the political
culture of Guatemala.
One group, which eventually was represented by the Liberal Party,
tended towards free trade, anti-clericalism, and republican political reforms.
They were intellectually under the star of the American and French revolution
and the rhetoric of free government, equality, and the principles of
enlightenment reason and progress. The Conservatives, on the other hand,
opposed each of those positions and upheld traditional values and institutions.
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Resentful of the dominance of royal and penisulare officials and threatened by
many of the administrative and economic reforms being enacted, Woodward
argues they began to:
...embrace two views of Spain, one historical, the other immediate...on
the one hand the Creoles idealized a glorious Spanish past-Spain at the
peak of its power, the Spain of the Conquest, with its elevated cultural
and spiritual values. They saw themselves as defenders of this spirit in
the new world. (1985: 75)
This brought them in opposition to what they viewed as "scheming and
calculating royal officials threatening their economic position with bothersome
and misguided laws" (Ibid).
The positions taken by each faction vis-a-vis independence were not
consistent or predictable, owing to the upheaval in Spain throughout the first
decades of the 19th century. The Spanish republicans were not inclined to
grant independence (Karnes 1976: 12-28). Moreover the Captain General, Jose
de Bustamante y Guerra, appointed in 1812, was a conservative who opposed
the republican constitution established by the government set up at Cadiz in
resistance to Napoleon. Bustamante's determined efforts to weaken liberal
forces in the colony provoked revolts throughout the Audiencia, until a more
extensive crackdown accompanied the return of Ferdinand VII in 1814. With
the restoration of the 1812 Cadiz Constitution in 1820, the movement for
independence started up again but it was far from united. Conservatives
rejected Spanish republicanism, but they also feared the potential strength of
liberal forces within a Central American federation. Many supported the plan
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put forward by Mexican leader Agustin de Iturbide which proposed to make
the Audiencia part of the newly independent country of Mexico. Many liberals
were fearful that Guatemalan elites would retain their traditional dominance,
but a majority of local municipios voted for independence. Still, as Woodward
notes,
All accepted independence from Spain, but there were variations in
their approaches to the future, so that as the national period opened
Central America was politically fragmented and caught up in wave of
regional and local acts of separation. (1990: 58)
Jim Handy develops the same point more broadly:
For Central America, independence came not as a victory in a bitter
battle against a commonly perceived oppressor. Rather it was the
culmination of a series of incidents that prompted almost universal
acceptance of the need for breaking ties with Spain, but which did little
to determine the shape that politics would take in the region. (1984: 37)
Federation and Discord
Full Central American independence came in March 1823 after Iturbide
was overthrown and the annexation of Guatemala was nullified. But calling
Central America a nation did not make it so. The states of the Federation, built
upon the powers given the intendentes by Bourbon reforms, and strengthened
by the independence period, were only weakly controlled by the federal
government. Woodward characterized the 1824 constitution as a mix of the
1812 Cadiz and 1789 American Constitution. "Widely recognized as
pro-liberal," it gave greatest power to local legislative assemblies and
"provided inadequate authority or revenue to the central government" (1990:
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59). These structures reinforced regional and social rivalries and factions which
had given rise to quite different interests and identities. Miles Wortman argues
that "most people in Central America recognized the state government as their
nation" (1983: 253). Moreover, each of the republics was internally divided,
though liberal forces were generally dominant beyond Guatemala.
Conservative forces took control of the federal government in 1826, but were
driven out in 1829 after two years of constant armed conflict between the two
parties. Honduran Liberal Francisco Morazan's efforts to organize a strong
national government were a failure; he was more successful in organizing
military forces which could put down threats to individual republics. In this
way, the era of confederation was mainly notable for the solidification of local
political structures and identities as the principle point of reference.
Liberal Rule: 1829-1837
Guatemala was always the strongest bastion of conservatism during the
movement toward independence. Its privilege and influence during Spanish
rule had long fueled provincial resentments, and distrust of Guatemala's
traditional aristocratic elite remained pervasive in the violent conflicts over
power which occurred in the first years of the federation. After the triumph of
Morazan's forces in 1829, the federal capital was moved to San Salvador, and
Liberal Mariano Galvez became Guatemala's new governor (Handy 1984:
39-40). Galvez set forth an ambitious program of economic and social reforms
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designed to create a modern, "enlightened" political economy. At the heart of
these reforms was the belief that Guatemala's Indian and Catholic heritages
were impediments to political and economic development. Going beyond the
original intent to separate church and state, Galvez moved actively to exile or
remove particularly vocal priests and weaken the Church's financial and
property holdings. The Liberals attempted to establish a unified legal system to
replace the juridical world of institutional fueros . They sought to end the
separate system of legal protection for Indians and promote equality. Galvez'
attack on the power of the Church included an effort at education reform that
would create a public school system to "westernize" the Indians (Woodward
1985: 102).
The Liberal program for economic development emphasized agricultural
modernization. Prior to Independence, Guatemala was still characterized by
extensive areas of land remaining under the control of indigenous
communities. While efforts to take over these lands were occasionally
successful, the Colonial state saw the Indian communities as important sources
of revenue and hence restricted the possibilities for purchasing community
lands (McCreery 1990). Galvez' government pursued diversification and a
strengthened position within the emerging world market; they hoped to
transform various "inefficiencies" within the agrarian sector-"most importantly,
inadequate agricultural practice on the part of Guatemalan peasants" (Handy
1984: 45).
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Liberal reform measures directly challenged the fiscal autonomy of
Indian communities and the traditional power of local officials. Galvez' policies
sought to exercise greater coercive power over Indian labor, levied an onerous
head tax, promoted foreign investment, and challenged Indian land holdings
(Woodward 1971: 49-55). His government also moved to extract greater
revenue from the cajas de communidad, community funds which were
traditionally under the control of village leaders. Legislation passed in 1829
allowed for the public sale of tierras baldias held by Indian communities as
well as the privatization of all common land. When Indians could not
document their legal title to the land, as was usually the case, they often lost it.
The goal of these measures was to open the land up to development by
agricultural entrepreneurs, especially foreigners who would be encouraged to
invest while an indigenous labor force would be compelled to work in these
new enterprises.
The Failure of Liberalism
Galvez' programs provoked resistance and often were imposed by force.
Indigenous rebellions grew more extensive and violent after a cholera
epidemic broke out in 1836. Catholic officials seized on the epidemic as a sign
of God's disfavor with Liberal political attacks on the Church and tradition;
they sowed suspicion about government vaccine programs. When the
government moved to enforce efforts at quarantine, a peasant army quickly
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coalesced under the leadership of Rafael Carrera in 1837. Conservatives argued
that Liberal reform programs were fomenting social chaos and disorder.
Galvez' program aimed at assimilating the Indians. The Conservatives
claimed this meant exploitation, with the danger of rebellion and
violence. Instead they offered paternalism and protection. (Woodward
1985: 115)
As Galvez waffled in response, a group of Liberals sought a coalition with
Carrera, believing the "illiterate goat herder" could be easily manipulated. They
underestimated their erstwhile ally; after the removal of Galvez in 1837, a
power struggle ensued from which Carrera's forces emerged victorious in 1840
after the military defeat of Morazan.
Some commentators have attributed the failure of Galvez and the
Liberals to manipulation of superstitious and ignorant Indians by the forces of
reaction. Mario Rodriguez wrote that the Indians "apparently rejected the
attempt to bring them into Guatemalan society as first class citizens" (1971: 29).
His analysis focused largely on the legal mechanisms of reform—the Livingston
Codes—and the general goals of regeneration, social change and progress.
Williford (1971: 39-40) argued that the general aversion of the masses to
change presented insurmountable obstacles, particularly in the wake of the
cholera epidemic of 1837. From these perspectives, the Liberals represented the
forces of culture and enlightenment struggling in a backwards wilderness that
was not yet ready to modernize. Liberal efforts at "applied enlightenment"
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appeared too soon and could not take root in such a hostile cultural
environment.
The liberals of Galvez' era clearly failed because their programs were
inappropriate to the setting. But we must carefully analyze the political culture
within which these policies provoked such resistance. It is useful to recall that
the Independence movement itself was dominated by penisulare and criollo
elites. Indigenous communities had little reason to view independence
favorably; Bourbon reforms which challenged community autonomy and tried
to exact more revenue from villages had generated increased, if fragmented
resistance in the late 18th and early 19th century (Handy 1984: 48-49). Liberal
policies under Galvez were presented as an effort to improve the life of all and
promote "development." But from the perspective of Indian communities, a
perspective reinforced by the Catholic Church but firmly grounded in their
own experience, Liberal policies were seen as a intensification of Bourbon
efforts to weaken their political autonomy. The change from a Spanish to
Central American government did nothing to grant the policies more
legitimacy or make them seem less threatening. As Smith notes:
Because the nationalism of this period was an imposition of elite culture
on the masses and because it had no respect for local cultural forms, it
provoked a popular, cultural reaction. (1990a: 79)
The resistance by indigenous communities to the Liberals' efforts to
construct a modern "nation" reinforces James Scotfs argument that peasants
often act to maintain traditional social relations which provide relative security
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in the face of changes which, under the banner of progress and economic
development, cause greater inequality and weaken the possibilities for
subsistence (1986). The Liberals' stated intention was to improve the life of
indigenous communities and end their separate legal status; but however
"enlightened" Liberal programs by intention, the indigenous beneficiaries of
these efforts judged, with reason, their practical impact to be otherwise.
The Carrera Regime
With the triumph of Conservative forces in 1837 under the command of
Rafael Carrera, most of the Liberal constitution was set aside and a less
centralized, more personalistic form of government ensued. Woodward argues
that the Conservatives returned to the pattern of the Habsburg era in some
ways. This represented a less ambitious governmental project, with control in
many areas returned to non-governmental institutions such as the Catholic
Church, in education, and merchant guilds or consulados that oversaw
maintenance of internal infrastructure. Local government was in the hands of
municipal corporations, and the system of special courts, embodying
institutional fueros, remained predominant.
With regard to the Indians, Carrera' s government sought a return to the
spirit of colonial laws which, with the intention of promoting their spiritual
and intellectual betterment, also expressed a commitment to protect indigenous
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communities from exploitation and abuse. The goal of regulating their
existence as a labor force was balanced by a commitment to the preservation of
their communities and land holdings:
The desire to bring our country's advance and improvements by
enacting the legislation of enlightened nations, without being prepared
to receive them, has produced nothing more than trouble and evil. Our
liberalism must be limited to giving our people a general education and
improving their habits.
While Carrera's government returned to the more paternalistic political
model of the past, important social changes led to increased Indian
participation in government, particularly in the military. Maya communities
recovered some of the autonomy they had possessed in the past, and Oliver La
Farge argued in a famous analysis that this period constituted the highpoint in
terms of the relative autonomy of indigenous communities (1940). Recent work
by David McCreery has offered further evidence to back up this assessment.
The reversal of anticlerical liberal legislation could only go so far in restoring
the former financial and political power of the Catholic Church. "This situation
freed up the Cabildo [town governments] and the cofradias to become more
genuinely indigenous political and religious vehicles" (1990: 91). This did not,
McCreery adds, lead to an era of highland peace and harmony; many conflicts
over land emerged and "not only could state authorities not bring the situation
under control, they commonly had little or no idea what was going on" (Ibid:
104).
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In the first decades after independence, cochineal, used in the
production of dyes, replaced indigo as Guatemala's most important export.
Carrera promoted cochineal production because it reinforced the social policy
of the Conservatives. Cochineal was taken from insects who fed on the nopal
plant and production tended to be household based. It provided a source of
revenue for Indian producers and their communities and did not generate
increased pressure on their land (Handy 1984: 58). But with the decline of
cochineal in the face of bad harvests and the discovery of aniline substitutes in
the 1850s, interest in coffee increased as Guatemalans saw the success that
Costa Rica and El Salvador were having in the world market.
While coffee production is often associated with the Liberal regimes
after 1971, both Carrera and his successor Vicente Cerna (1865-71) offered
incentives to promote coffee production and the new crop quickly expanded to
provide 50% of the country's export revenues by 1871 (McCreery 1990: 104).
But there were inherent limits in the Conservative approach to coffee
production from the perspective of the newly emergent planters. If the
enormous economic potential of the crop was to be more fully realized,
reforms in the policy and capacity of the nation state were necessary. In this
environment liberal economic and political ideas gained renewed credence as
the solution to Guatemala's economic weakness within the changing and
expanding world economy.
Liberal Reform 1871-1944
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Conservative President Cerna was overthrown in 1871 and replaced by
Miguel Garcia Granados (1871-1873). The new President's cautious moves
towards reform provoked impatience among more aggressive Liberals;
Granados resigned and was succeeded by Justo Rufino Barrios (1873-1885).
Barrios accelerated the Reforma Liberal and ushered in an era of Liberal rule
which would last until World War II and leave an imprint upon Guatemalan
society and political economy which still remains. These Liberals were very
much the heirs of the earlier tradition of anti-clericalism, faith in foreign
capital, and a general rejection of the political traditions inherited from Spain.
But their development philosophy included new elements reflecting the
economic and intellectual world of their era, as well as the lessons learned
from Carrera's defeat of their forebears in 1837. As Woodward notes, this new
generation was less idealistic and more overtly elitist in its rhetoric and
ideology. Political democracy was only a distant goal which could not be
approached without a prior economic and cultural transformation. These new
Liberal policies were inspired by cultural, economic and political goals which
were related in theory but are best analyzed separately in practice, for they left
a complex and inconsistent legacy.
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Culture
E. Bradford Burns has argued that 19th century Latin American
countries were often the scene of fundamental cultural conflict between three
groups: a Europeanized elite seeking North Atlantic-style modernization; a
conservative elite interested in slower and more selective adaption of outside
influences; and the masses who generally had to fight to preserve whatever
security tradition offered and whose situation was generally worsened by
"progress" (1980). The era of Carrera's rule clearly represented the ascendence
and dominance of the latter two perspectives in an ambiguous balance. The
return to Liberal government, especially with the rise of Barrios, brought the
unambiguous victory of the first group.
The Liberals viewed themselves as a progressive cultural vanguard with
a mission to impress their more advanced ideas upon a backward nation. They
spoke, in even sharper terms than Liberals of the 1820s and 30s, of the need to
purge the population of the Indian and Catholic influences that obstructed
Guatemala's potential for national development. The dominant philosophic
ethics behind these efforts were positivism and Social Darwinism; Liberals
embraced what they termed a "scientific philosophy" which carried the
promise of progress and modernity (Burnett 1986; 1990). Their idea of
progress, fueled by Social Darwinism, carried explicit assumptions about the
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racial and cultural superiority of the new missionaries. In Burnett's words:
Progress was converted into a synonym for the importation of values,
beliefs and if possible the genetic heritage of Northern Europe and
North America. Seen in this way Protestant missionaries were the
perfect physical and ideological vehicle for the improvement of the
nation-not only would they bring their capital, they would also
promote by their own effort, the same attitudes and values that had
brought their own people to the vanguard of developmental evolution.
(1990: 16)
President Barrios and his successors hoped that German and North
American immigrants would provide a vehicle for a transformation of cultural
values. Protestant missionaries were invited to set up schools to which the
President sent his own children as an example to others. The vision of the
liberal reformers—their project of economic and social modernization—inclined
them quite readily to see Protestant missionaries as partners in the task of
overcoming the debilitating influence of the Catholic Church on Guatemalan
culture and economy. Their goal was not simply the conversion of souls but
also, in the words of a missionary-'minds, bodies, and spirits."
These sentiments did not only express the goals of liberal reformers like
Barrios. They gradually came to reflect the foreign policy interests of
Guatemala's powerful neighbor to the north. While United States' missionaries
were initially slow to respond to Barrios' appeal, they gradually took up the
idea, which became prominent in the 1880s, that Christians-in other words,
Protestants-possessed a God-given duty to civilize non-European parts of the
world. They shared the ideas expressed with growing fervor by politicians and
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ministers such as Josiah Strong who informed his fellow Anglo Saxons that
God was "preparing mankind to receive our impress." One prominent
missionary in Guatemala, Edward Haymaker, referred to a "missionary
corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine which in essence stated that:
Central America is our responsibility. Others are not going to evangelize
it. The spirit of the Monroe Doctrine governs more than European
armies, it also discourages European missionaries and keeps mem at a
distance. (Cited by Burnett 1990: 23)
It was, therefore, the duty of North Americans to elevate backward peoples
and free them from vice, poverty, illiteracy, moral and spiritual degradation,
and superstition.6
In spite of continued effort and government support, the success of
these missionary ventures remained minimal during the first several decades
of this century. An institutional infrastructure was established, and liberal
reforms which decreed Catholicism to no longer be the state religion decisively
weakened the political and economic power of the Church. But the numbers of
converts remained quite small-never more than 5% of the population~and the
cultural power of Catholicism remained very strong. Burnett argues that in
essence the missionaries spoke a cultural language that was foreign to the
majority of the population. In many cases the linguistic barrier was more literal
as the missionaries were very slow to learn and use indigenous languages. But
even when the Bible was translated from Spanish into Quiche or Mam, the
aggressive anti-Catholic rhetoric deployed in seeking conversion often
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alienated more than it convinced. Burnett argues that it was only when
Protestantism began to find indigenous points of reference that it was able to
attract significant numbers of converts. What had been missing, and only
began to really appear in the 1950s and 60s, were religious messages
emanating from these churches which could speak in some way to the cultural
world of indigenous Guatemalans rather than simply to a small, racist elite
which looked to Europe and North America for its cultural models.7
Economic Development
While the Liberal's ambitious cultural goals were not realized, their
economic programs fundamentally altered the socio-economic condition of
indigenous communities as well as their relation to the state. Believing that
economic development would flow from an expanded agro-export sector,
Barrios immediately implemented policies designed to increase the availability
of land for coffee production as well as the expansion of available credit.
Railroads and shipping facilities were constructed. The results were
impressive: production grew by five times between 1871 and 1884, and
Guatemala's coffee won gold medals in Europe in 1888 (Handy 1984: 64).
Policies to promote coffee production necessarily involved securing
adequate supplies of labor. But the cultural goals of the reformers not
withstanding, the state was cautious and did not attempt to abolish communal
land holdings. David McCreery argues that while such a process did move
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very rapidly, and violently, in El Salvador and to a lesser extent in Nicaragua,
the situation in Guatemala was more complex. He also maintains that this
difference goes part of the way towards explaining why resistance to Liberal
policy was slower to develop than it had earlier in the century. The best coffee
lands were not in the highlands; this put less direct pressure on communal
lands than was the case in El Salvador. The Guatemalan state wanted to
ensure a ready supply of labor and did so under the system of forced labor
known as mandamiento . Yet, as I noted, the experiences of the 1830s had
chastened the new liberals and they were careful to avoid provoking another
uprising.
While Liberal reforms did not generally threaten communal lands, they
did greatly increase state control over the highlands and change the terms of
Indian-state relations. As previously noted, indigenous communities survived
the initial conquest more successfully in the Western Highlands in part
because they had received greater protection from the state, which viewed
them as an important source of revenue. Since Guatemala was the
administrative center of the Audiencia, colonial officials could more effectively
enforce crown decrees protecting Indian communities from exploitation; they
also dominated the processes which controlled access to Indian labor. Carol
Smith argues that the dominance of Church and state in the area "inhibited the
rise of a powerful landed oligarchy in the province holding power
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independent of the state." In other parts of the kingdom, these structures were
weaker and the local economic elites more dominant.
This kept most Guatemalan Indians more isolated from non-Indian
settlers than in other parts of the New World. It also prevented the rise
of a powerful landed oligarchy in the province, holding power
independent of the state. Thus, it established the central contradiction in
Guatemala, that between Indian communities and the state, rather than
between peasants and landowners or workers and the state. (1990a: 74)
When Indians were exploited in the colonial period, therefore, the process was
to large degree managed by the state. Coffee production built on this pattern
while altering the specific dynamics in important ways.
At the same time, legislation, reinforced by direct coercion, forced many
to labor in the new coffee fincas (Cambranes 1985; McCreery 1983). In the
process, Smith argues, the terms of ethnic identity shifted and "Indian" and
"ladino" took on their modern meaning in the highlands. The categories were
reconstructed amidst new strategies for the control of Indian labor. Prior to
this time the primary division had been between Indians and whites. Smith
illustrates this point by noting that Carrera, by modern definition clearly a
ladino, was widely labelled an Indian in his own time (1990a: 72-95).
The modern construction of ladino in the Western Highlands only
became widespread in the wake of the increased economic and political
penetration of the area after 1871. Ladino now referred to individuals who
were sometimes mestizo, and sometimes pure Indians who spoke Spanish and
no longer lived in indigenous communities. In the zones where the coffee
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economy flourished, ladinos, who had previously faced restrictions on their
right to live in the Western Highlands, began to move into the areas as "special
agents of the state and coffee economy"--as government officials, soldiers, labor
contractors, merchants. Whereas their economic status previously had been
essentially the same as Indians relative to the white elite, coffee production
engendered new class relations between Indians and ladinos. Smith writes:
What is notable.. .in Guatemala is that the emergence of agrarian
capitalism which eradicated distinctions between Indians and
non-Indians in the coffee zones of the rest of Central America, created
divisions between Indians and non-Indians in the coffee zones of
Guatemala which did not exist in the pre-coffee era. (1990a: 85)
Whereas in other parts of Guatemala-particularly in the capitol and the
Eastern Highlands—they gradually came to be viewed uniformly as poor
ladinos, in the highlands Indians and ladinos became "separate and opposed
classes" with the latter possessing political control through dominance of local
state institutions (1990a: 86).
These changes strengthened the long existing tendency of Indian
communities to define their interests and identity in opposition to the state,
instead of an economic class. On the one hand there was the further
strengthening of the state as the agent of capitalist expansion and, at the same
time, the continued presence of autonomous Indian communities resisting
efforts at cultural assimilation. Liberal governments did not need to launch an
all-out attack on indigenous lands in order to achieve their goals. Their project
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emphasized generating new export production, recruiting laborers, and
expanding administrative control. The expansion of state power in the form of
comandantes locales made rebellion much less possible, and local officials now
represented the state more fully than ever before (McCreery 1990: 110). Still,
the history of Indian resistance made the post-1871 Liberals cautious not to
upset local traditions any more than was necessary to further their ends.
The agro-export emphasis of the Guatemalan economy was extended
during the 22-year rule of Manual Estrada Cabrera (1898-1919). The first
decades of the new century brought increased dependency as foreign
entrepreneurs opened up the humid lowlands for banana cultivation.
Government land concessions and tax exemptions permitted the United Fruit
Company to gain control of the Guatemalan Railway Company. El Pulpo, the
Octopus, became one of the most powerful political and economic forces in
Guatemala.
Political Development
While there were elements of continuity, the rule of Barrios and those
who followed differed fundamentally from the caudillismo of Carrera. By
restoring some of the power of the Church and a more decentralized
governing structure, Carrera's rule possessed a degree of legitimacy. He came
to power with support from the masses, and even though he ruled in alliance
with conservative elites, his policies permitted much greater autonomy for
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local institutions. Barrios also ruled with paternalism and personalismo. but
did so with an improved bureaucratic apparatus and an explicit commitment
to a national project built around an image of racial difference (McCreery 1983:
16-17). His government openly equated the interests of a small, "enlightened",
developmentalist elite with those of the nation and for that reason was both
more powerful and less legitimate than Carrera.
While Estrada Cabrera ruled with an iron hand that kept him in power
for over two decades, elite opposition did emerge in response to his
compliance with the wishes of the United States government and foreign
companies. When Cabrera finally alienated his North American allies during
World War I, his foes were emboldened to remove the dictator in a 1920 coup.
The regimes of the 1920s represent both continuity and a time of transition.
Carlos Herrara's Unionist Party (1920-21) promoted trying to reestablish the
Central American Federation and tried to negotiate better terms with foreign
interests; Herrara was ousted in 1921. General Jose Maria Orellano (1921-26)
returned to a more compliant position and was immediately viewed more
favorably by the United States. But while Orellano and then Lazaro Chacon
(1926-30) often ruled with a repressive hand worthy of their distinguished
predecessors, conflict and contestation were much more evident. Elements of
the country's economic elite expressed opposition to government concessions
to United Fruit. New urban labor and professional groups were gradually
organizing. While movements for reform never approached the dimensions of
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those which emerged in El Salvador in the late 1920s, they reflected the
uncertainty and ferment of the times. To call this a full-fledged legitimacy
crisis would be an overstatement, however; legitimacy had been tenuous at
best during the Liberal era.
The rising political star of the decade was Jorge Ubico, godson of Rufino
Barrios. His work in a series of administrative positions established a record of
efficiency and reform which gradually won Ubico a following among
university students in the capital. After his 1926 effort to form an alternative
Liberal Progressive Party failed, Ubico returned to the traditional Liberal Party
as a vehicle for his political ambitions and won election in 1931.
The world wide depression after 1929 devastated the market for
Guatemala's exports and brought a 40% drop in trade between 1929 and 1932
(Dunkerley 1988: 90). In this environment Dunkerley argues that Central
American states
pursued essentially defensive and preemptive strategies in order to
maintain the plantation economy. The suppression of social unrest and
violence directed against political opponents was primarily to ensure the
preservation of existing social relations rather than in support of an
aggressive expanisionism. (1988: 94)
Victor Bulmer-Thomas argues that the structure of political control dominant
in Central America prior to the depression, which he calls the "liberal
oligarchic state" gave way to a more authoritarian model. The depression
brought increased unemployment and labor activism, intensifying demands
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upon the state. While the 1920s had exposed conflict among the economic elite,
particularly regarding the power of foreign interests, the 1930s encouraged
greater cooperation to keep the economy afloat. The depth of the economic
crisis temporarily quieted elite divisions; a strengthened state apparatus
clamped down on the spaces for political debate which had opened in the
1920s while marshalling fiscal resources towards recovery of the export
agriculture sector (1987: 82-86).
While Ubico extended the tradition of personalistic dictatorship, he also
introduced significant new elements to Guatemalan political institutions and
culture. By replacing locally elected alcaldes with hand-chosen intendentes,
Ubico increased the presence and control of the central government within
local communities. Ubico also changed the system of labor control in the
countryside; debt peonage was abolished but vagrancy laws satisfied the needs
of landowners while requiring the rural population to submit to administration
through a system of identity cards. He employed forced labor to construct new
roads which further expanded national-local linkages. Ubico's policies to
strengthen the national government were reinforced and consolidated by
expansion of the institutional capacity and coherence of the military and
security apparatus (Adams 1970; McClintock 1985: 14-20). The Escuela
Politecnica was expanded and military instructors from the United States and
their methods came to replace the French and Spanish curricula previously
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dominant. Internal security mechanisms were also enlarged, most notably
through expansion of the National Police.
Ubico's actions appear to have been motivated more by the logic of
personal power than by a coherent ideology of development (Handy 1984:
97-101; Dunkerley 1988: 99-101; Adams 1970: 176-86). At the same time,
Ubico's success in stimulating economic growth generated some popularity
among the emerging urban middle class. Periodic trips into the countryside,
made possible by new road construction, helped Ubico also build some
support among the rural population. But his systematic suppression of free
speech and political opposition provided little real legitimacy. Guatemala was
more of a nation in terms of administrative structures and state power, but a
stable and broad-based national political identity was still largely lacking.
While Ubico modernized the structures of repressive dictatorship in some
important ways, the early 1940s brought structural and cultural forces to bear
which undermined his legitimacy with elites while the struggle against
European fascism discredited his style of rule among other groups: students,
elements of the military, unions, and professionals. The war generated
increased markets for Guatemalan goods, but this growth and economic
development, brought about partly by Ubico's policies, at the same time
strengthened the influence of the groups which now opposed his dictatorship.
When elite and military support for Ubico further dwindling, a coalition of
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young military officers and middle class groups succeeded in overthrowing the
dictator in 1944.
The Revolution: 1944-1954
The era of Liberal rule between 1871 and 1944 had transformed
Guatemalan political economy. Export-based coffee and banana industries
linked Guatemala closely to the global economy and its vagaries. Foreign
economic interests played a central and growing role. While generating
economic growth, export oriented policies had not established the kind of
development they originally promised, and were never able to generate new
forms of legitimacy to replace the traditional sources they undermined. This
was particularly true with regard to indigenous communities; Liberal reforms
brought tighter state control and a weakening of local autonomy, but the
pattern of non-assimilation and cultural survival endured.
The Programs of the Revolution
The 1944 revolution which toppled Ubico remains the central event of
20th century Guatemalan history. New forces and new social groups came to
power, and significant changes were enacted in the institutional order. The
revolution produced an immediate opening up of the political process to a
disparate array of groups which had previously been either without any
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voice-peasants and workers--or effectively co-opted or repressed-students,
professional groups, trade unions. In December 1944, Juan Jose Arevalo was
elected President; his program of "spiritual socialism" promised "sympathy for
the man who works in the field, in the shops, on the military base, in small
business." Arevalo invoked the political program of Franklin Roosevelt and
rejected materialist socialism as "contrary to human nature" (quoted by Handy
1984: 106). The initial programs of the new government provided greater
constitutional protections and established a rudimentary welfare system in
health and social security. A labor code instituted in 1947 set forth the rights of
workers, including the right to strike and bargain collectively. Ubico's
intendente system was replaced by local elections which allowed for renewed
community autonomy while opening the rural areas up to national political
party organizations (Dunkerley 1988: 139).
These reforms reflected the goal of political modernization pursued by
the Arevalo administration. The President spoke of integrating Guatemala's
indigenous communities into a broader national political and economic
community and developed government education projects which, in the words
of a government agency, sought "to dispense to the further corners of the
republic the cult of the patriotic symbols and historical values of the nation."
(Cited by Handy 1990: 166). This goal was furthered by the development of
political parties in highlands municipios . At the same time, these programs
shared many of the traditional ladino biases against Indian communities and
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their cultures. Like their Liberal predecessors, the revolutionaries viewed
Indian culture as a largely negative influence which they now hoped could be
transformed by education. As such, Arevalo's programs were often
paternalistic (Adams 1990: 147-157).
Arevalo approached economic modernization cautiously, particularly in
the crucial export agriculture sector. Rural workers were given rights under
the labor code and Ubico's vagrancy law apparatus was overturned. Research
undertaken by the government's Agrarian Studies Commission suggested the
need for fundamental agrarian reform, but Arevalo feared alienating
conservative forces who might label such reforms communist and instigate a
counter-revolution. Though Arevalo's election had been facilitated by the
cooperation of important sectors of the military, opposition remained, as
reflected in the numerous coup attempts mounted against the civilian
President. After divisions in the military were exacerbated by the assassination
of Colonel Francisco Arana, under circumstances which appeared to implicate
his chief rival, Jacobo Arbenz, Arana's supporters revolted. Arbenz defeated
these forces and purged them from the military; he was subsequently elected
President in 1950.
Arbenz immediately moved towards a program of economic
modernization which in his own words strove to:
...convert Guatemala from a backward country with a predominantly
feudal economy into a modern capitalist state.. .our policy must
necessarily be based on strengthening private initiative and developing
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Guatemalan capital in whose hand rests the fundamental economic
activity of the country, (quoted in Handy 1984: 115)
A key element in Arbenz' program was the promotion of a more modern,
diversified agricultural sector. A 1951 study by the World Bank emphasized
the need to diversify and integrate the highlands into the national economy:
The basic poverty of Indian highland agriculture permanently hampers
not only agricultural progress but the whole economic growth of
Guatemala; for the Indian population constitutes the bulk of the
potential internal market, without which industry cannot develop
adequately. (Ibid)
While Arevalo's policies had freed Indian communities from forced labor,
they did very little to improve their general economic condition or further the
oft-stated goal of national integration. Rural unions and peasant leagues
organized after 1948, leading to greater political participation and pressure for
a more aggressive policy.
In 1952, Arbenz proposed the Agrarian Reform Law with the expressed
purpose of creating the conditions in which a rural middle class of small
farmers could be established. This was viewed as a step towards the
development of a larger internal market that would stimulate new production
and achieve the goal of diversification. The program provided land and credit
to over 100,000 landless families. A study by the Bank of Guatemala indicated
that the economic impact on agricultural productivity was largely positive, in
spite of the dire predictions which opponents had made (Handy 1988: 687-88).
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But the political impact was polarizing and ultimately fatal to the
revolution. Peasant leagues and unions sought to accelerate the process while
Church leaders, and finqueros mobilized opposition. As communist
involvement, particularly at the local level, became evident, Arbenz opponents
pressured the President to disassociate himself from the program and purge
the communists from government agencies such as the Agrarian Reform and
the Social Security Institutes, as well as from trade unions and peasant leagues,
but Arbenz resisted. The military viewed the reform programs with increasing
concern because they challenged its institutional power in rural areas. While
the military as an institution was not directly involved, its refusal to defend
Arbenz from the CIA-backed "liberation forces" led by Carlos Castillo Armas
sealed the revolution's fate.8
The Political Cultural Legacy of the Revolution
The revolution clearly left an enormous legacy in terms of new
institutions, political mobilization and memory. Virtually every sector of
society drew its own lessons from the experience. Those most immediately
involved in the counter-revolution were re-emboldened in their determination
to resist change. Still, many military officials who were not allies of Arbenz
were troubled by the North American intervention, and wary of letting the
military become simply a tool of the wealthy. The groups involved in or
mobilized by the revolution drew an assortment of conclusions. Some were
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further radicalized by the evident opposition of the United States to change.
The downfall of Arbenz and the counter-revolution which followed provided a
powerful lesson of the limits of reform projects given the framework of United
States foreign policy perspectives on the region. For the Catholic Church,
opposition to the revolution inspired a search for more moderate alternatives
that would lead in unexpected directions. It also created more space for
Protestant churches.
At another level, the revolution often represents a missed opportunity
made all the more tragic by what has occurred since. Politicians of that era
who survive still try to proclaim themselves its heir~as did the vice
Presidential candidate of the Christian Democrats in the November 1990
elections. A generation of mobilizations and terror stand between those days
and the present, and it is not clear how tangible any political project based on
the revolution as its animating myth can be in present day Guatemala.
Nonetheless, the memory of failure and elite intransigence that the counter-
revolution represents remains a powerful presence in Guatemalan political
culture. 9
The impact of the revolution on Indian communities has been debated
among scholars. Some stress the efforts at education and economic reform and
the elimination of vagrancy laws (Handy 1988; 1990). Others have seen the
impact more negatively with regard to community autonomy (Wasserstrom
1975). Richard Adams described a "sociological awakening" that was deepened
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by later events, but given important propulsion by the events of these years
(1970). Adams argued that for the first time Indian communities pursued an
active involvement in the national political system. Adams' recent analysis of
ladino discourse on ethnicity during the revolution has revealed the
ethnocentrism within well-intentioned programs. While emphasizing Indian
poverty and exploitation, and the need for change, Indians themselves "are
portrayed as capable of no self-generated action" (1990: 160).
This does not mean that Indians rejected the revolutionary programs
and political activity. Handy argues that whatever attitudes ladino officials and
activists might have carried towards Indian communities, the communities
themselves often participated actively and saw reforms as a way to further
their own agendas: "Community members were adapting national institutions
at the same time as they were adopting them, just as they had done numerous
times in the past" (1990: 182). 10
The ambivalent relationship between the revolution and indigenous
communities raises some fundamental issues regarding legitimacy and national
community. To the extent that Arevalo and Arbenz sought legitimacy, they
were partly defeated by the failure to achieve mass support at a level which
might have generated a stronger defense against intervention. As long as
indigenous communities have struggled to maintain their own identity and
these ambitions have not been fully appreciated by ladino political reformers,
the power of the ladinos to construct national political projects has been
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inherently weak. 11 This is not to deny that the reformers honestly sought to
improve the life of indigenous communities, even empower them in some
ways. But from the perspective of the communities, these programs still
carried the mark of a state towards which they were ambivalent, willing on the
one hand to pressure it for services, while on the other continuing to harbor an
inherent suspicion of its intentions. 12
Counter-revolution, Conflict and Military Rule:
1954-1982
In the remaining section of this chapter, I will construct a broad picture
of the cultural and structural forces which collided in the late 1970s. I will
focus on three aspects of this period: the increased institutional power of the
military; divisions within Guatemala's economic and political elites; and the
forms of political opposition, non violent and armed, which gradually emerged
to challenge the status quo, most importantly in indigenous communities. Each
of these topics will be examined more fully in subsequent chapters.
Institutional Military Rule
The forces which supported the counter-revolution were united more by
opposition to Arbenz than by a clear and coherent political project of their
own. Assisted by pressure from the United States, Castillo Armas became
President, but the coalition of forces which had opposed Arbenz began to
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fragment immediately amidst new struggles for power. Getting rid of a regime
was much less complicated than establishing a new and legitimate political
order. Arbenz was gone, but the countryside was still full of peasant
organizations, trade unions, and land reform recipients that needed to be
politically neutralized. Many, though not all, of the reforms of the previous ten
years were overturned, including the right to strike. These changes, reinforced
by government harassment and repression, greatly reduced the numbers and
power of the unions, though not without a struggle. Still, the genie of political
mobilization could not easily be put back in the bottle. The structures of
traditional authority in rural areas were permanently weakened and eventually
required the construction of new institutions of control. The strengthening of
state bureaucracy which occurred under Arevalo and Arbenz was not
overturned; the apparatus of the welfare state survived while the autonomous
political organizations mobilized to demand these services were repressed.
Still, what Caesar Sereseres called the "traditional mass-elite control system"
(1971: 40-41), was permanently weakened (Weaver 1969: 129-131).
The coup and counter-revolution of 1954 did not, as is sometimes
assumed, represent the establishment of institutionalized military rule. The
decision not to defend Arbenz reflected fundamental institutional concerns; but
while we can trace a connection between 1954 and the events of the 1970s and
80s, important transformations occurred in the intervening years which were
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by no means preordained. As James Dunkerley has noted, the new
government:
...looked determinedly backwards and sought little more than to restore
the status quo ante once the vestiges of a putative bolshevism had been
eradicated. Eisenhower's Washington possessed no alternative model
beyond the restoration of unbridled free enterprise. (1988: 435)
This illustrates how cultural settings place boundaries on political action. Only
later, in response to events which are analyzed in the next chapter, were more
expansive military political projects possible to envision. Serious tension
existed between the "liberation" forces and the military, and Castillo Armas
was rebuffed by the High Command when he tried to integrate his own forces
into the military. While these matters were resolved in the short run, they
reflected cleavages between elements of the military and the Guatemalan right
which would re-emerge later.
Castillo Armas' new party, the Movimiento de Democracia Nacional
(MDN), was challenged by the remnants of the old Ubiquista political
machine. After Castillo Armas was assassinated in 1957, long-time Liberal
Party politico Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes got the turn at being president that he
had long sought. But with a weak political base, he gradually lost support
within the military-especially younger officers. A general environment of
corruption and incompetence was made more odious by specific actions which
angered many militares . The use of Guatemalan territory by Cuban and North
Americans planning the Bay of Pigs invasion was viewed by many as a
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challenge to national sovereignty and revived some of the bitterness associated
with the 1954 intervention. While far from supporting Castro, some officers
expressed resentment about being made "puppets" of U.S. policy (Dunkerley
1988: 442). When Ydigoras Fuentes then allowed former President Arevalo to
enter the 1963 Presidential elections, he was deposed. 13
This coup in 1963 did far more than bring another general to power.
The reign of General Ricardo Peralta Azurdia (1963-1966) consolidated the
form of institutional military power which ruled Guatemala for the next two
decades. This military coup represents, therefore, a watershed in the
development of the Guatemalan military; it was the first time the military as
an institution put forward its own project. Like the officers studied by Stepan
in Brazil (1973), the Guatemalan military understood itself to be uniquely
qualified to both guarantee order and actively administrate the national
government. The effort undertaken by Peralta was motivated by the growing
awareness within the military that the 1954 counter-revolution had not
adequately addressed the political problems generated by the revolutionary
period. While progressive and grass-roots political activity could be
temporarily repressed, it kept re-emerging. The divisions within the military
which the revolution brought to the surface had grown, as reflected in the
coup attempt in 1960. Peralta hoped, therefore, to stifle the growing
fragmentation within the military as well as the larger society.
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Elite Consensus and Division
The intellectual and institutional foundations of the 1963 military coup
are examined more fully in chapter 5. The significance of those developments
is more as precedent for the more sophisticated project which emerged after
1982; Peralta's effort full well short of realizing its ambitions. The institutional
power of the military expanded greatly relative to other political institutions
and sectors. At the same time, division within Guatemala's ruling elite
continued to grow. Economic growth in the 1960s complicated that process by
generating divisions between agricultural and commercial elites over economic
policy. The military's effort to construct an electoral system which legitimated
their own power through the Partido Institucional Democrarico (PID) also
failed. The Presidential elections in 1966 were won by the centrist Partido
Revolucionario as the PID and the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional, heir to
Castillo Armas' MDN, split the conservative vote. The PR candidate, Julio
Cesar Mendez Montenegro, was only able to take power after negotiating with
the military and making explicit promises not to interfere in "military affairs"
such as the counterinsurgency war currently being waged in some Eastern
provinces. 14
Parties to the left of the PR-most notably the Christian Democratic
Party (PDCG)--were excluded from the 1966 election, though many initially
viewed the new President hopefully. The PR's subsequent capitulation to the
military lost the party most of its more liberal members. With the left more
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fragmented than in 1966, the 1970 election was won by Carlos Arana Osorio as
part of a PID-MLN coalition which gradually soured. In 1974 an electoral
coalition, the FNO (Frente Nacional de Oposicion) dominated by the Christian
Democrats but also containing other moderate and center-left politicians ran on
a campaign of reform. The specific nature of the reforms was left vague and
the coalition chose a presidential candidate, General Efrain Rios Montt, who
they believed would be acceptable to the military. The coalition's caution and
tact were useless however; the FNO won the election but was denied office
through fraud (Handy 1984; Black 1984; Dunkerley 1988). After Rios Montt
capitulated, the Laugerud Garcia Administration did make some mild
movements toward reform. While never producing permanent change and
gradually replaced by ever higher levels of repression, these policies reflected
growing divisions within the ruling elite. While the parties of the right were
generally united in the face of challenges from below, reformist elements in the
military increasingly viewed the MLN faction as wedded to an inefficient and
anachronistic economic and political model whose days were numbered.
Political Mobilizations from Below
The overthrow of Arbenz in 1954 brought a halt to the process of reform
which the revolution had started. But important legacies remained. The legal
framework of the 1947 Labor Code remained in place, though substantive
rights were weakened. The political mobilization of campesinos was slowed,
172
but gradually found new outlets. The relationship between Indians and the
state intensified and grew more conflictive over the next two decades. The
political mobilizations engendered and then abruptly halted were driven not
only by the logic of revolution; they were part of larger socio-economic
transformations which placed new pressure upon indigenous communities and
prompted changes in political culture (Falla 1978; Warren 1978; Watanabe 1981;
Davis 1971; Brintnall 1979). In the absence of land reform, population growth
put new pressure on community subsistence, bringing about increased
landlessness and migration. 15 These changes weakened the political and
religious authority of traditional community institutions such as the religious
brotherhoods known as cofradias . A principle catalyst of change in some
communities was the appearance of Catholic Action. The situation was further
complicated by the growing presence of Protestant, and particularly
evangelical, churches in indigenous communities. 16
These processes of political mobilization accelerated in the mid 1970s in
response to several developments. The decline of the Central American
Common Market, and the OPEC embargo in 1973 sent the Guatemalan
economy into a tailspin after a decade of steady growth in the GNP. While the
FNO, 1974 electoral coalition, did not offer much in the way of concrete
proposals-regarding land reform for example-and offered little official protest
of the fraud, the result convinced many that electoral politics was a dead end.
On the eve of the 1976 earthquake, the political culture was as tightly
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pressurized as the geological formations which finally moved on February 4.
Repression, death squads, inter-elite competition, religious renewal from
several different directions, frustrated political mobilizations, and a growing
guerrilla movement were all significant factors. The death and destruction
wrought by the earthquake generated intensified pressure on the state for
services, organization, and money.
From the perspective of the Guatemalan state the most significant
development was the growing movement of cooperatives emerging in the
highlands. Several accounts of the emergence of these groups reveals a
consistent pattern (Davis and Hodson 1982; Berryman 1984; Carmack 1988).
The original animus often came from church-based community cooperative
organizations, sometimes with U.S. AID funds, pressuring local and national
officials for basic services. Some worked on behalf of political parties and some
of these efforts succeeded locally, but the larger pattern was of state inaction,
fraud, and repression.
The scale of state repression reached a new level of ferocity after the
1976 earthquake, and prompted a cut off of U.S. military aid by President
Jimmy Carter in 1977. The situation only grew worse, however. A particularly
brutal massacre in April 1978 at Panzos in the Northern Tranversal Strip
occurred when peasants gathered to protest illegal seizures of their land. In
January 1980, Ixil and Quiche Indians occupied the Spanish Embassy in
Guatemala City to protest army repression; acting against the wishes of
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Spanish officials, the Guatemalan police stormed and burnt the building,
killing 39 and prompting a break in diplomatic relations with Spain. While
state violence against labor and Indian political activity increased, repression of
center-left politicians also grew, particularly after the election of a PID-PR
coalition headed by General Romeo Lucas Garcia in 1978. The murder in 1979
of two popular progressive politicians, Alberto Fuentes Mohr of the Social
Democratic Party, and Manuel Colom Argueta of the Popular Revolutionary
Front, who were expected to lead an electoral movement in 1982, reflected an
intensification of repression and effectively ended any possibility for a
reformist electoral project (Handy 1984: 174-181; Sereseres 1984). 17
In the struggle to make sense of so much violence and turmoil, new
interpretations and analysis developed as some avenues for change appeared
completely blocked. By the end of the 1970s national Indian-based
organizations emerged; most notable of these was the Comite de Unidad
Campesina (CUC). 18 As the repression grew worse in 1978 and 1979 the CUC
and other "popular organizations" began to form links with guerrilla groups
which re-emerged after being brutally defeated in the 1960s. Whereas the
popular support for those earlier efforts was marginal and largely drawn from
poor ladinos of the Eastern Highlands, this new movement drew wide support
from the Western and Central Highlands. The extent to which Indian
communities actually supported the guerrillas, as well as the reasons why,
have been matters of great controversy and are discussed in more depth in
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Chapters 5 and 7. It is clear that the development of organizations like CUC,
and the relations, however complex and problematic, between guerrilla
organizations and indigenous communities was profoundly worrying to the
military and represented one of the largest and most diverse challenges to the
political status quo ever mounted in Guatemala.
Counterinsurgencv and a New Political Order
By the late 1970s a variety of political, economic, and social processes
came together to create a cultural crisis of profound dimensions. Economic
downturns wiped out much of the growth that was achieved in the 1960s; at
the same time, it exacerbated inequalities and put new pressures on
community structures. Arturo Arias argues that these events:
complicated the search for a new world view that could encompass the
dizzying rate of change. As class differences within the communities
were eased, the crisis of values became deeper and more pronounced.
The traditional structure of authority was basically undermined.
Capitalism made its presence known at the economic level but was
absent at the level of ideological production, resulting in a crisis of
community authority, tradition, and symbolic structure. (1990: 241)
For a time revolutionary movements offered explanations and
possibilities for meaning to some. So did evangelical movements. And so did
the army. From early on counterinsurgency was not simply an effort to
brutally pacify rebellious Indians; it was an effort to construct a new
order-built from the old but firmly recognizing that the basic problem of
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creating a legitimate political order had never been resolved. Fraud,
corruption, and incompetence all contributed to a loss of faith in national
institutions which could then be exploited by the forces of subversion and
external aggression. The causes and solutions to this crisis were elaborated in
the Plan Nacional de Seguridad y Desarrollo (National Plan for Security and
Development), the intellectual framework for the forces which overthrew
General Romeo Lucas Garcia in March 1982 and brought to power General
Efrain Rios Montt. The plan acknowledged a legitimacy crisis at three
fundamental levels: economic decline, widespread administrative corruption
and incompetence, and loss of faith in a political system torn by polarization,
violence and human rights abuses. And in their place it proposed
development, democracy and Guatemalidad . The structure and meaning of
that project will be examined in the next chapter.
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Notes
1. See the discussion in chapter 3.
2. The cultural role of towns in establishing the line between civilization and
otherness is examined by Grant Jones in his study of Mayan resistance to Spanish
rule in the Southern Yucatan and the Peten (1989). He argues that "frontiers"
aren't simply areas where administrative control starts to weaken or dissolve; they
also mark the edge of cultural boundaries. This is worth noting for it is not
necessarily the way the Indians understood the frontier. Working within very
different cultures of time and history, they understood these "non-civilized" areas
as places of resistance and cultural freedom. And even as political and religious
institutions from Spain began to influence their culture, an element of strategic
withdrawal was always present.
3. This illustrates a point made more abstractly in chapter 2; traditions are
continually asked to confront new problems that stretch their categories and yet
seldom leave them behind. We must be careful to recall that the Enlightenment
is a ideal type. When the light of actual histories is shone upon it, a quite diverse,
even contradictory group of features and characteristics emerge. Spanish policy,
while rooted in medieval and Renaissance formulations, was not impervious to
outside influences. As noted in chapter 2, this is a point that critics of the analysis
of Wiarda, Morse and others who focus on the importance of Latin America's
distinct political tradition often overlook in the rush to label that approach
"culturalist" or "reductionistic." To focus on economic change without studying
its cultural context is equally one-sided, and too dismissive of human agency.
Nonetheless, the "culturalist" argument is often contrasted to a "western" and
"liberal" paradigm which is overgeneralized and, as stated, applies to only a part
of the West. Moreover, by identifying the West so strongly with "capitalist
society," they leave aside the valid questions raised by dependency theorists about
the penetration of capitalism as a world system~as opposed to systems of
relations of production or social values which only existed in a relatively few
countries.
4. The ambiguous combination of authoritarian and libertarian tendencies within
the enlightenment is brilliantly discussed by Michel Foucault in his essay "What
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is Enlightenment?" (1984: 32-50). The philosophical significance of Foucault's
discussion is considered more fully in Chapter 8.
5. Of course, this is not to idealize or even imagine the existence of a previous
unity. As van Oss notes, "the synthetic holism of the colonial Church papered
over deep rooted cultural and social divisions in society." This was true enough
of even the Spanish, let alone when we consider the Maya.
6. The quote by Strong appears in Frederick Merk's study of the North American
sense of mission and manifest destiny (1963). His book provides an excellent
account of the long tradition of these attitudes. The social Darwinism of the late
19th century was a further extension of the attitudes toward Latin America and
the impact of Catholicism which were voiced earlier in the century around the
discussion of territorial expansion and manifest destiny. The ongoing prominence
of these ideas in North American political culture and their influence on foreign
policy is explored by Michael Hunt (1987).
7. The more recent and much larger wave of evangelical Protestant churches in
Guatemala, and the response of the Catholic Church, will be taken up in Chapter
6.
8. Jim Handy (1986, 1988) argues persuasively that the military perception that
its power in the rural areas was threatened was the decisive factor in its lack of
support for Arbenz. The precise motivation for the intervention has long been the
subject of controversy (Schneider 1958; Immerman 1982; Kinzer and Schlesinger
1981). Assessing the relative importance of ideological, geo-political, and economic
factors behind U.S. policy is difficult. The links between United Fruit and the
Eisenhower Administration have often led to a conclusion based on corporate
interests. But while the claims of U.S. officials, given credence by press accounts,
clearly exaggerated the extent of communist influence, it is probable that they
were sincerely held convictions in the context of the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis
argues that the use of the CIA in Guatemala and Iran reflected the Eisenhower's
Administrations desire for relatively low cost forms of containment that could still
offer important symbolic and practical victories for U.S. policy makers in the
cultural and psychological battle for influence in the "developing world" (1982:
157-159). For an excellent analysis of U.S. policy between 1954 and 1960, see
Charles Brockett (1991). The author uses extensive internal documentation to
show how the U.S. placed great pressure on Castillo Armas and Ydigoras
regarding the political suppression of suspected communists in surviving labor
179
and peasant organizations; at the same time, the economic assistance provided by
the Eisenhower Administration fell far short of creating the "capitalist showcase"
that was promised.
9. In their analysis of the cultural construction of terror in Peru Susan Bourque
and Kay Warren argue that those symbols and meanings are constructed against
the backdrop of political failure surrounding a variety of political projects-most
notably the 1968 military-initiated revolution (1988). For different reasons, the
failure of the revolution of 1944-54 also casts a sense of limitation over the future.
10. The difficulty ethnicity has presented for the analysis of left and progressive
ladino political projects is discussed further in chapters on religion and political
movements. While the reforms undertaken between 1944 and 1954 were often
well-intentioned efforts to improve the life of Indians, Adams reminds us of the
systematic and enduring incapacity of ladinos-and this is true across the political
spectrum, to confront ethnicity and racism as fundamental structural and cultural
elements in Guatemalan political life (Smith 1987). We shall see other versions of
this problem; to the extent that modern developmentalist and class analyses have
seen ethnicity as something that would gradually be assimilated by modernity,
their interpretations of the national problematique have been limited. Some
analysts—particularly those who deploy class as a category—have tended to define
ethnicity relative to economic categories. Seen through this lens, Indians exist
largely within pre-capitalist relations of production. Arturo Arias and Carol Smith
both caution that changes in the economic status of Indians within capitalist
relations of production do not necessarily mean a change in their sense of class
consciousness. Such a point may seem obvious, but has often been forgotten in
analysis of the revolutionary potential of changes in the economic status of
Indians. Arias has argued that if Indians develop a sense of class unity with
working class or peasant ladinos, this change in consciousness will not emerge
from economic transformations alone (1990: 231).
11. This argument is drawn from analysis by Carol Smith. She argues that
Carrera's revolt in the 1830s reflects the only real mass movement prior to the late
1970s, and that the lack of strong mass support facilitated Arbenz' demise (1990a:
259-264).
12. These issues also confronted the FSLN after 1979 in its policy towards
Nicaragua's indigenous communities. For a even-handed and insightful account,
see MacDonald (1988).
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13. While Ydigoras' actions in support of the Bay of Pigs angered some, the 1963
coup which brought the military to power was fully supported by the United
States, which also disapproved of Arevalo's return (Dunkerley: 444).
14. This election and the government of Mendez Montenegro are discussed more
fully in Chapter 5.
15. These processes are analyzed in several different contexts by the essays in
Carmack, ed. (1988). See especially the essays by Shelton Davis and Roland Ebel.
16. These developments are discussed in much greater detail in Chapter 6.
17. For a particularly detailed account of this period, see Berryman (1984). The
murders of Fuentes Mohr and Colom Argueta occurred in the context of a small
political opening initiated by Lucas Garcia when he permitted the PSD and FUR
to register for elections.
18. The story told by Rigoberta Menchu (1984) provides a personal, but
representative account, even if her eventual choice to join the armed resistance is
only one of several choices that Indians made. Her father, Vicente Menchu,
worked through Catholic Action in his local community in Northern Quiche for
several years struggling to claim title to their land. After years of runaround and
outright deception by national land reform institute (INTA), he and others formed
the Comite de Unidad Campesina (CUC). The appearance of the CUC was most
significant in terms of the degree and extent of indigenous political mobilization
that it involved. After her father was killed in the massacre at the Spanish
Embassy, and other family members, including her mother and sister, were
tortured and murdered by the army, Rigoberta describes how she and others
chose armed struggle. She recounts that a good part of the inspiration for this
choice came from just war arguments drawn from her newly acquired ability to
read and interpret the bible in Spanish.
CHAPTER 5
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
In the previous chapter, I traced the history and cultural contours of a
legitimacy problem which has long confronted the Guatemalan state. The
counterinsurgency program which was carried out following the coup of
March 1982 must be understood within that historical context as a response to
the unresolved effort to construct a modern nation state and national identity.
But it must also be understood within the historical development of the
Guatemalan military as the country's most powerful institution. While touched
on previously, the institutional and cultural issues and preoccupations which
informed military analysis of the problems confronting Guatemala must be
more fully explored. And that in turn raises theoretical questions regarding the
study of military institutions. Before turning to a fuller analysis of the political
project of "national stability" set forth after the 1982 coup, it is necessary to
briefly review those questions.
The Military and Political Culture
in Latin America
The literature on the military in Latin America is vast and growing all
the time. Few areas of study have received more attention in Latin American
politics, and the continued importance of the military in Latin American
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political life ensures that the subject will not soon become passe. The
continuing relevance of the subject has also ensured that theoretical debates
seldom lose their grounding in reality. In the 1960s, some analysts argued that
military institutions were inherently conservative (Lieuwen 1961), while others
viewed them as a potentially important force for modernization and
development (Johnson 1964; Huntington 1964). The wave of military coups and
interventions in the later 1960s and early 70s muddied the theoretical waters as
analysts sought to interpret distinct military political projects which emerged
in Peru, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay, as well as Central America.
Alfred Stepan's "new professionalism" and Guillermo O'Donnell's
"bureaucratic authoritarianism" became dominant new paradigms, though each
was generally subject to extensive critique and reformulation once applied
outside the original context in which they developed. Other analysts of
military politics looked more carefully at the often complex and ambiguous
relationships which form between military and civilian political actors (Weaver
1969; Nun 1967; Ronfelt 1974). Their conclusions often challenged the tendency
to assume that divisions between the two groups over interests and policy
were natural or inevitable.
The development of this scholarship over the past several decades has
clearly illustrated the analytic dangers in generalizing about military regimes
across Latin America (Remmer 1978; Rouquie 1987). Differences in geography,
history, socio-economic structure, and political culture have forced students of
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military institutions to refine and qualify generalizations. It is apparent, for
example, that the military institutions of Central America differ in some
fundamental ways from those of South America, and particularly Brazil and
the Southern Cone. While categories and analyses which have been developed
through study of the latter may be useful in general comparative terms,
Weber's caveats regarding the use of ideal types must be heeded with
particular care in studying the politics of the military in diverse settings.
The issues of institutionalization and professionalism illustrate this point
well. Central American militaries have generally been considered less
professionalized, more weakly institutionalized, and more subject to the power
of the United States (Varas 1989). While each point is true comparatively, they
can be deceptive as a guide to analysis of actual events. Central American
militaries are certainly less institutionally developed or professional than their
counterparts in South America, but at the same time their power relative to
civil society (with the exception of Costa Rica) is arguably stronger, with
Guatemala being perhaps the most powerful military institution within its own
borders, in the hemisphere. Placing too much emphasis on the role of the
United States raises similar analytic dangers. The perspectives and priorities of
Washington policy makers have long shaped the structural setting in which
Guatemalan civilian and military leaders act. And yet, as we shall see, the
legacy of U.S. intervention has also unwittingly provoked deep resentment.
Those feelings have in turn generated a heightened nationalism among military
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officers which has strongly shaped their perceptions and actions over the past
several decades.
These issues demonstrate the importance of the question of political
culture. Perhaps the most valuable contributions provided by Stepan and
O'Donnell's research were their insights into the cultural significance of the
process of modernization for Latin American military officers. Previous work
on the institutional and intellectual traditions of the military effectively pointed
up the limitations of developmentalist assumptions about the liberalizing
impact of greater professionalization. But O'Donnell and Stepan took that
research a crucial step further by analyzing what happened when military
officials began to acquire greater expertise in modern social science and then
deployed these new skills to study their changing national situations in more
depth. The conclusions that emerged from these processes were influenced by
past intellectual and cultural traditions but Stepan persuasively demonstrated
the ways in which new knowledge and experience reshaped institutional
notions of legitimacy, participation, order, development and national identity.
The acquisition of new perspectives and skills strengthened the traditional
notion of the military as the quintessential national institution, while
encouraging a heightened sense of political competence which in turn
produced more sophisticated military political projects.
1
These kinds of issues and developments have generally not received
adequate attention in the extensive literature on the process of democratization
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in recent years. As was noted in Chapter 2, much of this literature takes its
theoretical direction from the approaches which emphasize the "relative
autonomy" of the state; this research has generally been cautious about or even
hostile to the issue of political culture. Military political behavior-particularly
the handing over of power to civilian political leaders-has generally been
explained by reference to structural or institutional factors: alliances, war,
external pressures, economic crises. This research has generated valuable
institutional analysis, but it has left aside some of the important insights and
approaches to military political culture present in earlier work. While great
attention is paid to the conditions which encourage or hinder the process of
democratization, this literature has often failed to adequately consider the
precise ways these structural contexts or coyunturas are culturally constructed
and understood by the military as political cultural problems in the Weberian
sense discussed in Chapter 2. The issues of meaning, identity, and legitimacy
which were so fruitfully raised by O'Donnell have often been put aside in the
rush to build typologies and generalizations regarding democratic transitions.2
The emphasis on external or structural explanations for changing
civil-military relations has been particularly evident with regard to Guatemala.
Many analysts have emphasized the economic or foreign policy factors
motivating the military since 1984. But when military political actions are
viewed solely as tactics or short-term strategies, it is difficult to understand the
deeper cultural forces at work within those policies. The program of
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counter-insurgency and democratization undertaken by the Guatemalan
military as the project of "national stability" is the product of new thinking
brought to bear in response to long-term problem which have been reshaped
by new events. "Democratization" was not imposed upon a discredited military
forced to make concessions; what was most notable in Guatemala in the 1980s
was not the retreat of the military but its greater autonomy, and the distinctly
nationalist political and military ideology which put it at odds in important
ways with some of the traditional oligarchy. Cultural analysis must thus
complement institutional and structural analysis if we wish to construct a
fuller account of Guatemalan politics.
Before proceeding further, one point of clarification is in order. This
chapter will in part try to explain how Guatemalan military officers
understand democratization and the role it plays within their political project.
All references to democratization should be understood in that light as the
elaboration of the particular political and cultural perspective of the military.
That many would contest the credentials of Guatemalan military to speak on
the subject of democracy is an understatement. Chapters 6 and 7 will examine
in more detail the larger political culture of democratization and the sharp
conflicts over the meaning of democracy which continue to characterize
contemporary Guatemalan politics.3
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The Institutional Development of the Guatemalan Military: 1871-1963
The Army represents the spirit of the state, and thus, its members must
cultivate the highest national virtues. To be a soldier is most deeply to
belong to an institution that is in the political realm something akin to
the religious orders in the spiritual realm. Thus as the Brothers and
Sisters are distinguished by their daily manner from other men and thus
accept the obligation to give example of virtue before others; the soldier
accepts a similar obligation: to serve and defend la patria at the sacrifice
of his own life. (Marroquin 1963: 45)
We never forget our obligation to defend the country, guarantee the
constitution, and preserve respect for human rights, observe the law,
and protect order, given that we are a permanent and national
institution...we are apolitical and must present ourselves to the country
as immune and disconnected from the influence of any organization or
political party. The army should situate itself above disputes between
social, economic, and political groups...oriented to its constitutional
destiny and committed solely to the interests and vital aspirations of the
nation.
General Juan Leonel Bolanos Chavez
Army Day Speech, Guatemala City, 1990
The Guatemalan military traces its traditions, particularly its sense of
corporate identity and autonomy, to Spanish colonialism. But it was during the
era of Liberal reform after 1871 that the institution began to assume its modern
character. The power and scope of the Guatemalan state expanded as a
consequence of changes made to accommodate expanded coffee production.
While the reforms did not result in wholesale dispossession of indigenous
lands, the military now exercised much stronger control over the procurement
of Indian labor. Most of the presidents who ruled between 1871 and 1931 were
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military officers, though they usually ruled through personalismo rather than
the institutional power of the military (Handy 1986: 386-387). The factions
which formed were generally not of civilians or officers as such, and usually
involved intrigues over power rather than significant ideological debates.
Building a stronger and more professional military was central to the
goal of state modernization promoted by Liberal reformers. Prior to this time
Michael McClintock argues that
The Guatemalan army~or armies--were largely ad hoc affairs, evolved
in part from Spanish colonial militia system, but considerably less
structured....most of the 19th century armies were city based and in no
sense national; they were effectively local militias or ill armed bands.
(1985: 10)
President Rufino Barrios founded the Escuela Politecnica in 1873 in order to
strengthen the professional training and sense of national mission of
Guatemalan military officers. Barrios staffed the Escuela with officers from
Spain including the first director, Colonel Bernardo Garrido y Agustino. The
Politecnica combined training in modern methods with an attempt to generate
a heightened sense of group identity and mission. Military codes and
procedures were modernized and the curricula at the Politecnica was
expanded to include classes in engineering, mathematics, and history
(Patterson 1988: 364-365). The school was closed by Estrada Cabrera in 1908
after one of many assassination attempts against the dictator drove him to
purge many of the school officials and open his own version, the Academica
Militar. The Politecnica reopened, however, after Cabrera's removal in 1920.
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The merit based admissions procedures at the Politecnica made the
military an important opportunity for upward mobility for ambitious young
men from lower and middle class families. One of these students was Jorge
Ubico, who as President from 1931-1944 left an important imprint on military
institutions. He reorganized and expanded the National Police, originally
established in 1922, and assigned it the task of policing rural areas which had
previously been the responsibility of the national military. Ubico greatly
expanded the influence of the United States government and military in the
training of Guatemalan officers. His goal was partly tactical; putting U.S.
directors in charge at the Politecnica kept domestic competition for dominance
at bay. Close relations between the United States and Guatemalan military
leaders were maintained after the overthrow of Ubico.
The relationship between the Guatemalan military and the revolution
which overthrew Ubico is very complex. Ubico initially resigned and placed a
military junta in charge under the command of General Federico Ponce Vaides.
Widely perceived as "Ubiquismo without Ubico," Ponce was quickly
challenged by demonstrations and strikes, and was ultimately forced out when
forces led by Colonel Jacobo Arbenz and Major Francisco Arana supported the
opposition (Handy 1984a: 105). Handy argues that the cultural influence of
Roosevelf s "four freedoms," and the resentment of younger officers regarding
the dominance of Ubico cronies in the upper ranks combined to inspire the
action against Ponce (1986). But while permitting the election of Arevalo, the
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military junta which overthrew Ponce first issued a decree clearly establishing
the continued institutional autonomy of the military (McClintock 1985: 20-21).
Arevalo proceeded to extensively revamp the national police and civil
guard, while abolishing Ubico's secret police apparatus. The civilian president
was, at the same time, continually cautious to avoid antagonizing military
officers. Nonetheless, he endured more that thirty coup attempts and gradually
came into increased conflict with Major Arana. The most powerful military
officer, Arana actively blocked the full implementation of Arevalo' s labor
legislation in the countryside (Handy 1986: 389). Conflict between Arana
loyalists and supporters of Minister of Defense Jacobo Arbenz deepened as the
1950 presidential election drew near and the two officers emerged as the
leading candidates. Amidst reports that he was planning a coup against
Arevalo, Arana was killed by Arbenz loyalists, and many of Arana' s leading
supporters were subsequently removed. Arbenz easily won the 1950 election.
Arbenz' own reform programs, which went further than his
predecessor, gradually produced new opposition and anxiety within the
military. The biggest concern, according to Handy, was that political
mobilization was weakening the military's capacity to control the countryside
(1986: 391). While the military as an institution was not directly involved in the
1954 counter-revolution, its failure to support Arbenz was crucial to the
success of the "liberation" forces. But while the removal of Arbenz solved an
immediate problem for the military, other serious issues remained.
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The most important of these problems was the persistence of schisms
within the military. Castillo Armas temporarily closed the Politecnica in 1954
after an uprising of cadets and then reopened it in 1955 with a new plan of
studies which included intensified training in the techniques of modern
warfare (Handy 1986: 392; Patterson 1988: 370-371). Most of the Arbenz
loyalists were purged from the ranks by 1957, but officers continued to harbor
bitterness regarding the military's "defeat" by the forces of Castillo Armas as
well as the new president's compliant attitude toward the United States. While
not directly involved in the assassination of Castillo Armas in 1957, many
officers felt little remorse; nor did they respect his successor, Ydigoras Fuentes
(1957-63). The new president's blatant favoritism in promoting officers of his
generation angered many, while the ambivalent legacy of the 1954 coup among
many military officers was re-enforced and brought more into the open after
Guatemalan territory was used in the staging of the Bay of Pigs debacle in
1961.
Anger over Ydigoras' incompetence, corruption, and compliance with
the United States provoked a coup attempt on November 13, 1960. The coup
was put down when many officers involved in the planning apparently backed
off at the last minute for fear of failure or U.S. involvement (Sereseres 1971).
Some of the leaders of the coup became commanders of the guerrilla armies
which emerged over the next two years. In the aftermath of this failed coup,
anti-Ydigoras officers were purged and divisions shored up, but they quickly
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re-emerged. Elections in Guatemala City in November 1962 reflected the
continuing presence of vigorous opposition movements with links to the
revolutionary period and "left" ideas. The results led former President Arevalo
to declare himself a candidate for president in the elections of 1963. Two days
later on November 25, members of the Air Force launched a coup which
eventually failed but strongly bolstered the prominence and prestige of that
branch. Amidst these political challenges, a downturn in the price of coffee
was exacerbated by inept and corrupt policies. Commercial elites were angered
by new tax proposals, while Ydigoras committed the further sin of appearing
to be willing to permit Arevalo to return to the country for the presidential
campaign.
The 1963 Coup: Expanded Institutional Power and Mission
Nationalism and Mission
The military coup led by General Enrique Peralta Azurdia in June 1963
marked a fundamental watershed in the development of the Guatemalan
military. It reflected long-term attitudes and preoccupations-nationalism,
anxiety about the accelerating political fragmentation and discord-but the
coup was the first time the military as an institution put forward a national
political project which directly addressed its concerns. By their intervention,
military leaders sought to establish clear boundaries regarding political
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participation by left and center parties, which it associated with "foreign" and
"communist" doctrines, while at the same time restoring the institutional unity
of the military. While the revolutionary period was seen as the root of many of
their concerns, Peralta and his colleagues believed that Castillo Armas and
Ydlgoras Fuentes had exacerbated the problems by their incompetence and
corruption; the spectre of Arevalo's return was the final straw.
The coup reflected, therefore, a sharply heightened sense of the military
as the institutional embodiment of the national identity. While always
describing itself as "apolitical," the military intended this as a badge of
legitimacy reflecting their mission, and capacity, to look beyond the limited
sights of mere "politicos" and fully represent the interests of the nation. Peralta
declared that the military was:
...acting without personal ambition...limited to the time absolutely
necessary to realize its work: to liberate the country from anarchy and
the importation of exotic and anti-democratic doctrines (Ejercito, No. 17,
Jan. 1964: 1)
These attitudes were deepened by the professional training many officers had
received in the skills of civilian governance-political economy, management,
policy analysis (Handy 1984: 156). An article in the monthly periodical of the
army, Ejercito, described the coup as a "patriotic decision taken by the High
Command in order to save the country from disgrace and immanent danger."
The military was described as an institution that was "permanent and
apolitical-fully recognized by the democracies to which Guatemala is proud to
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belong" (Ejercito No. 7, March 1963: 3). In pledging to save the country from
chaos and protect the "bien comun". the military invoked a long tradition
while intensifying its political range and sophistication in important ways. A
July 1963 article in the military journal Revista Militar described the "Mision
del Ejercito," as a task of national integration in which the military must
develop its technical capacity to preserve order and protect the "national
tradition against ideas that threaten and suppress the real feeling of the nation"
(Marroquin 1963: 44).
The traditional military training programs provided by the Politecnica
were revised to include a stronger civil component. The Instituto Adolfo Hall
Central-established in 1955 by Castillo Armas-was expanded in an effort to
develop a stronger sense of civic mission in future officers prior to their
entrance to the Politecnica. This training sought to instill a deep conviction
within military officers that their level of conscience and duty set them apart
from civilians. While this notion was by no means new, its implications were
widened now to involve a much more direct role in the process of governance.
Young aspiring officers were taught that
The duties of the military are more important and exceed those of the
rest of the population. While civilian citizens carry important
obligations, nothing demands the sacrifice of their rights, nor deprives
them of the right to avoid danger, nor asks them to put aside, in critical
circumstances, personal feelings and emotions... Military honor
commands that all these are forgotten, that in the supreme moment in
which he is struggling for the dignity of the country, he cannot
remember his mother, girlfriends, wife, nor children because the nation
(patria ) is something more than all that and the love for her demands
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something more than the pure feelings for family and home can ask.
Only the soldier can impose upon himself denial and sacrifice without
limits. (Ejercito, No. 63, Jan. 1967: 3)
The power of this message was strongly reinforced by the Politecnica's
conscious effort to isolate the young cadets from the rest of society and their
immediate family. Franklin Patterson notes that the rhetoric of this training
possesses an
...extravagance and color unfamiliar to non-hispanics, and is therefore
easy to discount. This is a mistake, however; in its cultural context the
rhetoric reflects the intensely idealized, almost mystical attachment that
graduates profess for an institution in which their brotherhood is forged.
(1988: 375)
Patriotism, nationalism, and subordination of one's personal identity to a
mission and duty were all fused with institutional loyalties and further
deepened by strong internal bonds with classmates, mentors, and proteges.4
This expanded concept of the national mission of the military provided
a powerful basis for military identity. With support from U.S. AID, programs
of "civic action" provided the military with an important forum for
strengthening its claim to national leadership:
The concepts about how to carry out the duties and responsibilities
concerning the defense of the nation no longer involve only the duty of
training its citizens and employing its resources in the maintenance of a
public defense force. The army must include in its work also programs
of cooperation and assistance to resolve the social problems of the
popular classes; now it is understood that only by improving the
condition of the people can we speak of the defense of political and
economic sovereignty. (Ejercito, No. 1, Sept. 1962: 10-11)
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Road building, health facilities, water projects, youth and public service
projects, and other examples of desarrollismo were thus motivated by closely
related national and institutional goals.
Programs of civic action were also intended to more fully integrate rural
and indigenous communities, and in the process broaden the legitimacy of
national institutions. In the 1960s, these objectives were only vaguely
developed and would be, as we shall see, subject to much greater reflection in
the 1970s as tensions between the state and those communities grew. Civic
action projects mostly attempted to boost the public image of the military and
the state in local communities, and thereby weaken any appeal that more
radical parties and proposals might obtain. The effort to integrate indigenous
communities and traditions into a more strongly constructed Guatemalan
national identity was also reflected in the military's symbolic embrace of
Indian hero Tecun Uman who died fighting the forces of Spanish Conquistador
Pedro de Alvarado in 1524.5
Civil-Military Relations
While the coup in 1963 reflected expanded intellectual and institutional
horizons for the military, Peralta and other officers did not intend that the
military rule on its own without civilian participation. From the beginning they
sought relations with what were deemed acceptable civilian partners and
gradually attempted to establish a political party, the Partido Institucional
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Democratico (PID), modeled on the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
in Mexico. In establishing such a party, military leaders sought, in Handy7 s
words, "to dominate politics through the governmental bureaucracy it
commanded, and to smother reform movements by incorporating them into
the party" (1986: 393). They intended to establish similar capacities for
legitimation and the integration and/or co-optation of opposition political
groups that the Mexican party had managed so successfully. The new
constitution implemented registration requirements that served as an
instrument for limiting left parties.
At the same time, the coup received significant political support from
civilian elites-government officials, business groups, and officially sanctioned
political parties~who shared the general disgust towards Ydigoras and had
their own reasons to fear the return of Arevalo. Civil-military relations
following the coup in 1963 were insightfully studied by Jerry Weaver in his
research on the "political style" of the military (1969: 1969-70). He emphasized
that in highly militarized societies such as Guatemala the relationship between
civilian and military leaders is complex and murky terrain. Weaver's work
remains valuable for its empirical analysis as well as his conceptualization of
the subject. Moving beyond the theoretical debate between Lieuwen and
Johnson, he carefully studied the decision-making processes at work in order
to understand concretely how military regimes governed before drawing
conclusions about their political power. He pointed out that the institutional
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expansion of military political power engendered by Peralta's policies
promoted a simultaneous increase in the authority of non-military officials at
various levels. These officials, in turn, viewed Peralta as a moderate force to
control the left and extreme right while promoting modernization. Peralta's
government needed the experience of technocrats and financial officials. They
served a technical and political function, providing expertise as well as
building institutional strength, while weakening possible sources of opposition.
While skeptical of the capacity of civilian political parties or traditional elites to
effectively manage the challenge confronting the Guatemalan state, the military
never sought to rule without those groups.
At the same time, the military's political power relative to civilian
groups clearly grew after the June 1963 coup. Caesar Sereseres described the
political process in these years as
...one of manipulation and negotiation among power contenders with
reciprocally recognized power capabilities. In effect what this means is
that the Guatemalan political system is based on a flexible
coaUtion—both civil and military—among diverse power contenders
which is subject to revision. (1971: 81)
While this remained an accurate description of Guatemalan political processes
in some ways, it missed the significance of expanding military power in the
wake of the coup. The accelerated process of professionalization created
significant new institutional power combined with powerful new notions of
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military identity. Weaver argued that:
Translated into political action, military professionalization meant
sophisticated new means of violence to serve effectively self-defined
values....while the armed forces were forging a sense of purpose and
solidarity, the greater Guatemalan society was fragmenting.. ..the armed
forces were experiencing new heights of discipline, coordination and
sense of purpose while civilian political power was fragmenting to a
level approaching anarchy. (1969-70: 78)
Weaver's point is reinforced by Richard Adams who argued that what he
termed an "assumption of regnancy" among military officers increased
enormously in these years and was not balanced by comparable growth in
other political institutions (1970).
While the military increased its institutional power, competence, and
corporate cohesion after 1963, it was still far from a united group. Weaver
located three tendencies whose policy prescriptions were quite different. The
first position, put forward most strongly by Major Jorge Lucas Caballeros, was
characterized by Weaver as "economic reformers." They promoted a version of
desarrollismo that emphasized economic and political modernization: tax
reform, administrative development, and a stronger government effort to
stimulate national industry. These officers found allies among progressive
civilian sectors, but alienated the traditional economic elites which associated
such programs with Arevalo and Arbenz. Weaver describes them as
...a new element within the economic elite: men concerned with profit
and lose and technical innovation as opposed to traditional norms of
social prestige and paternalism. (1969: 65)
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This group was seldom dominant in those years, but their perspective would
continue to find voice in the military and be present in the post-1982
programs.
These reformers were opposed vigorously by the "duristas" (hardliners)
who generally labelled reforms "communism" and opposed any change which
threatened to open political space for the mobilizations of the past. Peralta
generally pursued a middle course between these two positions, initiating the
rudimentary social welfare projects carried out under civic action programs but
at the same time maintaining close vigilance over political expression and
opposition activity. Though able to accomplish this balancing act for a time,
Peralta failed to accomplish the long-term goal of creating a basis for elite
consensus. The effort to brake the fragmentation of Guatemalan political life in
the 1960s ran up against continuing division within the military as well as the
efforts of civilian parties and politicians to coopt the military for their own
ends.
Nevertheless, the concerns, ideas, and intentions which motivated the
military coup in 1963, as well as the institutional expansion it promoted, are
essential elements of the political cultural setting in which the more fully
elaborated project pursued after 1982 must be interpreted. The sense of
mission, nationalism, and expansion of the expertise and governmental breadth
of the military were all present, but in a much less developed form than later.
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And the same could surely be said for the legitimacy crisis confronting the
Guatemalan state.
Elections and Counterinsurgencv
It was previously noted that one of the major concerns which motivated
the military coup in 1963 was the need to reconstruct a system of mass control
which had never really recovered from the 1944-1954 period. Despite the
repression by Castillo Armas, continued sporadically by Ydigoras, left and
centrist parties with reformist platforms continued to garner significant
support when allowed to operate freely. Peralta had based the legitimacy of
military intervention in 1963 on a promise to return to electoral democracy, so
the 1966 elections provided a crucial test of how successful the military had
been in its effort to control political participation and establish a more
legitimate basis for state power. Left and centrist parties were carefully
excluded from participation-including the Christian Democratic Party. The
Partido Revolucionario (PR), a party established in 1958 by former supporters
of Arevalo, was permitted to participate after its leadership-headed by Mario
Mendez Montenegro-appeared willing to enter into a coalition with the
military's PID, which had only managed to obtain weak support (Handy 1984:
158-159).
Subsequent events got in the way of these efforts, however. Mendez
Montenegro died prior to the election and his more leftist brother Julio, dean
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of the law school at the University of San Carlos, became the party's leader
and presidential candidate. All bets were off now, as the PR received support
from more radical parties and easily won the election. Winning the election
was one thing, taking power another, however. Negotiations between the
President-elect and the military ensued, and Mendez was only able to take
office after promising to not interfere in "military affairs."
The military's principle priority was maintaining a free hand in the
growing counterinsurgency program in the Eastern Highlands. The first
guerrilla armies began to appear in early 1962 and were led by former military
officers involved in the Nov. 13, 1960 coup attempt who had subsequently fled
the country. The groups were based largely in the Province of Zacapa in the
Eastern Highlands, the site of the cuartel from which the coup had been
launched. By most accounts, these groups were divided by tactical and
political analysis and enjoyed only weak and localized support. While the
actual number of combatants never exceeded more than 1000, an estimated
8000 people were killed between November 1966 and March 1967 (McClintock
1985: 85-86; Dunkerley 1988: 457-458).
North American training and support in counterinsurgency methods,
heavily based on experience in Vietnam, figured decisively in the military
operations conducted against guerrilla forces. But, as Sereseres has noted
(1971), this should not be taken to indicate a compliant relationship. We
already saw how Ubico had used the presence of United States advisors to
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serve his own purposes, and also noted the tensions which pervaded the post
1954 period. Good relations often existed for reasons which permitted the
military to further its own institutional agenda and didn't necessarily reflect
U.S. control. These elements of independence and nationalism should be
accented because they became more prominent, and have been present even
when relations were close and cordial. The United States put most of its
resources into defeating the guerrilla armies, which given their military and
political weakness was not difficult. But from the perspective of the military,
controlling the boundaries of acceptable participation and expanding their
political control over the countryside were still the highest priorities.
The counterinsurgency expanded the institutional power and
instrumental capability of the military towards that larger end; it also
introduced a new, but not transient, element to Guatemalan political life-the
"death squad", of which the Mano Blanco (White Hand) and Oio por Oio (Eye
for an Eye) were the most prominent. Then, as later, Guatemalan military and
political leaders described the death squads as "outside the law" and not under
official control; the government portrayed itself as the center caught between
violent right and left factions. These paramilitary organizations were often
informally organized by local military commissioners and members of the
ultra-conservative Movimiento de Liberation Nacional (MLN) who could use
the cloak of anonymity to express their strong convictions on social and
political hygiene: "Gangrene demands the amputation of the infected limbs;
204
cancer must be cut out at its roots" (Cited by Aguilera Peralta 1980: 103). The
MLN was the updated version of Castillo Armas MDN and was the political
base for what Weaver called the "hardliners," military and civilian elites with
no use for the developmental philosophy of Peralta. The MLN now referred
to itself as "the party of organized violence" (Dunkerley 1988: 460).
The leader of the counterinsurgency campaign, Carlos Arana Osorio,
was also a liberacionista (MLN member), and had contempt for the PR. While
President Mendez made some efforts at tax reforms, he was blocked by the
MLN, and was subject to several coup conspiracies; early commitments to
agrarian reform were also set aside. Mendez' power increased temporarily in
1968 after a group of right-wing officers and businessmen kidnapped Cardinal
Mario Casariego in a botched effort to implicate the guerrilla armies in
"terrorist" activity, but by 1969, the right was back in full command. The
election campaign of 1970 occurred amidst enormous violence and tension,
especially in Guatemala City. The Christian Democratic Party was permitted to
put forward as its candidate, Jorge Luis Caballeros, a former Arbenz advisor
and one of what Weaver called the military "reformers". Many PR members
had been disillusioned by what they viewed as Mendez' capitulation to the
military. Though originally proclaiming itself the "Third Government of the
Revolution," the fate of Mendez' regime is well summed up by Georges
Fauriol and Eva Loser:
Despite its civilian and democratic facade, Mendez Montenegro's term
of office concluded with a lop-sided civilian-military imbalance. By 1968,
one could already discern the beginnings of military "developmentalist"
regimes. (1988: 47-49)
In this atmosphere of violence and cynicism, with center-left political parties
and activists generally weak and divided, the election was won by the "Jackal
of Zacapa," Arana Osorio, on a MLN-PID ticket. President Arana unleashed a
renewed wave of repression directed against labor and student groups in
Guatemala City and often carried out by the death squads.6
1970-1982: Stronger Military, Weaker State
With the election of Arana in 1970, Guatemalan politics entered a new
period of conflict and drift. The programs undertaken after the military coup
in 1963 had greatly expanded the institutional power of the military, but
internal schisms, shaped by both personality and policy differences, remained
(Handy 1986). The developmentalist agenda set forth by Peralta was now
moribund and the civilian elite remained as divided as ever. The regimes
which ruled between 1970 and 1982 continued to pursue civil-military
alliances, but success was temporary and the situation only continued to
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deteriorate. Sereseres described what he termed the "esquema politico " as
...tacit understandings among the military, the private sector, and the
political parties to create a democratic facade marked by periodic
elections. Each of the major actors wanted the political system
"managed" and political surprises avoided. (1983: 24)
This "tacit understanding" not withstanding, differences over economic policy
and factional disputes over political power were pervasive. Each of the
regimes of the 1970s pursued a strategy aimed at coopting elements of the
"popular" sector, though the specifics of these efforts differed with each
regime. Arana initially presided over a period of intensive repression of
dissidents, but permitted some "radical" organizations to operate-most notable
the Guatemalan Worker Party (PGT). But the PID-MLN coalition which Arana
represented gradually broke apart as many of the PID-allied military officers
began to question the MLN's embrace of violence, ultra-orthodox capitalism
and rejection of all efforts at socio-economic reform.7
Divisions between the two groups grew more heated after MLN leader
Mario Sandoval Alarcon was passed over in favor of Arana Chief of Staff
General Kjell Laugerud Garcia as presidential candidate in the 1974 elections.
While there was sufficient elite unity to fraudulently turn back the electoral
victory of the FNO coalition, the tensions grew sharper when Laugerud put
forward quite moderate reforms to promote economic diversification and
reduced dependence on agro-exports. He distanced himself from the MLN and
Arana, and began to listen to some of the political demands of labor and
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peasant political organizations. For a time, Laugerud also permitted political
space for the emergence in the highlands of a rural cooperative movement,
largely supported by private voluntary organizations and Church groups.
Conflicts over the administration of earthquake relief funds sharpened
inter-party resentments, and in 1978 the PID was forced to revive its
partnership with the PR in order to defeat the MLN in an election which drew
a dismal turnout.
Another source of elite conflict and tension in the 1970s was the
growing economic prominence of the military and its commanding officers.
The expanded institutional power of the state in the 1960s and 1970s provided
more than a strengthened capacity for military repression; it also offered
extraordinary new possibilities for personal enrichment, particularly through
the acquisition of land. Much of the expansion that took place in the Franja
Transversal del Norte (Northern Transversal Strip; FTN), which included
highways and other infrastructural links to Guatemala City, directly benefitted
members of the High Command. Over the next decade other major enterprises
controlled by military officials included the Aurora International Airport, the
airline AVIATECA, the state electric company INDE, the phone system, and
Channel 5 TV (Painter 1989: 48-49). The military also dominated over a dozen
other parastatal agencies which served largely as forums for the personal
appropriation of state revenues. In this way military officials were able to
directly enter into Guatemala's economic elite, though this wealth and the
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interests that came with it generated new divisions with the traditional landed
oligarchy.8
Laugerud's support for the rural cooperative movement declined after
1976, and quickly gave way to intensified repression after the election of
General Lucas Garcia in 1978. With electoral politics clearly at a dead end,
national organizations of nearly unprecedented size began to emerge
representing rural and indigenous communities.9 Some of these groups
formed alliances with guerrilla organizations which first emerged in the 1960s
but had previously been without any real links to indigenous communities in
the highlands. Military massacres, assassinations, and disappearances were
matched by a growth in the insurgency; by 1982 guerrilla groups were
operating widely in the Western Highlands and had developed a social base
far beyond that achieved by their forebears in the 1960s. These coalitions were
built more on strategy than coherent ideological unity, but for awhile between
1980 and 1982 they appeared to enjoy significant support and even have a
chance to succeed. 10
The military response of the Lucas regime to this crisis drew bitter
criticism from many officers, base commanders, and rank and file; they
believed that corruption and incompetence were hurting the government far
more than guerrilla activities. A widespread perception developed that while
the rank and file were dying in the highlands, Lucas Garcia and the military
officers of the PID were getting rich (Handy 1986: 401-402; Dunkerley 1988:
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489-490; Sereseres 1984). In the words of a lieutenant colonel interviewed by
Caesar Sereseres,
The government has no strategy to deal with the guerrillas. It has used
the tactic of disorganizing society, labelling any vocal leadership as
subversive, [and has] attempted to used brute force against a political
problem. The guerrilla would not be a serious military problem if not
for the corruption, inability to govern, exploitation, and violence that
provides the guerrillas with recruits and legitimacy. (1984: 31)
When Lucas Garcia' s Minister of Defense fraudulently won the March
1982 presidential election, the prospect of more corruption and inept command
was finally intolerable. On March 23, 1982, Lucas was overthrown in a coup
engineered by junior officers, many of them field commanders who were
anxious to pursue a more effective counterinsurgency while restoring some of
the prestige the Guatemalan government had lost internationally as well as at
home (Handy 1984: 183; Dunkerley 1988: 492-493; Black 1984: 136-139). In the
words of a Guatemalan colonel, the new government:
...was established in order to bring justice.. .and to end all the forms of
corruption that had existed previously, corruption that like a contagious
disease has slowly and imperceptibly infiltrated all forms of life in the
republic and carries the risk of converting us into a people without
ethical principles, without shame, living in a state of demoralization.
(Giron Tanchez 1983)
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A New Military Political Project
The junta which took power after the March 1982 coup was led by
General Efrain Rios Montt. The General had been fraudulently denied the
Presidency in 1974 as the candidate of a centrist coalition. In the years between
1974 and 1982, Rios Montt became a minister in the California-based Church of
the Word (Iglesia del Verbo). His fervent evangelism and pious political
language made Rios Montt the focus of enormous international interest, and a
lightning rod for positive and negative commentary on the situation in
Guatemala. The significance of Rios' evangelism will be examined more fully
in Chapter 6; it is important, however, not to exaggerate the importance of one
controversial figure. The March 23, 1982 coup marks a fundamental turning
point in Guatemalan politics and in the institutional development of the
Guatemalan military. Rios Montt played virtually no role in bringing the coup
about, and while chosen because of his personal reputation for honesty, the
General was readily removed 17 months later when he came to be seen as a
liability by the military high command. A full analysis of the intentions of the
coup must, therefore, concentrate on the goals of the military as an institution.
The unprecedented levels of violence and terror unleashed in the wake
of the March 23 coup have been well documented. In its purely military
aspects, the counterinsurgency was one of the most ruthless ever carried out.
A "scorched earth" campaign destroyed over 400 villages, while 30,000 people
were killed or disappeared, and hundreds of thousands displaced (Black 1984;
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Americas Watch 1983; Manz 1988). While not eliminated, the guerrilla armies
were forced into retreat and lost most of their civilian base. This outcome did
not reflect only upon the effectiveness of military tactics; it also pointed up
important weaknesses in the power and strategy of the guerrilla groups-now
united as the Unidad Revolucionario Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)— despite
their impressive gains over the previous several years.11 Dunkerley argues,
drawing on discussions within the groups themselves, that the guerrilla
offensive begun in September 1981 eventually overstretched their resources
and forced them into a
...strategic counter-offensive that they could not sustain in either military
or political terms....the inability of the URNG to sustain military
operations outside its core areas of support and, more importantly, its
failure to provide protection where it possessed a longstanding base,
proved to be disastrous. (1988: 490-491)
The focus of the military did change somewhat after the coup. During
the latter part of the Lucas Garcia administration, repression had been targeted
most harshly at urban activists by "death squads" usually working directly
with the military (Amnesty International 1981). Some of the coup backers
viewed the indiscriminate and highly visible political terror deployed by Lucas
Garcia as ineffective and harmful to Guatemala's international image, while
serving only marginal military purposes. After the coup, these officers moved
to rationalize the violence and concentrate on pacifying the rural areas. There
had been rural operations during the Lucas period-including a massacres of
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over 100 at Panzos-but the program now became more systematic and
focused. 12
But from early on, counterinsurgency was not simply an effort to
brutally pacify rebellious Indians; it was also a political project that sought the
construction of a new order, built from the old but firmly recognizing that the
basic problem of creating a stable and legitimate political order had never been
resolved. As previously noted, the military took seriously the post-Vietnam
recognition that a lack of attention to the political dimensions of an armed
conflict could undermine military success. 13 Hence military doctrine linked
winning with programs of civic education and democratization, and the goal
of a fully realized program was not simply defeat of a guerrilla force, but the
legitimation of the state and, in the military's terms, the creation of a more just
social order. In that sense, the military also recognized that, in the words of
two U.S, defense department analysts: "insurgencies and 'revolutionary wars'
are wars for moral legitimacy" (Mainwaring and Prysk 1988: 2).
The intellectual framework for this political project was initially set
forth in the Plan Nacional de Seguridad v Desarrollo (National Plan for
Security and Development). The analysis and program extended and widened
the conceptions of state building and mission that were nascent at the time of
the coup in 1963; the nationalism, the pursuit of development, and the
construction of a sense of national community and identity which included
Guatemala's indigenous communities were all articulated much more fully.
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The Plan acknowledged a three-fold legitimacy crisis: economic decline,
widespread administrative corruption and incompetence, and loss of faith in a
political system torn by polarization, violence and human rights abuses.
Among its stated objectives were:
...the reconciliation of the Guatemalan family in order to favor national
peace and harmony...to establish a nationalistic spirit and lay the
foundations for the participation and integration of the different ethnic
groups which make up our nationality.. .[and] to stimulate among the
various pressure groups which represent the activity of the nation a new
way of thinking which is developmentalist, reformist and nationalist.
(Plan Nacional, reprinted in Black 1984: 189-190)
These objectives were formulated by the military through an intensive
process of analysis by the military in response to what they clearly perceived
to be a crisis. Their analysis has been set forth in articles, many appearing in
the Army's Revista Militar, and other documents. Careful attention to the
thinking which these writings reveal provides an illuminating perspective on
the political culture of the military. Recalling the Weberian idea of culture as
the setting within which problems that the past has left to the present are
analyzed and acted upon, what is the military's understanding of the political
and cultural problematic confronting Guatemala? If culture is the place where
structure, meaning, and identity collide, what response can we discern in the
military's political project?
The analysis which informs this political project has been elaborated
most fully by one its principle intellectual architects-General Hector Alejandro
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Gramajo (later to be Minister of Defense for President Vinicio Cerezo).
Gramajo's thinking deserves further consideration if we are to fully interpret
the political goals of counterinsurgency. In a 1987 presentation of military
strategy he began by analyzing the political context within which guerrilla
armies had been able to generate widespread popular support in the early
1980s. While his analysis included the standard assertions regarding the role of
external actors and "international terrorism", Gramajo also clearly
acknowledged the indigenous sources of guerrilla support. He argued that
their easy defeat at the hands of the military in the 1960s had led guerrilla
leaders to rethink their situation and reflect upon their political weakness
among the Guatemalan population. Acknowledging that they had learned from
experience, Gramajo argued that in the 1970s the guerrillas had made the war
an "integral struggle" of political and military programs in order
to construct a solid base in support of their operation. They moved to
the West where they were able to take advantage of the lack of
government attention to development. In these conditions the terrorist
groups were organizing and strengthening, stimulating the resentment
of the local population regarding the abandonment to which they were
condemned. (1987: 65-66)
The guerrillas, he argued, were able to persuasively tell impoverished
Maya as well as ladinos that the military repressed them in the service of the
rich: the landowners, businessmen, and foreign economic interests.
The socio-economic conditions facilitated this process of integration of
the subversives [with the indigenous population] without the
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government foreseeing the dramatic consequences that the next years
would bring. (1987: 66)
This historical legacy of neglect and poverty was further magnified by the
impact of the recession and the 1976 earthquake. Gramajo also argued that the
guerrilla cause was being strongly supported by what he considered an
international campaign to discredit Guatemala and destabilize its government
under the banner of human rights. Taken together, these factors combined to
produce a profound crisis for the Guatemalan state. 14
While Gramajo believed that Guatemala had been unfairly singled out
and victimized by this international attention, there was a silver lining. The cut
off of U.S. aid by President Carter in 1977, in response to human rights
reports, damaged Guatemala's international image. But, Gramajo argued, it
also forced the military to rethink its own doctrine. The military results of that
process began, he argued, to appear in 1981 when General Benedicto Lucas
Garcia organized a more effective military strategy for confronting the
expanded guerrilla presence in the highlands. By early 1982,
...the military threat was diminished and controlled within this
offensive, but it was necessary to begin to redesign the military strategy
in order to adapt it to the situation in which we were living. (1987: 69)
Just as the guerrilla armies had been forced by experience and reflection to
deepen their political analysis, Gramajo argued that the military realized it had
to move beyond a purely military approach and begin to develop a more
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profound political analysis of its own. This required innovative reflection and
action by the military, and also necessitated stronger participation by
Guatemalan civilian groups-both elites and masses:
To this point the war against the terrorism had been the total
responsibility of the army while political organizations, private sector,
the government, and other groups remained outside as spectators and
negative critics. (1987: 70)
Gramajo argued that these attitudes had generated cynicism and apathy and
permitted the further deterioration of Guatemala's political institutions amidst
pervasive corruption.
In this way, the principle objective of the coup of March 1982 was not to
clear the way for a more efficient prosecution of the military war; that had
already begun. The central motivation of the coup was to set forth a new
political project-elaborated by the Plan Nacional-which sought to make the
civilian population the "backbone" of a new strategy based on nationalism and
"the reconciliation of the Guatemalan family" (1987: 71). The political crisis was
fundamental and could not be resolved simply by another election or change
of rulers or some other immediate action. The crisis went to the heart of
Guatemala's continued existence as a nation. Under these circumstances, the
military was compelled by duty and mission to "take control with the duty of
rescuing the dignity and faith of the people in their institutions" (Cited in
AVANCSO 1989: 111). This new military analysis was thus put forward as a
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response to what was viewed as the Lucas regime's total lack of attention to
the socio-economic and political factors that fueled the military crisis.
A Doctrine for Guatemala:
The "Thesis of National Stability"
Guatemalans can feel proud and satisfied to be the first country in the
world that has been able, with its own strategies and tactics, sustained
in our national spirit, and without foreign assistance, to soundly defeat
subversion and, thus maintain our integrity. (Ejercito de Guatemala
1984: 88)
It is important to note that while the military saw itself as the
quintessential national institution with a duty to promote unity, it
conceptualized its message and program as directed at two quite distinct
audiences—Guatemala's political and economic elites on the one hand, and its
indigenous communities on the other. In this section, the approach to the first
group will be examined, while the next section will look at the programs in the
highlands.
We have already seen that the proponents of the 1982 coup laid much of
the blame for Guatemala's political problems squarely at the feet of the
country's political and economic elites. President Rios Montt early on told the
population "we don't want any more politicians (politiqueros) " (Cited by
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Sereseres 1984: 40), and characterized the Guatemala's private sector as
strong and intelligent...which has impoverished itself and the nation by
tax dodging and its illegal export of dollars which has made us all poor.
(Cited by McClintock 1985: 235)
Many of the "democratic" proposals Rios Montt promoted, including the
Council of State which offered representation by sector, carried a strongly
corporatist cast. This was one of many actions which alienated Rios Montt
from elements of the elite--in this case those with ties to the traditional political
parties. Rios' proposals for tax and agrarian reform provoked similar
opposition in other quarters. The moral fervor of Rios' political
rhetoric—including his weekly sermons to the country—was welcomed by many
rank and file military as well as middle class Guatemalans, but gradually
generated opposition from the High Command. Having outlived his usefulness
as a head of state, Rios Montt was overthrown and replaced by Defense
Minister General Oscar Mejia Victores on August 8, 1983.
But while Rios was shown the door, the political project set forth by the
Plan Nacional of 1982 continued fully on track. Military officers continued to
criticize the failure of Guatemalan civilian and military leaders to offer
effective and consistent long-term programs to deal with Guatemala's
underlying social, political, and economic problems.
In 1986, all of the themes and preoccupations which had been expressed
by many military officers over the previous two decades came together in the
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articulation of what General Gramajo and other officers presented as a new
Guatemalan political doctrine: the "thesis of national stability". Gramajo
asserted that this doctrine represented a genuinely Guatemalan program, not
one derived from foreign realities and theories. Gramajo argued that President
Carter's cut off of military aid in 1977 had provoked a transformation in the
consciousness of the military:
We began to teach our own doctrine based on the principle that the
army of Guatemala is not an army of occupation, but a national army
that struggles within its own frontier. (1987: 76)
This led, he maintained, to a reconsideration of the relevance of United States
military concepts such as "low-intensity warfare" and "national security:"
The conflicts that other latitudes coldly refer to as "conflicts of
low-intensity" are very highly intense and involve the survival of these
little nations. Vietnam and Nicaragua demonstrate that military power is
not enough, the predominant factor is the political decision to win.
(1987: 77)
Gramajo went on to argue that the doctrine of "national security" was
relevant to North America and Western Europe but not to Guatemala.
Advanced industrial countries had obtained a level of development in which
they could "guarantee to their people a better future through economic and
social means." Under such conditions, the doctrine of national security helped
"maintain a psychological state of security" within the cold war and the
perceived threat of communism (1989). Gramajo argued that in Guatemala, on
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the other hand, the conditions for basic political and economic development
did not exist and the doctrine became a kind of free floating pretext for
knocking off one's adversaries: "We came to realize that domestically, national
security deteriorated into irrationality and crudeness" (Schirmer 1991: ll).In
this way, the doctrine of "national security" faced a crisis in 1982 because it
couldn't respond to the political and social needs of the country. For the
military it represented "a decrepit and inoperable doctrine within the
democratic system" (Quoted in Schirmer 1991: 11). This critique of "national
security" led logically, Gramajo argued, to the articulation of a more
appropriately Guatemalan political and military doctrine.
A 1986 article in Revista Militar, co-written by five military officers,
described the new doctrine of "national stability" as:
The joining of two inseparable factors: security and development. It is
understood as the equilibrium of the four factors of national power:
political, economic, psycho-social, and military. It is necessary to
integrate in the same strategic equation, the planning of the politics of
security and the politics of development. (Ejercito de Guatemala 1986:
74)
This new doctrine spoke directly to the previous failure to "structure a national
strategy that established the path to follow for continued periods" or enunciate
a "national strategic concept or a plan that joined security with development."
Past programs had:
reacted to specific situations, but never [provided] a strategic plan for
the long term that recognized and pursued permanent national
objectives regardless of the type or form of government. (1986: 88)
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Of the four "factors of national power" listed by these officers, military
power had previously been considered the most important; but now, the
military argued, it was necessary to develop a more complex analysis and
practice in which each form of power was carefully integrated. From this new
perspective, the military defeat of the guerrillas was proceeding and remained
a vital task; but now the military war could only be fully won if it was
integrated into a national political project constructed by Guatemala's diverse
classes and groups within the framework established by the military. While it
could not simply impose its own solution, the special role of the military was
continually asserted. A leading military intellectual wrote:
The army is responsible for creating a system of defense which is not
only material, but also spiritual: that permits the state to maintain or
obtain the national elements and objectives essential to the policy of
security....There will be a country as long as the military exists. (Alvarez
Gomez 1985) 15
The expansion of what was termed "psycho-social power" was an
especially important element in this project. This concept referred to the
attitudes and tendencies of individuals and groups; the weakness of this form
of power in Guatemala pointed up directly the absence of a strong sense of
national identity and community, and the corresponding legitimacy problem
confronting the Guatemalan state. Gramajo's elaboration of the doctrine of
national stability made civilian participation and elections central to the
successful realization of the project. Democratization in these terms was thus
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not simply the military being pressured from power; "victory over subversion"
was directly related to the capacity to generate an alternative that "overcomes
all the antagonisms and pressures of every sort that are opposed or could
oppose themselves to the establishment of permanent national interests"
(Ejercito de Guatemala 1986: 83).
By framing the issues in this manner, Gramajo and his colleagues were
confronting the tensions and fissures between economic and political elites
which had fragmented Guatemalan politics over the past several decades. The
analysis being put forward explicitly attributed many of Guatemala's problems
to the attitudes and policies of the country's traditional oligarchy.
This generation of military officers is tired of being the peon~of being
the peon of politicians and businessmen.... The success of Guatemala
depends on wresting power from the economic elite. (Quoted by
Schirmer 1991: 13)
In setting forth this project, Gramajo bluntly challenged Guatemalan
economic elites. The time was past, he said, when the military would
automatically support their economic interests. The previous doctrine of
national security had, he argued, made the military into what was essentially
an "occupying force" representing foreign interests and a small sector of the
elite.
16 Gramajo admonished those elites to expand their vision as well as the
tax revenues they provided the state (Anderson and Simon 1987: 9-11). At the
same time, Gramajo made it clear to military groups unhappy with the
presence of civilian politicians that coups from the right would not be
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supported; the high command was behind civilian leadership. He also made it
clear that the army felt under no obligation to talk with groups it considered
subversive and would continue to enforce what it considered necessary limits
on acceptable political participation by the left
In order to facilitate the development of an effective national consensus
regarding policies that would promote both security and development,
Gramajo proposed the creation of a center of study where civilian and military,
in close collaboration, "study and debate national problems and solutions"
(1987: 88-89). He realized this goal in 1989 with the establishment of Centro
ESTNA (Centro de Estudios Estrategicos para la Estabilidad Nacional), an
organization intended as a forum for discussion and the forging of national
dialogue among different sectors. In explaining the raison d'etre of the Centro,
Gramajo wrote:
Experience indicates that one of the principle obstacles to stability in any
society is the superficial knowledge that different groups have of each
other. (Cited in AVANCSO 1989: 116)
Centro ESTNA was intended to foster stability and concertacion by
engendering stronger awareness of the perspectives and concerns of diverse
groups. The leaders of those groups would then develop the capacity to
broaden their own analysis and find ways to make their interests coincide with
the public interest. Gramajo described this as something that would happen in
stages; further evaluation must first locate the proper objectives and strategy,
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then develop projects and institutions through which different sectors could
work together toward those objectives.
The discussions undertaken through Centro ESTNA and similar forums
point up the importance Gramajo and like-minded military leaders attached to
the development of improved civil-military relations. 17 As Enrique Baloyra
notes:
For some the military decision to cede power...is nothing more than a
strategy imposed by circumstances. For others, matters are more
complex, given that the military cannot govern directly with any
coherence for very long, or convert itself to a political party. (Cronica,
June 23, 1989: 15)
In this way, Centro ESTNA was intended as a vehicle through which the same
concerns expressed by Peralta and other military leaders in the 1960s might be
finally addressed.
This is the political and intellectual context in which the elections and
the process of democratization undertaken by the military must be understood.
Hence, elections were not simply a concession to a specific covuntura; they
were a response to what Gramajo and others understood as the historical
failure to develop a modern national project of economic and political
development. A central element in the project of "national stability" is the
construction of a state which can establish the legitimacy of modern political
institutions at the same time as it fully integrates the country's indigenous
population and weakens the capacity of independent social and political
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movements. The process of democratization envisioned by the military within
the doctrine of national stability is central to that agenda; it is designed to
increase the administrative and cultural power of the state. The institutional
power of the military is understood as essential reinforcement of that project
wherever it is threatened, but Gramajo's concept of an "integrated" strategy
should be considered seriously. It is by no means ad hoc or simply tactical, but
reflects the thinking through of a long-term political cultural problem
confronting the military with regard to the problems of national identity and
the absence of a legitimate political order.
Bringing out the political culture dimension of the military's project
points up again the importance of a complex approach to the analysis of
civil-military relations; otherwise, we can underestimate the political power of
the military or its understanding of the dilemmas it confronts. The relationship
between Christian Democratic President Marco Vinicio Cerezo, elected in 1985,
and the military reflects very well a point made by Alain Rouquie about
particularly militarized political systems:
...contrary to a view marked by liberal ethnocentrism, in a system so
militarized, there do not exist two worlds entrenched like two camps
prepared for battle, with civilians on one side and the military on the
other. Far from provoking a sacred union of the political class or of the
social forces organized to defend democratic institutions in danger, any
military uprising will enlist the public support of certain civilian forces
competing with their rivals. (1986: 133)
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A fuller analysis of the political culture of political parties and elections will be
provided in Chapter 7, and the weakness of civil society vis-a-vis the military
will be examined more closely in order to assess the significance of the process
of democratization which has occurred in Guatemala. For now, this
examination of the doctrine of national stability put forward by Gramajo and
other military officers should suggest that the project reflects an ambitious
institution, fully confident of its power and competence to articulate the
interests of Guatemala, and equally capable of structuring the processes of
political development and democratization on their terms. Jennifer Schirmer
argues that the thesis:
may represent the future model for Latin American military strategic
thinking because it strives for an accommodation between national
security and democracy. (1991: 13)
This cultural and institutional context must be kept in focus. The
military did not intend to "hand over power" and go "back to the barracks" in
the usual sense. Hence analysis which simply argues that the military remains
in command despite the efforts of civilian leaders remains superficial. The
military was genuine in seeking collaboration and dialogue with other political
groups and yet it clearly reserved a special supervisory position for itself and,
as noted, viewed itself as the proper judge to decide which groups could
participate in the process of national dialogue and concertacion they
envisioned. In Schirmer's words, once again, "Gramajo's interest lies in
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institutionalizing the army's own political, economic and strategic interests
apart from any political movement" (1991: 13). The project cannot, therefore, be
easily categorized as simply military or civil. It goes beyond a defense of the
traditional sense of fuero militar; while clearly wishing to maintain its
corporate autonomy and privilege, the concept of "national stability" reflects a
fundamental deepening of the military's sense of national mission. Anderson
and Simon describe Guatemalan style democratization as a form of "permanent
counterinsurgency," and quote one military official who says "now that the war
has been won we have to figure out how to govern these people" (1987: 47).
The authors tell us that the officer was reading The Prince, and one might
surmise that he was interested in Machiavelli's advise regarding the relative
virtues of being loved and feared, as well as the dangers for regimes which
rely on excessive force and incur the hatred of their own people. In the next
section we will examine what the military's reflection on these matters has
meant Guatemala's for indigenous communities.
'The Continuation of War by Other Means":
Counterinsurgency Institutionalized
As we proceed to examine what "winning the political war" has meant
in the highlands, it must be made clear from the outset that from the
perspective of the Guatemalan military, the political and the military conflicts
are not separate spheres with their own logic and practice. When Guatemalan
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officers reverse the famous Clausewitz formulation, as quoted in the title of
this section, they express the tight link between their conceptions of
development and pacification. Jim Handy has argued that threats to the
military's control in the highlands have been a principle motivation for
military interventions in politics over the past four decades (1986). If that was
its priority in 1954 and 1963, the political opposition which emerged in the
early 1980s was arguably the biggest threat to the Guatemalan state since the
revolt which destroyed the Central American Federation in the 1830s.
In response to that threat, the military concluded that it was necessary
to "integrate into the same strategic equation, the politics of development and
the politics of security." That analysis contributed to setting forth-after the
1982 coup—the most ambitious effort at integrating Guatemala's Indian
communities yet attempted. In Carol Smith's words, "the point of all these
efforts is to end once and for all the resistance of Indian communities to
Guatemalan state policy" (1990: 275). Successive military campaigns-Victory'
82, Firmness' 83, Institutional Re-encounter' 84, National Stability' 85, National
Consolidation' 86, etc- sought to eliminate the guerrillas and permanently
institutionalize state political control, through the military, over indigenous
communities. While building on the institutional foundations of the past, these
campaigns reflected unprecedented range and depth and introduced important
innovations in the application of state power.
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The analysis behind the project began from the assumption that
Guatemala's political violence was a product of underdevelopment and
exploitation. If the military wanted to win the "political war" for the "hearts
and minds" of Guatemalan indigenous communities, it would be necessary to
confront the social conditions which created a climate in which "subversion"
could thrive. It was argued that poverty and racism created conditions in
which communist guerrilla movements could exploit the genuine suffering of
the people and fool them with empty promises (Manz 1987: 18-20). In response
to what the military leaders referred to as "imported ideologies," they claimed
to put forward authentically Guatemalan solutions to Guatemalan problems.
From Civic Action to "Civil Affairs"
The attack on "imported ideologies" was most sharply directed at
Marxist analysis, but Guatemalan military leaders also questioned the
relevance of North American developmentalism from the 1960s. We previously
saw how this led to the revision of the doctrine of national security and the
development of the more appropriately Guatemalan concept, its proponents
argued, of "national stability." This thinking generated a similar reformulation
of the notion of "civic action" into the doctrine of "civil affairs." The older
concept, it was noted, grew out of United States military experience as an
occupying force in Europe, Korea, and Vietnam. For that reason, civic action
was now seen as a "paternalistic, assistance concept," which needed to be
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replaced by a policy "oriented to the attainment of the welfare of the
population." "Civil affairs" was defined as
...the combination of activities carried out by the army in a participatory
manner with the civilian authorities and the population in general, to
facilitate military operations against a declared or hidden enemy, and to
foresee and resolve problems stemming from underdevelopment or
from actions by the terrorist groups. (Cited in IGE 1989: 59)
Previous civic action programs were now characterized as having had
limited, humanitarian goals which, like most previous state policy, had lacked
a long-term plan and vision. Civil affairs programs, on the other hand, were
not
...isolated acts, nor based on luck or improvisation; they are the result of
realistic studies and intensive analysis of the general situation of the
country. (Ejercito de Guatemala 1984: 63)
Another military document described the goal of civil affairs as the creation of:
...a feeling of identity and unity in order to achieve national objective
and to win, preserve, and strengthen the populations support for the
army. (Internal Military document on civil affairs, cited by IGE: 62)
The emergence of the concept of "civil affairs" reflected a sharpened
awareness of the political and cultural aspects of the war being fought. The
military argued that it had learned its lessons from past experience. The
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Chairman of the Defense Chiefs of Staff noted
Subversion had put in 12 years of political work in the region; that is
why it was necessary to combat it using the same methods, and that is
why we are entering the age of ideological and developmental military
operations.. ..we will conduct counterinsurgency security and
development operations and ideological warfare. In other words, once
security is achieved, the army penetrates the population with the
development incentives in order to correct the vulnerabilities which our
society faces due to the abandonment in which it has lived and which
the subversion has exploited. (Ejercito de Guatemala 1984: 58)
An account of the civil affairs program conducted in the Ixil Triangle of
Northern Quiche relates the evolution of military doctrine to lessons learned
from the military's attention to changing guerrilla tactics. The author of the
account noted that the guerrillas:
...haven't been speaking to the Indians about Marx, Lenin, Mao, Fidel, or
Che, but have pointed out that they [the Indians] are poor and the
ladinos are the owners of the wealth. They have reminded them of
historic processes, raising their awareness [concientizandolesl and
offering them a dignity the Indians haven't found from governments
which all their life have treated them as backwards and brutalized by
ignorance and alcohol.
Civil Affairs, the author concludes, will succeed only:
...by offering the Indians realities and complying with them immediately
in order to neutralize the action of the enemy. We must take into
account the psychological work of the enemy against the army and all
the civic values of Guatemala.. ..it is vital that a deep and well-
considered psychological campaign be able to reassure the Ixil mentality
and make it feel part of the nation. (Porta Espana 1982: 44)
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These goals were to be carried out by the civil affairs section (S-5).
General Gramajo later described the task of the S-5 as directing the war in a:
...more integrated form in order to make local government agencies
more efficient and thus able to contribute to the war effort in their
respective fields. (1987: 79)
These programs were described as "bottom to top" and the emphasis was on
the voluntary joining together of military and rural communities in the pursuit
of security and development. In the process, the military greatly strengthened
its control over rural political institutions, promising development while trying
to mobilize the population into the security strategy.
Security and development are so integrated that it is impossible to enjoy
fully the one without the constant presence of the other. (Gramajo 1987:
81)
So whereas civic action had brought limited development to some rural
areas, civil affairs programs now sought to establish a stronger institutional
relationship between peasants and the state. The military did not simply
intend to offer services, but hoped to construct a new infrastructure of power
relations that directly linked indigenous communities and the state. Involving
the population more directly in the security strategy was to be reinforced by
new services and the consolidation of military dominated administrative
structures linking rural and urban areas.
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This effort to transform the political-cultural attitudes of indigenous
communities towards the army was part of what David Stoll has described as
an effort to seize "the moral initiative" away from the guerrillas by convincing
the population that the military was more genuinely interested in their welfare.
By acknowledging both the misery of the majority and the bankruptcy of
traditional development approaches in Guatemala, the military's project had
two inter-related dimensions; it was framed in a confident new discourse of
nationalism and independent development. Even opponents of the military
acknowledged the sophistication of this new approach:
In Ixcan, they themselves [the military] state that the purpose of the S-5
is to relate to the population. There are education and health promoters.
They use indigenous and many women to work with the women of the
community in health hygiene. They bathe the children....It is very
sophisticated. As they themselves say, they work with an ideological
and psychological perspective towards the population. (Cited in IGE: 50)
This assessment from a member of the population targeted by the
military points up clearly that the analysis set forth by the military was not
just new words and meanings; it was embedded within new institutions and
political infrastructure which powerfully expanded the connections between
the state and its rural subjects. At the center of this expansion were two new
institutions which the military hoped would transform its relationship with the
rural population: development poles, and civil-defense patrols.
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Development Poles
The goal of strengthened military and political control was initially
carried out by the Victoria 82 campaign. This included Rios Montt's "fusiles v
frijoles" (beans and guns) and "techo, trabaio, y tortillas " (shelter, work, and
food) civic affairs programs. The campaign clearly reflected the notion of an
"integral" strategy for defeating the guerrillas while restructuring the political
order. Gramajo described the objective of this campaign as the:
...development of a program of psychological operations in order to
strengthen the nationalist feeling of the population and the fighting
spirit of the troops and to weaken the morale of the terrorists. (1986: 73)
The civil defense patrols (patrullas de auto defensa civil ) were introduced
under this campaign, and will be examined more fully in the next section.
The "Firmness 83" campaign sought the further isolation of the
guerrillas, while deepening the "physical and psychological control" and
institutional reach of the military in the areas of conflict. Twenty three military
zones were established with the intention of reducing the extensive territorial
jurisdictions which previously had been the responsibility of a single
commander (Gramajo 1987: 74).
The next phase, "Institutional Re-encounter '84/' was informed by three
principle goals: return to institutional rule; reconstruction; relocation of the
displaced. The first priority of counterinsurgency had been to separate the
guerrillas from their social base, defeating them if possible, but at least
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neutralizing their capacity to operate. While highly successful, the military's
tactics produced an enormous displacement of the highlands population. The
widespread violence, destruction, and upheaval-including the destruction of
over 400 villages had, by design, confronted those who survived with three
choices: to live in hiding in the mountains, to leave the country, or to turn
themselves over to the army. The military sought to consolidate dispersed
populations into what were termed "development poles," and defined as:
an organized population center that guarantees the adherence of the
population and their support and participation against communist
subversion. (Ejercito de Guatemala 1984: 25)
Each of these polos de desarrollo contained smaller units, strategic hamlets and
model villages, which were intended to become bases of services and
livelihood for individuals, families, and communities displaced by the war.
The development poles were most prominent in the areas where the guerrilla
groups had been strongest. They were also the focal point of army-directed
"programs of psychological operations to strengthen the nationalist feeling of
the population...The mind of the people was the principle object" (Gramajo
1987: 73). These were populations which from the perspective of the military
had been in some kind of relationship with guerrilla groups and almost
certainly the target of their propaganda about the army and the state.
"Re-education" programs were employed to teach the people that they had
been tricked by the guerrillas.
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The development poles were administered by a system of
"Inter-institutional Coordinators". As explained by the Chairman of the Defense
Chiefs of Staff during the regime of Mejia Victores, they were the
framework which homogeneously promotes and harmonizes
coordination of the public sector. It eliminates the possibility of
duplication of efforts and financing, which, by some undesirable
possibility, could reverse the benefits established by the social
integration of the population. As an additional dividend, it gained
mastery over the themes utilized by the subversives. (Ejercito de
Guatemala 1984: 88)
Translated into concrete structures and functions, the coordinators were
supposed to strengthen the capacity of the state to supervise rural
development. Similar efforts were made in the 1960s and after the earthquake
in 1976, but had not been sustained. The network of coordinators worked at
four levels—national, departmental, municipal, and local. While presented as an
effort to decentralize administrative control "from the bottom to the top," and
thus implement the "filosofia desarrollista ", the system had the effect of
subordinating all other local officials. 18
The military originally planned to construct 49 model villages that
would be home to 60,000 internally displaced Indians (Manz 1987: 42). For
anyone who has travelled in the Guatemalan highlands, model villages
immediately stand out in sharp contrast to most rural towns or village which
typically retain the design promoted by the Spanish conquerors. Most have a
center with a church and a square along with some stores (the number and
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extent varying according to size), and perhaps a school. There are usually
some residents clustered on side streets, with many more living on small
family plots in the surrounding area. Model villages have a completely
different spatial and cultural texture. The villages are organized in a much
more gridded fashion, with geometrically proportioned lots of equal size, with
a very small area for growing food. The residents have generally been
gathered from a variety of locations and may not even be of the same
language group-which serves the army's goal that they learn Spanish and
develop a more national sense of identity.19
The streets are patrolled by a civil defense patrol in which local men are
required to participate. Programs of psychological re-education were initially
conducted and reinforced by signs such as the one which greeted residents
and visitors to the model village of Ojo de Agua-"Welcome to the village of
Ojo de Agua which has said "'no' to communist subversion." The army tightly
controls the comings and goings of the residents with a lookout tower at the
entrance, and limits their ability to farm beyond the immediate environs of the
village. Health clinics have only been constructed in a few of the villages, and
are often severely understocked and without staff unless run by foreign
agencies.
Hence, in spite of the grandiose vision initially presented, there is little
evidence that the model villages have brought economic development and
prosperity for their residents. The efforts at greater rationalization of the state's
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infrastructure for promoting economic and social development have fallen
short because of bureaucratic infighting and lack of revenue. After the election
of a civilian president in 1985, the system of Inter-institutional Coordinators
was replaced by a network of civilian administered development councils; but
the councils came to be widely viewed as a scheme by the Christian Democrats
to build their own political base in the countryside, a concern which
apparently limited their capacity to work with non-governmental organizations
(WOLA 1988: 15). There has thus been no significant expansion of the civilian
services provided by development poles and model villages since 1985. 20
Building "Guatemalidad": Civil Defense Patrols
The most influential and enduring element, so far, of the military's
effort to reshape Guatemalan political culture has been the system of civil
defense patrols. While immediate security and intelligence goals were evident
in the formation of these paramilitary patrols, the military has also hoped from
the beginning that the patrols would help establish a stronger sense of what
some officials have called "Guatemalidad" (Castaneda 1982). In this way, the
patrols were conceived partly as an ideological project for fostering a sense of
national identity. While the military has long seen itself as uniquely capable of
promoting the national unity and identity of the Guatemalan nation, the
problem of national identity became more troubling to some military analysts
in the 1970s. A 1973 article in Revista Militar, "In Search of the National
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Identity: The Army and National Development/' argued that Guatemala must
reject imported solutions and seek its own path, "in the way that each country
has or tends towards their own Personalidad Basica " (Ejercito de Guatemala
1973: 19). The task of the army, with the nation, was to extract the best
elements of each of Guatemala's cultural components, ladino and Indian, and
find common ground from which to derive a national identity. Similar
concerns were expressed in an analysis of the military as a vehicle of
ladinoization (Cruz Salera 1978). Many who joined or, more likely, were
forcibly conscripted, became alienated from their communities and were not
able to facilitate the building of cultural bridges. Another analyst argued that
the appearance of many Protestant evangelicals has created further
fragmentation and disunity (Mejia Carranza 1979).
The civil patrols addressed these problems by directly linking villages to
the army through civilian militias which, it was argued, would foster a sense
of partnership in the defense of the nation. One proponent of this notion,
writing in Revista Militar, presented the civil patrols as proof of Guatemala's
claim that it was now a "national community". In joining the patrols, this
writer argued, local militia members were defending "the distinctness of their
own style of life in the face of a foreign system that intended to displace it."
These actions were further referred to as a "defense of the personality. ..a
hispano-aboriginal transculturation which has defined contemporary
Guatemala" (Castaneda 1982: 8). With this notion of "Guatemalidad", the
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military claimed to celebrate the cultural achievements of Maya civilization
and suggested that the active participation of indigenous communities
reflected an assertion of nationalism on the part of the rural populations who
"liberated themselves from bloody and oppressive hands". Guatemala thus
showed itself to be like any other national community when "an external threat
conspires against the national definicion, when something or someone tries to
erase its personalidad " (Castaneda 1982: 6).
The military stressed the voluntary nature of the patrols; indeed, the
Guatemalan constitution guaranteed the right to not serve. The patrols were,
the military argued, an effort by "those most infected by terrorism. Once they
had overcome the armed crisis, they organized themselves according to their
own wishes." General Gramajo maintained in 1987 that
...if the situation had been otherwise-if many Guatemalans with a
nationalistic vision had not become involved in "the troubles"~the army
only could have designed plans, made profound analysis, and
developed strategies, but it would not have been able to move forward.
(Quoted in Guatemalan Church in Exile 1988: 45)
It was, Gramajo argued, because the military was among the "mind of the
people," that it was able to convince them to turn to the army for help in
defending themselves against the guerrillas.
The objective is to organize the population civically and politically...so
that through the civil defense patrols the persons formerly infected by
the subversive groups come to know, study, and understand how they
were deceived and how to prepare not to fall again into the same or
similar trap. (Ibid)
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In order to strengthen this sense of connection, participation in patrols includes
rituals of national allegiance and solidarity such as parades and singing the
anthem of the civil patrol:
I am a victorious soldier
Of the civil defense
Always side by side like a brother
With the brave army
For my country Guatemala
My blue and white flag
For my home, my ideals
I shall fight with fierceness
Civil patrol training also often includes a strong "re-education" component for
rooting out remnants of support for guerrilla propaganda.
The immediate task of the patrols is to protect their area against
guerrilla activity and provide intelligence as well as paramilitary support for
the army. Close to 900,000 men take part in the patrols, which are particularly
prominent in those areas of the highlands where guerrilla activity was most
intense. Only about 5% of the patrollers are actually armed, usually with
Winchester or M-l rifles that they must turn in after each round on patrol. It is
said that the quality of the weapons depends on the amount of trust the
military has in the patrol.
The role of the patrols in the evolving political culture of
democratization in Guatemala has been very controversial. While the patrols
are voluntary according to the constitution, this is generally conceded, by
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former President Vinicio Cerezo and the U.S. State Department among others,
not to be the case. The prominence and ambiguity of their presence is evident
in the violence which has surrounded the activities of CERJ (Ethnic
Communities We are All Equal), a group working particularly in the
department of El Quiche to educate Indians about human rights, including the
constitutional right to refuse service in the patrols. The organization's leader,
Amilcar Mendez, has received repeated death threats. As of February 1991, 10
CERJ members had been killed and 9 disappeared; one was murdered the
same week that Mendez was in the United States to receive an award from
former President Jimmy Carter. Civil patrol members in areas where the CERJ
works are repeatedly told by the Army that the organization is subversive and
represents the "politics of human rights."
Participation in civil patrols also brings economic hardship. The
requirement to serve 24-hour shifts, whether twice a week in some smaller
villages, or perhaps every two weeks in larger communities, means missing
work opportunities or paying a part of one's meager earnings to another
patroller. In an area where most men must leave their communities for
extended periods of time to work in other parts of the country, the
requirement to serve in the patrols presents a severe burden.
Critics of the patrols also argue that they tend to foster and/or
exacerbate cultural divisions, suspicion, and xenophobia. While the military
argues that the patrols reflect and reinforce the national identity, they also seek
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to reinforce local community and family connections while weakening larger
ethnic bonds of solidarity (Barrientos 1983). The military wants patrollers to
feel they are Guatemalan in some sense, but also that they are protecting their
family and village against external forces, which the military implies may be
located in another village or represented by all manner of desconocidos or
"strangers"--ladino, foreign, or Mayan (Americas Watch 1986: 76-77).
At the same time, it is important to recognize the complex cultural
world in which civil patrols and model villages exist. Reports from
anthropologists who have returned to areas where violence was extreme have
uncovered evidence of bitterness towards the guerrillas among many
indigenous survivors (Manz 1988; Carmack ed. 1988). David Stoll has
suggested that given the long distrust of ladinos the military was able to gain
a degree of support from indigenous communities by appealing to their sense
of having been "burned" by the "subversives" (1990: 180-217). Stoll argues in
his account of the highly militarized Ixil Triangle in Northern Quiche that
many Ixils turned to the army though fully aware that it was the institution
most responsible for the violence; some had even recently supported the
guerrillas but concluded that they could not protect them. Others resented
being left unprotected from the wrath of the military after the guerrillas
realized they were militarily overextended and had to pull back.
An argument such as Stoll's is obviously controversial and problematic
many question the testimony of Indians about this period and attribute
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anti-guerrilla statements to the presence of the army and fear of retribution.
Given the long tradition of strategic withdrawal and distrust of ladino politics
among indigenous communities, we must be cautious in assessing what is
going on. Moreover, joining civil patrols is only one of the choices made by
Maya. In the following chapters some of the other choices, including exile,
religious conversion, political activism, urban migration, will be examined in
order to provide a fuller assessment of the military's success in realizing its
political-cultural goals.
What is clear is that the network of civil patrols has permitted the
Guatemalan military to greatly expand its control and presence in the
highlands. Those who choose to oppose the civil patrols put their lives in great
danger because they threaten a thus far quite successful effort to
institutionalize and internalize a direct relation between rural communities and
the state. In that way the patrols have been a powerful force for reshaping the
political culture of Guatemalan indigenous communities in the direction
sought by the military. For the political parties and movements emerging in
recent years, they represent a large percentage of the adult population which is
difficult to mobilize.21 During the 1985 election campaign, the Christian
Democrats promised to reorganize the patrols and ensure freedom from
coercion. Once in office they instead sought to give the patrols a more
developmental cast as it became apparent that the military saw them as central
to the ongoing tasks of pacification and national integration. While former
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President Cerezo stressed their role in rural development, human rights groups
have argued that the predominant function of the patrols is military-
intelligence, logistical support, helping gather refugees and displaced
people--and their character largely repressive. In August 1987, civil patrols
played an integral logistical role in carrying out a major military offensive in
northern Quiche, and local patrollers have been repeatedly accused of human
rights abuses.22
These debates over the role and nature of the civil patrols reflect a more
fundamental issue underlying the entire military project: the role of force and
violence. While this analysis has emphasized the political goals of the military
project, I have also stressed that security and development are integrally
related. When Gramajo and others discuss the "political war," they always
assume the continued relevance of military considerations. The change
represented by the "thesis of national stability" is hence one of degree. General
Gramajo has recently referred to what he calls the concept of "minimum force,"
which he explains as a
...more humanitarian, less costly strategy to be more compatible with the
democratic system. We instituted Civil Affairs which provides
development for 70% of the population while we kill 30%. Before, the
strategy was to kill 100%. (Interview by Schirmer 1991: 11-12)
When asked by Jennifer Schirmer how these numbers were arrived at and how
strictly they governed policy, the General made it clear that the percentages
were more of a metaphor than a guideline; they were meant to convey a spirit
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of moderation, but the military would continue to do what was necessary and
permit no interference from civilians in the analysis and performance of that
task. The violence which has surrounded the civil patrols reflects clearly how
important they are in the military's project.23 A fuller discussion of what will
be termed the "political culture of terror" will be undertaken in Chapter 7.
Provisional Conclusions
How successful has this project been in achieving its ambitious
objectives? In 1987, in the aftermath of elections, with the guerrillas apparently
reduced to a marginal position and the United States hailing the
"consolidation" of democracy, Jean Marie Simon and Ken Anderson
persuasively suggested that what they termed "permanent counterinsurgency"
might rule Guatemala for several generations and even provide a model for
other states. The military expressed great pride in their success, suggesting that
it was they who should instruct the United States and not visa versa. But in
1992, the situation appears uncertain and the consolidation of the military's
project seems far off. Economic problems have limited developmental
ambitions; the system of parties and elections, which is central to the
legitimacy of the project, has its own political culture and is viewed with
cynicism and apathy; the guerrillas have not been defeated and are now
participating in a process of dialogue with other sectors of Guatemalan
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society-religious, political, business, labor, etc. And all the while, tensions
persist within the military as an institution with regard to policy, tensions
which will be examined more closely in chapter 7. It is much too early to
dismiss the scenario suggested by Simon and Anderson; the pattern of
Guatemalan history until this point has been toward ever-increasing
institutional power for the military. While a definitive break with that pattern
is possible, it is not inevitable. Still, political spaces exist that continue to
challenge the military's project and widen the room for opposing groups and
agendas. At the same time, external cultural and structural forces gather
around those spaces, also providing opportunities and constraints.
It is necessary now to look beyond the political cultural goals of the
military officers who have formulated the project of "national stability," and
examine the larger cultural worlds they confront within Guatemala. How do
those other forces foster and/ or hinder the goals of that program? The most
significant of these other cultural forces will be examined in the next two
chapters; in chapter 6 the role of religion will be explored, while chapter 7 will
examine the political culture of the democratization process in Guatemala since
1985.
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Notes
1. The best discussion of the cultural dilemma confronting military regimes is
provided by O'Donnell's "reflections" on his original model (1979). While his
work on bureaucratic-authoritarian states is often accused of providing
structural explanations, the more interesting part of his analysis involves the
legitimacy crisis which confronted those regimes as they tried to work within
the symbols and discourse of democratization when the authoritarian tradition
could not provide adequate cultural resources to marshall and sustain
continued support for exclusionary projects. Viewing history as a series of
interventions and subsequent retreats is convenient, but doesn't provide
insights into the impact of new knowledge and political cultural change.
Structural factors are always present, but are not necessarily viewed in the
same way.
2. An impressive exception to this tendency is reflected in the chapter by
Alfred Stepan in the collection by Evans, Skojpol, and Rueschemeyer (1985).
Stepan's analysis of state-society relations in the Southern Cone is illuminating
on specifics; it is also comparative without forcing his case studies into
superficial typologies. In examining the "different dilemmas that democratic
opposition faces" in confronting military-dominated governments in that
region, his conclusions are relevant to the case at hand:
The power of the state as an actor and an institution cannot be analyzed
in isolation from an understanding of the nature of the cleavages that
rend civil society, on the one hand, or the growth of horizontal ties that
bring different sectors of civil society together on the other hand. At the
same time, the evolution of opposition to the state within civil society is
shaped by the ways in which the state defines its project and by the
contradictions and conflicts that emerge within the state apparatus itself.
(1985: 340)
3. Analysts of democratization often start from classical definitions of
democracy and proceeded to examine the institutional developments and
transformations necessary for its realization, as well as the degree to which
democratic norms and values are accepted by elite and mass groups; see Booth
and Seligson (1989; 1991). The degree of civilian rule is considered an essential
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barometer and it is automatically assumed that the military was a repressive,
anti-democratic force yielding because of institutional weakness. My goal is not
to argue that the Guatemalan military is democratic in any sense that
corresponds with democratic theory; it is to ask how they understand
democratization.
4. Patterson argues that some of the traditional internal networks of loyalty
such as the promocion and centario appear to have faded in importance in
recent years. He also notes the continuing difficulty for social science students
of military political culture which Richard Adams noted in 1969-the military
remains resistant to all efforts at sociological research on the Politecnica .
5. The effort to rehabilitate Tecun Uman included the publication of Estudio
Critico de la Conquista de la Republica v Muerte del heroe nacional Tecun
Uman by the military publishing facility, Editorial del Ejercito. The book,
published in 1966, proclaimed him a national hero who protected Guatemala
from foreign invasion and hence defended the sovereignty of the nation. While
probably wildly at odds with the ways that history was understood by
indigenous communities, for whom Guatemala had a weak meaning at best,
the willingness, though mostly symbolic, to view Guatemala's Indian past in
positive terms was a small change in traditional attitudes expressed by the
state. One officer wrote in the military monthly Ejercito, that
in recognizing the heroism of Tecun Uman the military understands that
it isn't a man or a hero who is being exalted, but a collection of values
and virtues of the inhabitants of the country....Tecun Uman crosses time
to establish a genuine link of spiritual continuity between the ancient
peoples and the contemporary Guatemalan nation. (No. 14, Oct. 1963: 3)
Ejercito also carried a serialized historical account of the Conquest which
spoke of the heroic effort of Indians "in defense of the sacred territory of our
nation" against "the Spanish," in a way clearly designed to draw parallels with
what they considered the current assault from foreign communism. The
journal also focused on developing a national military history which reinforced
the notion of the military as the "backbone" of the nation.
6. Other sources for this account of the Mendez election and government
include Kenneth Johnson (1966), John Sloan (1968), and Milton Jamail (1972).
Jamail's account provides the best review (136-161).
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7. The MLN is often labelled "fascist," but the label seems misplaced for the
reasons noted by Rouquie in a more general discussion of Latin American
militaries. He notes the important differences between the fascism of Hitler or
Mussolini and military rule in the continent, particularly regarding approaches
to capitalism and political incorporation. His argument applies particularly
well to the MLN given their antipathy to state intervention in the economy.
8. In his insightful discussion of the Politecnica, Franklin Patterson notes one
area where the training received by cadets does not prepare them well for
professional life~the difficulties of living the life of a caballero on the salary of
a soldier. On the expanded economic power of the military, see Painter (1988),
and Black (1984).
9. Good accounts of this period are in Carmack, ed. (1988); Davis (1983);
Handy (1984); Arias in (Smith ed. 1990).
10. This degree of popular support is hard to quantify with precision. Arturo
Arias (1990: 255) estimates between 250,000 and 500,000. A 1982 study by
Davis and Hodson for Oxfam America found that for most highland Maya
who joined the guerrillas the desire for protection from the army was a
stronger motivation than ideological affinity . Despite the triumphalist tone of
the guerrilla groups in this period, whether they could have won is highly
debatable. If they had won, it would probably have been due to military
incompetence, given the assurance with which they were turned back once the
military improved its operation.
11. The URNG drew together several factions with historically diverse political
bases and revolutionary analysis. These will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 7.
12. While "death squads" clearly worked closely with military leaders in
determining targets, Benjamin D. Paul and William J. Demarest provide an
extraordinary account of a death squad in San Pedro la Laguna which shows
that the extensive political violence did sometimes provide a cover for settling
personal scores (Carmack ed. 1988: 119-154).
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13. On the subject of counter-insurgency and "low-intensity warfare" see the
edited collection by Klare and Kornbluh (1988). While the authors are highly
critical of U.S. policy, they draw heavily on military documents to examine the
intentions of programs in several areas. For an interesting internal assessment
of counter-insurgency in neighboring El Salvador see Mainwaring and Prisk
(1988). Their study, commissioned by the Small Wars Operational
Requirements Division of the United States Southern Command interviews
North American and Salvadoran principles and points towards a central
problem: the lack of a coherent, long-term national plan and objectives. One
Salvadoran colonel told the authors:
At this point all democratic forces are polarized and disunified. I believe
there will be no unity unless it is sought through a national perspective
where all sectors of the population are integrated.. .and we will be able
to obtain a national consensus. We will be able to clearly determine our
national objective...we will be able to visualize where we want to go as
a state. At this time I believe we do not know. (1988: 20)
His comments clearly indicate why the Guatemalan military felt it had
something to teach it neighbors.
14. For an account of this process from a perspective more sympathetic to the
guerrilla organizations and with a strong knowledge of their internal debates,
see Black (1984).
15. The same author wrote in another article (1985a) that the model of
development followed by Guatemala should not answer to
...any other patron foreign to our nature; it should be established on the
basis of a democratic society whose end is to elevate human values and
social values while honoring our cultural and spiritual traditions.
Once again we can see the effort to posit and invoke a sense of national
identity in the hope of thus creating one.
16. This view is also expressed by Col. Eduardo Wohlers, head of the civil
affairs division (S5) and an important architect of the rural institutions of
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counter-insurgency described in the next section. See the interview with him inWOLA (1988).
17. For more on Centro ESTNA see Cronica (Oct. 6, 1988; June 23, 1989).
18. For a fuller version of the military's vision of development poles and
desarrollismo, see their full color 1984 publication. While redundant and
propagandistic, its expresses well the triumphal attitude of the military at that
point in time.
19. In many ways development poles carried on the process of reduction
attempted by the missionary orders who first colonized the area in the 16th
century. Gathering the Indians into colonially administered towns was seen as
a fundamental aspect of the cultural process of civilizing and Christianizing
them. In the case of counterinsurgency in the 1980s, security concerns played a
more central role, but are closely connected to cultural goals.
20. This conclusion is based on research by Beatriz Manz (1988), James Painter
(1989), Carol Smith (1990b), the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA)
(1988) and AVANCSO (1990), and was reinforced by my own visit to the Ixil
Triangle in Northern Quiche in July 1990, as well as discussions with
development officials working in the area.
21. This point was made on several different occasions during conversations I
had while in Guatemala during the summer of 1990. One prominent Christian
Democrat told me that from the standpoint of any sort of center-left political
project, the civil patrollers were unmobilizable. In the interview with Jennifer
Schirmer (1991), General Gramajo makes it clear that the military is seeking to
eliminate independent political movements in the rural areas through the
deployment of selective political violence. This account of the patrols is based
on Americas Watch (1986; 1991). For the military's perspective see Castaneda
(1982) and Barrientos (1983).
22. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a non-binding
international injunction requiring the Guatemalan government to protect 14
members of CERJ. The ruling came in response to the government's slow
pursuit of two civil patrollers accused of murdering several CERJ members.
The suspects were arrested just before the ruling was handed down, a fact
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human rights activists attribute to the pressure applied by the Court hearings.
(Christian Science Monitor, August 6, 1991: 5)
23. General Gramajo's frank discussion with Schirmer did not go unnoticed,
and was used by groups who sought to prosecute the General when he has at
Harvard University in 1990-1991. In response Gramajo told another interviewer
more recently that Schirmer's grasp of Spanish was poor and that she had
misrepresented his views. What he really meant to say was that he had:
tried to make the military more of a service organization. The effort of
the government was to 70% in development and 30% in the war effort. I
was not referring to the people, just the effort. (Times of the America
Feb. 5, 1992: 3)
CHAPTER 6
RELIGION AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN GUATEMALA
It does not take long for a visitor to Guatemala to realize that it is a
very religious country. It is virtually impossible, therefore, to approach the
issues of political and cultural identity without taking that religiosity into
account. The relationship between religion and politics has grown all the more
significant and controversial given the explosive proliferation of evangelical
Protestant sects in recent years, and the political success of evangelical
minister-politicians such as General Efrain Rios Montt and current President
Jorge Serrano Elias. The extraordinary number of conversions in a time of
intense political change, violence and militarization has led many to generalize
about the conservative political orientation of evangelical churches. Many have
viewed the proliferation of these churches as a form of foreign intervention
and/or an arm of the counterinsurgency. The evangelicos have been accused
of dividing Guatemalans and destroying indigenous culture, while preaching
subservience to the existing political order.
While this perspective is not without merit, I will argue that the
relationship in Guatemala between political and religious identity, and political
and religious change, is profoundly more complex than right and left
categories can suggest. It is more complex because the newly emerging
255
evangelical churches are highly diverse and cannot be easily explained by
simply examining the intentions of foreign and domestic elites. While those
intentions should not be dismissed, a more complete analysis requires
understanding the ways religious change, and specifically religious conversion,
is constructed as a cultural choices within Guatemala.
A better grounding in Guatemalan reality helps avoid another of the
ways in which religious change is sometimes oversimplified. The emergence of
Protestant sects is sometimes portrayed as a new and unprecedented challenge
to the power of a previously pervasive and monolithically powerful Catholic
Church. 1 The discussion of ethnicity and legitimacy in Chapters 3 and 4
established the limits and ambiguity of the cultural influence of the Catholic
Church. The central point underlying the analysis in this chapter is that the
present must be seen in the context of that history. A Weberian formulation
can be borrowed to argue that the Catholic Church has long confronted
"competing Gods" in Guatemala, and its victories over indigenous religious
traditions have always been incomplete. Recent events do not, of course,
merely reflect the patterns of the past. Knowing more fully why large numbers
of Guatemalans, including hundreds of thousands of Maya, are converting will
require more years and careful research, but Guatemalan history offers
important lessons about ethnicity and religion which can improve the quality
of the questions which are asked. When both the nation-building political
ambitions of the counterinsurgency project and the explosion of religious
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conversions are viewed within their respective historical and cultural contexts,
the political relationship between them becomes ambiguous.
This chapter will, therefore, ask the same questions of religious groups
which the previous chapter did of political elites and the military. How have
changes in state power, social structure, and political economy been
interpreted culturally? What new questions have those changes provoked, and
how have the questions and the answers been grounded in tradition? But
before we can approach these questions, it is necessary to begin with some
brief theoretical reflections on the study of religion and politics.
Interpreting Religion and Politics
Events of the past several decades have provided continual testimony to
the power of religion within a wide array of political cultures. This has been
especially evident in Latin America and has stimulated an impressive
collection of scholarly work by political scientists seeking to make sense of the
recent developments. What makes this work so impressive is its potent
combination of theoretical insight and empirical observation. Complex changes
require sophisticated analytical tools capable of untangling the relationship
between cultures, structures, and practice, and this work directly builds on
Weber's analysis of the relationship between changing structures and religious
practice.2
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Recent analysis of religion and politics in Latin America has been
motivated by changes in the Catholic Church which previous models of
analysis could not satisfactorily interpret. Much of the earlier analysis was
rooted in structural-functional modernization theory and tended to view the
activities of various religion elites as political strategies employed in a context
of waning temporal influence and gradual but inevitable secularization. One of
the most influential proponents of this approach, Ivan Vallier, constructed a
typology of these responses along a spectrum from "conservative" to "radical"
(1972). He then analyzed the attitudes and values of clergy within each
category and outlined the probable political actions that could be expected at
each point. His own normative hopes were with the "progressives". In contrast
to the regressive "conservatives" and anti-developmentalist "radicals," the
progressives could potentially make up a part of the modernizing elites who
would create the values and goal orientations conducive to liberal democracy.
This perspective was concerned primarily with the Church as an institution
and paid little attention to religious belief itself. Sharing the assumptions
which linked modernity and secularization, this analysis saw the Church
engaged in an effort to survive politically and hence pursuing largely temporal
considerations.
Daniel Levine argued that this approach reflected the general bias of
modernization theorists regarding the need to separate the religious and the
political in the process of political rationalization and modernization. In its
258
place he offered a "phenomenological" approach, animated by the imperative
to "take religion seriously as a source of guiding concepts and principles,
instead of merely subsuming phenomenon under secular rubric" (1978: 518).
Functionalist approaches downplayed the importance of religious faith and
reflection by focusing on temporal political roles and strategies deployed by
religious leaders. Levine did not argue for making religion the principle point
of reference, but maintained rather that religion and politics must be
understood as mutually related phenomena. This approach recognizes that
historically adjacent institutions and theoretical models influence religious
expression but in a manner which is dialectical and ongoing. This requires that
social science pay serious attention to the political significance of "changes in
the existential act of being religious." The movements of religious faith reflect
an ongoing dialectic between experience and reflection:
Such a perspective requires research that looks at groups and structures
over time in specific historical contexts, working so far as possible with
their (italicized in original) concepts and categories. (1981: 187) 3
We must also guard against the danger of seeing religion as the
principle point of reference without understanding the practical dilemmas
within which it is applied daily. This tendency is present in much of the public
discussion of Islam and often blinds observers to the element of practical
politics and rationality, culturally constructed, in actors perceived to be simply
fanatics. As Clifford Geertz has noted, few people operate wholly in the realm
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of mystic symbolism and it is in the everyday world that cultural systems have
their most enduring if never completely consistent influence (1973: 119-20).
Levine provides two warnings in his work which are particularly
relevant to the case at hand. When religious values are not taken seriously
enough and subsumed into political categories, there is a tendency to fit events
within a left-right framework relative to the current political scene. While not
without some rough heuristic value, those efforts do not take us far enough
inside the cultural world where choices are made.
The same can be said of analyses which stress the structural forces or
institutional imperatives, or try to interpret a rational basis for behavior
according to categories independent of the cultural logic of the actors
themselves. Such analysis can tell us part of what happened, but not what it
means for living women and men. Analysis of recent religious conversion in
Guatemala has tended to focus on macro issues: conflicts with the Catholic
hierarchy; the intentions of North American missionaries and their political
allies; relationships between evangelicals and the Guatemalan military's
counterinsurgency project; natural disaster. But to explain conversion solely by
reference to these factors is incomplete. A 1990 paper by Levine makes this
point nicely in cautioning against explanations which put too much emphasis
on structural changes:
These conjunctures provide a necessary but not a sufficient basis for
understanding....Transformations within religion (ideas, structures and
practice) need to be set in the context of changes that made them
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resonate and ring true to ordinary people and gave average men and
women a chance to shape the course and content of change on their
own. (1990: 7)
While the Guatemalan case may appear to strain the possibilities for
individual agency, it is important that we continue to recognize that choices
are being made in however constraining an environment, and that they involve
the deployment of culturally constructed categories of thought and action.
Structural forces aren't simply external events to which individuals must
respond, they are viewed through cultural lenses which interpret change, ask
new questions and provide for new possibilities. Levine again puts the matter
well:
This vital dialectical relation between the arts of living and studying
religion and politics suggest considerable dynamism: participants are
searching for new values, elaborating new categories of analysis, and
creating new forms and meanings of action and reflection. (1981: 187)
While Levine's terms imply a more esoteric frame of reference, they can be
applied to all cultural practice. What does it mean that hundreds of thousands
of Guatemalans have changed their world view in significant ways? The
answer is something we can only interpret through attention to cultural
categories. And the same is of course true for the majority of Guatemalans
who remain Catholic. This is what it means to say that religious faith is an
"existential art" which continually influences how experience is interpreted
while being reshaped in turn.
The Legacy of the Past
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In Chapter 4, 1 argued that religious goals were central to the political
identity of the Spanish Conquest. Drawing upon the research of historians and
anthropologists, I contended that while the Catholic Church provided the
strongest element of legitimacy the colonial political order possessed, it was a
legitimacy based in syncretism, fragmentation, and ambiguity. It is not
surprising that Bourbon and Liberal political leaders later viewed limiting the
Church's power as essential to their efforts to construct more coherent and
centralized political structures and legitimating principles. The first effort to
construct a "national" political order-the Liberal-led Central American
Federation—failed because of the violent reaction it provoked from indigenous
communities and the Church.
The generation of Liberal leaders who ruled Guatemala after 1871
succeeded in permanently weakening the political and economic power of the
Church. Richard Adams argues that
Indeed, if a crucial case is needed to counter the die hard stereotype
that blames all Latin American ills on the Church, Guatemala is the
case. For, in the some eighty years of liberal suppression, the Church
could hardly be accused of being the major offender in keeping
Guatemala underdeveloped. (1970: 278)
The Liberals also sought to transform what they viewed as the Church's
debilitating cultural heritage by encouraging the work of Protestant
missionaries. Indeed, from the first appearance of Protestant missionaries in
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the 1830s, their influence within Guatemala has been fraught with political
meaning and connected to broader struggles. At the same time, as Virginia
Gerrard Burnett has argued, success or failure at any given point has been
directly linked to the capacity of new churches to speak to Guatemalans in a
culturally meaningful way. In that regard, as was noted in Chapter 4, the
missionaries of the 19th and early 20th centuries failed dismally.
The Catholic Church fared somewhat better under Ubico's
administration. The assault on the Church moderated, although it was not able
to recover its lost properties, and Ubico was initially less supportive of the
efforts of Protestant missionaries. Burnett argues that while Ubico cited fiscal
restraints imposed by the Depression, the president seems to have had a
"personal distaste for Protestants." By the mid 1930s, Ubico's desire to improve
relations with the United States prompted a more conciliatory policy however
(Burnett 1986: 112-121).
If Ubico's policy towards the Catholic Church was more even handed,
earlier attacks on its power had severely weakened the infrastructure of the
institution, especially in rural areas. But requiring the large majority of foreign
clergy to leave Guatemala produced rather different results than were
intended. For while the state increased its presence in indigenous communities
during under Ubico's regime, the weakening of Catholic institutions made
possible a tremendous flowering of indigenous religious institutions and the
emergence in many communities of what Kay Warren has called a
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"civil-religious hierarchy," dominated by the system of religious brotherhoods
known as cofradias. In her study of San Andres Semabaj, Warren documents
the ways Indian leaders:
...redirected the religious brotherhoods, initially founded by Spanish
missionaries, to serve as the mainspring of a separatist Indian culture
with its own ritual language and valued images of behavior. (1978: 27)
Warren goes on to argue that in a time when the larger socio-economic and
political reality limited the autonomy of indigenous communities, this
separatism enabled the construction of a cosmology and ethos in which moral
autonomy was possible.
Within this separate sphere of control, Trixanos [residents of San
Andres] celebrate an identity that they believe is distinct from their
economic and political subordination to ladinos in the bi-ethnic social
system of San Andres. (1978: 173)
The revolutionary period provoked responses from Guatemala's
religious community which were to greatly complicate the relationship
between religion and politics between 1944 and 1954 and well beyond. Still
weak from earlier attacks, the Catholic Church was furthered challenged by
the political reforms undertaken by Arevalo after the overthrow of Ubico.
While rejecting the agro-export model promoted after 1871, the reformers in
both the Arevalo and Arbenz administrations shared many of the same
assumptions about modernization. They were deeply suspicious of the Catholic
Church and its cultural influence, and the feeling was mutual within the
Church hierarchy.
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Protestant churches, dominated as they were by North American
missionaries, were initially concerned about the strongly nationalistic tone of
the new administration. These concerns gave way quickly, however, as
Protestant groups found they could work well with the reformers and shared
many of their developmental goals (Burnett 1986: 125-128). The churches
worked closely with government literacy programs and also supported
Arevalo's labor legislation.
This cooperation exacerbated tensions with the Catholic Church which
accused Protestants of "being the opening wedge of Communism in
Guatemala." An article published in 1945, entitled "Protestantism:
Fountainhead of Communism?," traced a conspiracy between the American
missionaries, the "Dean of Canterbury, Moscow, and the head of the national
labor union in Mexico" (Burnett 1986: 134). These attacks apparently had little
effect, however; public attitudes toward the Protestants improved because of
their social work.
With the election of Jacobo Arbenz, matters turned more complex.
Arbenz sought to limit the entry of foreigners and by 1952 it was virtually
impossible for missionaries to obtain visas. These actions reflected concern that
a strong foreign presence would hinder further reforms, especially the
appropriation of foreign, held properties under the Agrarian Reform law.
Missionaries were gradually excluded from teaching in government literacy
programs, and many foreign missionaries became themselves convinced that
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Arbenz was moving towards communism. This was not, however, the
assumption of many of their Guatemalan parishioners. Burnett argues that a
split ensued within the churches between foreign missionaries alienated by
Arbenz radical nationalism, and Guatemalans who supported the government
because they stood to benefit from reforms. Protestant converts were more
likely to be landless; moreover:
...the fact that the Church members had already committed a major
deviation from accepted social norms by joining a Protestant
Church...were more open to radical change than their Catholic brethren.
(Burnett 1986: 143-144)
After the triumph of the counter-revolution, these individuals gradually
became the members and leaders of denominations which were much more
indigenous in their philosophy and institutions. Burnett argues that the
revolutionary period unleashed nationalistic energies in a part of the
population which earlier Liberal regimes had viewed as a brake on national
development and which had hence rather naturally tended to view
government projects with passive or active hostility. New possibilities for
social and political identity emerged. When this nationalism could no longer
find active political expression after the coup in 1954, and as the traditional
Protestant Churches suffered from their association with the revolution,
Burnett argues that this nationalism took on more religious forms. In this way,
the growth of new Protestant sects in the 1950s and 60s can be seen as an
expression of nationalism as well as of individual autonomy and self
determination in a new and more politically constrained environment.
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This nationalism was expressed in schism and sectarianism; major North
American churches, including Central American Mission and the Assembly of
God, fragmented in this way as new sects emerged which were increasingly
identifying themselves as
...pura Guatemalteca ...autonomous, spiritually appropriate to its people,
and not tainted by association with foreign personnel or ideas. (Burnett
1986: 175) 4
The 1960s and 70s brought on an explosion of conversions. Why, in
addition to the factors discussed by Burnett, did these religious groups and
practices now have the capacity to speak culturally to larger numbers of
Guatemalans? As before, we must start with a grasp of the structural context
and then ask why these experiences inspired new cultural practices. Among
the conjunction of factors were: urbanization in response to economic
development programs which increased landlessness; political violence and
polarization; renewed and expanded missionary activity; and the havoc
provoked by the 1976 earthquake. Burnett noted a consistent pattern among
those who convert: they tend to be among the poorest and most marginalized
populations. Bryan Roberts argued that Protestant churches helped create
support networks among people who found themselves on their own in the
city; these networks were a particularly important source of support for
working women with children. The moral strictures of pentecostal
communities-especially with regard to drinking, adultery, and wasteful
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spending-also appealed strongly to women struggling with abusive or
alcoholic husbands.5
Renewal and Change in the Catholic Church
The growth in evangelical sects did not only reflect their intrinsic
appeals. A convert, after all, does not simply join a new church; he or she
leaves another behind. This in turn suggest that the activities of the Catholic
Church need to be examined to determine the extent to which they may have
been responsible for alienating Catholics and encouraging them to look
elsewhere for spiritual and practical guidance.
The Church recovered some of its institutional power after 1954. Castillo
Armas expressed gratitude for its support in the battle against communism,
and while his policies did not go as far as Archbishop Rossell y Arellano
hoped, they did permit the entrance of several hundred new priests from
abroad. While that process had begun quietly under Ubico's regime, the
improvement in relations after 1954 allowed the Church to increase the
number of priests from 132 in 1950 to 483 by 1965. The increase in women
religious was equally impressive. And as before, the clergy thus remained
80-85% foreign (Berryman 1984: 173-174; Adams 1970: 278-296).
The Church's improved relations with the Guatemalan state occurred
within the larger context of expanded Vatican interest in the situation of its
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Latin American base. Catholic Action was one reflection of a renewed interest
in reviving the Church's presence in the continent "with the largest single
number of Catholics in the world and with unquestionably the most
underdeveloped clergy and Church structure" (Adams 1970: 282). The purpose
of Catholic Action was to "involve laymen more profoundly in the work of the
Church and against the ideas stemming from humanism, Protestantism,
rationalism, autorevelation, historical materialism, and laicism" (Adams 1970:
295). The Vatican and Guatemala's Catholic hierarchy viewed this movement
as a moderate and Christian alternative to what it perceived as communist
political movements which had been fostered during the revolution.
Another significant effort to mobilize Catholic laity politically was the
development of Christian Democratic parties in several countries. This
movement, which originated among Catholic intellectuals such as Jacques
Maritain in France, presented itself as a kind of "third-force" political
movement: a communitarian alternative to socialism and liberalism. This
brought many middle class Catholics, especially students, into the political
arena and the parties became an important political force in several countries
including Guatemala.
Christian Democracy and Catholic Action represented a major effort by
the Church to more actively engage with the forces and movements of
modernity. But the Second Vatican Council took that process of encounter
several steps further under the mandate of Pope John XXIII's program of
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aggornamento or bringing the church up to date. If the Church was to be
brought up to date it first would need to understand the world better through
the prudent application of modern social science. The Church, it was argued,
needed to confront secular philosophies openly, and with confidence of its
own relevance.6
The work of applying the new ideas unleashed by Vatican n within the
Latin American context was taken up by the Second General Conference of
Latin American Bishops in Medellin, Colombia in 1968. For many of the
region's clergy this was the first extended chance to meet with their colleagues.
A network of social science and theology research centers was established; this
research represented the first systematic attempt by the church to look closely
at the socio-economic conditions facing its parishioners.7
The effort to analyze Latin American reality more fully and draw upon
relevant modern modes of study led to serious rethinking of the institutional
Church's significance and identity. The Church could no longer rely on the
security of temporal institutional edifice as a source of identity; it was more
accurately seen as a "pilgrim people," a community of believers in the world
engaged in an on-going interpretation of the Bible. Rather than remain aloof
vis-a-vis temporal authority, the Church was instead called to bear witness in
the light of its values and to show solidarity and provide support to the
oppressed. It was also in a position to critically examine the institutions of the
world. At Medellin, this impulse was manifest in the examination of
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alternate forms of giving voice to the Church" (Berryman 1984: 189). As many
Catholics looked to more radical options, governmental repression grew more
fierce.
The Politics of Conversion and Counterinsurgencv
While many within the Catholic Church moved to the left and joined
with other emerging political movements, evangelical churches grew in
members and prominence throughout the 1970s, and especially after the 1976
earthquake. But with the ascendence of General Efrain Rios Montt in the wake
of the March 1982 coup, the politics of these churches became the subject of
intense domestic and international controversy. The new President
immediately declared himself the hand of divine will. Rios' continual
invocation of religion, prayer, and divine love galvanized the support of North
American evangelical churches intent on taking a concrete step to combat the
spread of "communism" in Central America (Stoll 1990; Burnett 1986). The
support of these groups for Rios' "guns and beans" civic action program in
turn led many observers to argue that evangelicals were playing a critical role
in trying to foster cultural legitimacy for the institutions of counter-insurgency.
Several points of common ground between the military and evangelical
churches were asserted: opposition to the social activism which parts of the
Catholic Church have promoted; a strongly anti-communist ideology and
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inclination to apply the label "communist" to all forms of social activism;
promotion of more individualistic and less communitarian attitudes; a strongly
right-wing ideology which could confront the influence of "liberation
theology".
While not without some basis, this analysis of the relationship between
conversion and counterinsurgency has serious limitations, and is most
convincing as an explanation for the intentions of foreign missionaries. Much
of the evidence used to support links between evangelicals and the military is
drawn from the stated intentions of North American groups, the experience of
Rios Montt, and/or anecdotal quotes from individual military officials. But a
closer analysis of the military's project suggests several reasons to question the
connection. The military officials coordinating "civil affairs" in the countryside
no doubt welcomed the support of evangelical churches in the "humanitarian"
aspects of those programs. Their initial priority-particularly in 1982 and into
1983—was to defeat the guerrilla armies and establish civil patrols. Burnett
points out that the qualities which tended to characterize
evangelicos--"sectarianism, passivity, apoliticism, and a lack of articulated
politics"-made them attractive to the military partly because they were
unlikely to generate coherent political analysis and/ or mobilization (1986:
240-243).
At the same time, these qualities also create problems. While evangelical
churches do not encourage the kind of overt political mobilization which
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Catholic practice did in the 1970s, they can also be seen as a threat to the
military in that they encourage fragmentation and autonomy.9 Hence the
personal style and message of Rios Montt should not be automatically
conflated with the more elaborate ambitions embodied in the "thesis of
national stability." The strong nationalism of that project would also suggest
that alliances which emerged between the military and foreign missionaries
were probably largely tactical. Moreover, the process of concertacion among
the country's various sectors envisioned by the military was designed to
establish legitimacy among the elites, many of whom are strongly Catholic.
There is, thus, no consistent indication that evangelical groups form an
important part of the military's project the way, for example, Protestant
missionaries did under the Liberals in the 19th century. Rios Montt was
replaced because the High Command saw him as divisive and
counter-productive to their goals; General Mejia Victores retorted that what
Guatemala needed was "more murders, not more prayers". Moreover, the more
recent experience of Rios Montt as presidential candidate has shown that the
moral self-righteousness of some of the evangelical groups does little to
legitimate Guatemala's political leaders and parties.
The Politics of Interpreting Religious Change
in Guatemala
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The analysis presented so far has argued that interpreting the political
culture of religious conversion requires placing more emphasis on how those
choices are understood culturally by the people who must make them. Before
proceeding further toward that goal, if s useful to ask why explanations based
on the intentions of the military and foreign missionaries are so readily
accepted by many non-Protestants in Guatemala. What cultural perspectives do
these explanations express and how have they been constructed? The answers
to that question provide further insight into some of the schisms within
Guatemalan political culture as well as their influence upon religious practice.
The Catholic Church has been far from passive in the face of intensified
religious competition, and in January 1989 the Episcopal Conference of
Guatemalan Bishops issued a pastoral letter advising the faithful on this
question. The letter emphasized the Church's position throughout Guatemalan
history as a source of unity; for centuries it has been "the only element that
could establish a certain integration among the diverse races and social and
economic groups." When turning to the Protestants, the tone of the letter turns
quite sharp. Noting the positive intentions to correct Church errors which
motivated the Reformation in the 16th Century, the Bishops argue that
constructive impulses were manipulated to support the political agenda of
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various political actors of the time. The Church stood in the way of their desire
to expand dominion over larger populations:
In this way, even thought the Reformation had its origins in a religious
motivation, its diffusion and consolidation was more as a political
weapon than a religious preoccupation. (1989: 9)
This reasoning provides the foundation for the Bishops' effort to present
the Catholic Church as a unifying force against the individualistic ideologies
carried by Protestantism. They recount the cooperation of Protestants with
Liberal development policies which had a devastating impact on peasants.
Now once again, Protestant sects are, according to the Bishops, dividing
communities and families, and promoting exclusive forms of solidarity:
""Brother" (hermano) isn't man as a being in the image of God, but solely the
one who shares the same religious belief." Moreover, the Bishops assert, the
evangelicals carry a foreign philosophy which in addition to dividing
communities is also having a harmful effect on indigenous culture. The
Bishops cite the well-known contents of a report given by Nelson Rockefeller
to President Richard Nixon in 1969 which described the growth of
Protestantism as a positive development for U.S. foreign policy given the
increasingly liberal stands taken by the Catholic Church. At no point does the
letter consider elements of Church practice which might have alienated
Catholics and rendered other churches more appealing.
10
A similar argument is put forward by many ladino intellectuals and
activists.
11 Drawing on the ample evidence that foreign, and largely North
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American, churches have sought to gain a missionary foothold in Guatemala,
this phenomenon is attributed to a sinister plot, backed by the CIA and the
Guatemalan military, to foster a right-wing, anti-communist alternative to the
growing radicalism of the Catholic Church. The problem with this kind of
analysis, as David Stoll has noted, is that it only focuses on half the question,
What are the intentions of external actors and the military? In doing so, it is
assumed that indigenous Guatemalans who convert are being manipulated or
terrorized into doing what others want them to, and lack any real agency. The
intentions of elites certainly matter, but they only provide a partial
explanation. Recalling Daniel Levine's discussion, we must still strive to
understand the meaning of social action within the concepts and categories of
the actors.
Religion and Ethnicity
How, then, do those who convert understand that choice? I will
examine the evidence available thus far in a moment. It is important to stress
that it will take much more observation over the next decade and beyond to
more fully understand the political significance of what is happening. Until
then, analysis on the subject should be careful not to overestimate the element
of change manifested in these events. In his recent book on Protestantism in
Latin America, David Martin describes what is happening as the rending of
the "sacred canopy," a concept borrowed from Peter Berger, long provided by
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Catholicism. Developing societies dominated by Catholicism, he argues, have
yet to experience the social differentiation which "hives off religious
mobilizations from political mobilizations." The Catholic heritage continues to
generate comprehensive social doctrines which make a universal claim and
keep the religious and the political closely linked. As a result, most Protestants
are suspicious of politics and power and prefer cultural forms which are only
indirectly political. Hence the apolitical orientation of the new Protestants in
Latin America.
Martin goes on to argue that the region is now entering a phase in the
process of secularization comparable to that through which North America
passed two centuries ago. He analyzes this religious fragmentation as part of
the process of differentiation and secularization in which politics and religion
become two distinct realms. In this way, Martin understands what is
happening in Latin America today as analogous, although culturally distinct,
to what occurred in North America in the 18th and 19th centuries as the all-
encompassing organicist political tradition of Catholicism gave way to
secularization.
Yet, there are serious limitations in an attempt to draw the emergence of
Protestantism in Latin America into a general theory of secularization such as
this. Focusing on what are seen as universal processes of social differentiation
does not tell us very much about the specific cultural setting where change
takes place. This is particularly problematic when transferring a model of
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Catholic Church-State relations from North America and Western Europe to a
rather different setting. While the Church does still see itself as a quintessential
unifying force, its cultural power has always been ambiguous and its economic
and political power on the decline for the past two centuries. Moreover, the
existence of such a pervasive tradition of syncretistic religious practice suggests
that what is happening today in Guatemala is not nearly as new--or analogous
to North American experience-as Martin wants to suggest. 12 Martin's analysis
also fails to adequately consider the ways transformations in the contemporary
Catholic Church further challenge his general theory.
Studies of the local dynamics of the Catholic Action movement reflect
that the religious practices which existed prior to the 1940s and 50s were
uniquely Mayan (Warren 1978; Falla 1978; Brintnall 1979). They were gradually
transformed when socio-economic changes introduced new pressures and led
especially younger community members to look in new directions (Annis
1988). The appearance of Catholic Action engendered sharp divisions in many
towns and villages. Brintnall notes, for example, that in Aguacatan, Catholic
missionaries who arrived in the 1940s encountered nearly as much resistance
as the Protestants. Much of this resistance emerged in response to Church
efforts to "modernize" religious practice and weaken or eliminate elements of
Maya "folk" Catholicism. Catholic Action-based community organizations often
appealed to younger community members because they challenged the
traditional, racist political hierarchies of Ladino domination as well as
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indigenous political and religious leaders (Warren 1978; Falla 1978). Yet, the
proliferation of new Protestant churches in the 1960s and 1970s reflects that
many made other choices.
This is the context which is missing when the Episcopal Conference of
Catholic Bishops argues that Protestant sects are exclusionary and divisive in
Guatemala; these new churches didn't suddenly disrupt peaceful indigenous
communities that had previously lived in harmony. Changes in the Catholic
Church, such as efforts to challenge the authority of traditional institutions,
divided families on occasion, as did efforts at political mobilization. Thus, the
image of a Catholic Guatemala losing its unity and being divided by new sects
is based on a mythical understanding of the country's past.
At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, as David Stoll has
noted, part of what has accelerated the number of conversions is the confused
and contradictory political culture of the Catholic Church itself. On the one
hand, the post-World War II Church has continually tried to promote more
participation and decentralization, as reflected in the Catholic Action
movement and, more recently, Christian base communities. 13 These efforts
have been articulated with reference to notions of praxis, empowerment and
democracy. But in recent years the Vatican has clearly acted to rein in these
forces and re-establish institutional hierarchy and authority. These efforts have
led many to see evangelical sects as sources of self-expression and
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autonomy-places where a peasant can become a pastor or community leader
in ways the Catholic Church makes more difficult.
In the process, commitments to democracy and hierarchy carried within
diverse strains of modern Catholic thought spring into open competition.
Daniel Levine has stressed that the practices of religious institutions don't
simply set forth standards of religious conduct; they also express values
regarding participation, because the influence of religion extends far beyond
the realm of spiritual reflection. It also informs the world of daily practice and
is a culturally constructed interpretation crafted locally in response to the
pressures and challenges of experience. That is not to say that most evangelical
churches are models of democracy and participation; their structures are often
quite authoritarian. But at the same time, they provide possibilities for mobility
and self-determination which are more difficult to come by elsewhere. If
cultures are where we seek some small sense of being in control of our fate
amidst structures of power which constrain, a church in which a peasant can
become a pastor, or a women can get her husband free of alcohol, and which
offers a world view with many resonances in Mayan tradition provides one
way to get some control over a very disordered and tumultuous reality.
Giving a full account of the sectarian world of evangelical Protestantism
is impossible here. 14 But the fragmentation should make us cautious about
generalizing about the political thought and action which have emerged.
Defining the politics of the new sects is hard because they are so diverse.
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Indeed, what is most clear is that the dynamics differ from one setting to the
next and a composite explanation can only offer some ideal types. Some
churches clearly fit the right-wing stereotype. These have strong connections to
North American churches, have an explicitly political ideology, and, it appears,
appeal largely to middle class and working class ladinos (Evans 1991).
Timothy Evans refers to them as "neo-pentecostal," and argues, based on field
research in Quezaltenango, that they appear to make up a small percentage of
Protestants in Guatemala.
Many of these groups are stridently anti-communist and were directly
involved in the "civil affairs" components of the pacification program (Stoll
1990; Guatemalan Church in Exile 1988). The military's civil affairs program
was partly administered initially by the Fundacion de Ayuda al Pueblo
Indigena (FUNDAPI), with extensive support from fundamentalist groups in
the United States. They were able to operate much more freely in military
zones than Catholic groups and their work was given vocal support by North
American evangelical leaders such as Jimmy Swaggart, Jerry Falwell, and Pat
Robertson.
In his 1990 election campaign, Rios Montt gathered much of his
support from these churches, but it is important to add that he also received
significant support from conservative Catholics, disgusted with corruption and
growing lawlessness and including some of the officers who originally placed
him in power in 1982. Public speeches in which Rios denounced congressional
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deputies as "clowns and mental defectives" may have shocked some but they
struck a chord with many others. One frequently heard it said that when Rios
was in power, people worked hard, respected God, and behaved morally. So
his candidacy did not just appeal to hard-core evangelicals.
The available evidence suggests, however, that a rather small percentage
of Guatemalan Protestants belong to these more politicized churches. There is
another, much larger group of evangelicos which are better characterized as
apolitical. Most of these churches are also Pentecostal and are also generally
more Mayan in their origins and membership, and are often quite small. They
are often not linked at all-or only loosely~to larger churches, and some
analysts believe they represent the majority of Protestants in Guatemala (Evans
1991; Stoll 1990). Many of these smaller churches are the products of sectarian
fragmentation and internal feuds. The practices themselves-faith healing,
speaking in tongues, singing—often resonate with the more mystic, intimate,
and emotionally cathartic elements of traditional religious practices. There are
also obvious differences of theology and cosmology. Protestantism is
thoroughly monotheistic and less subject generally to syncretism than
Catholicism. It is also more completely grounded in biblical scripture. Being
Protestant, as David Scotchmer has noted, means living outside a large
network of traditional culture and practice. The resonances between Protestant
and Mayan religious practice may reflect what Burnett terms "functional
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substitutes" for earlier practices which were more emotionally satisfying than
their modern Catholic replacements (Burnett 1986). 15
While it is important to see continuity, we must recall Levine's words:
religious faith is an "existential art" in which "participants are searching for
new values, elaborating new categories of analysis, and creating new forms
and meanings of action and reflection" (1981: 187). In re-confronting sources of
value and meaning in the light of new experience, Protestant churches do not
simply recover earlier traditions. Guatemala's current social, economic, and
political problems are seen partly as the product of failures of the past-which
are now seen as dead ends. New cultural constructions build on what are
understood to be the "lessons" of previous experience. The problem of divining
meaning continually pits individuals and communities against forces they can
not control and which threaten to undermine and even destroy their moral
autonomy and physical security. Unless we remain sensitive to this aspect of
culture we are likely to evaluate outcomes too materialistically and not see the
cultural problematic they reveal for individuals. 16
This becomes clear and tangible in considering why many Protestant
churches chose to cooperate with the military. Stoll and Burnett argue that for
many of these groups and individuals the motivation was largely fear and
survival, rather than ideological affinity. The cultural world in which those
choices were made was, of course, violent and complex. As discussed in
Chapter 5, reports from anthropologists who have returned to areas where
284
violence was extreme have uncovered evidence of bitterness towards the
guerrillas among many indigenous survivors (Manz 1988; Carmack ed. 1988;
Stoll 1990: 180-217). In a world in which all the political choices were perceived
as bad, Protestant churches may have offered an escape from politics.
"Apolitical" Politics
There are analytic dangers, however, in characterizing these groups as
apolitical. It would appear at first to confirm David Martin's argument (1990)
regarding the important role Protestant churches play in the process of
secularization. But recalling Weber's warning that the political significance of
religious belief differs according to history and context, it is necessary to ask,
What is the cultural meaning of "apolitical" within Guatemala? One North
American sociologist doing field research told me "For a lot of Indians getting
involved in politics means getting caught in the middle when the Ladinos start
shooting at each other." We have seen that religious practices in Guatemala
have long embodied an account of inter-ethnic relations of power, and they
have often expressed indirect, but implicit, rejection of status quo ideologies
and systems of domination. In that sense, continuity with the past may be
present in these new religious communities. We should at least anticipate the
possibility that the capacity for cultural renewal will continue in new and
285
different ways, and that, whatever the intentions of elites, religious conversion
will not destroy indigenous culture.
Evangelicos, whether ladino or indigenous, are not simply the objects of
subjugating ideologies and practice; like many before them in Guatemala they
are engaged in a cultural practice in a situation of "brutality, intimidation, and
subordination" (Scotchmer 1989: 214). Viewing religion as part of an ideology
from above which attempts to legitimate domination does not explain how
every day reality is experienced and interpreted by those who form their own
sense of what religion means. Protestantism may provide a "fresh and inviting
option to the politically weary or uncommitted" (Burnett 1986: 232), but the
long term result may be unpredictable. David Stoll reports that many local
evangelicals were apprehensive about the way individuals like Rios Montt had
"politicized the faith". He also suggests that, like the Catholic Church in
previous decades, the new churches were inevitably forced to confront the
social needs of their members. He quotes one evangelical: "Even though the
conservatives are in control, they are not going to maintain it, because the
people are learning to speak, in their own terms and their own forms" (1990:
182).
In the short run, perhaps evangelicals reinforce the political goals of the
military. But they do so in the same way that past cultural practice reinforced
domination-in a manner that is slightly askew~off center-and autonomous
enough to be unpredictable. This is not to suggest that they harbor latent
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radicalism. James Scott's work has illustrated brilliantly that "everyday forms
of resistance" are usually not intended to establish a new cultural order, and
have little faith in achieving revolutionary change. Instead, they use what
space they can to preserve as much security and cultural meaning as they can.
The task of culture, as Weber understood so well, is an endless practice of
understanding, with the cultural resources at hand, how we came to be who
we are so we might know how to proceed. We must analyze what a culture
says, what the structures that push against it are, and where the spaces are
where local knowledge and experience slide into the cracks and create their
own meaning. The historical experience of the Maya suggests a well-developed
talent for this work in the most hellish of worlds. The challenge is to
understand the complex relation between structures of domination and the
cultural worlds which interpret them. In the Guatemalan world of democracy
and counterinsurgency, in which dialogue shares the spotlight with widening
political violence and economic crisis, we should expect what Michael Taussig
calls "epistemological murk," in which things are only partly what they seem
and the message which is received by "subordinate classes" is never exactly
that which is intended. 17
It remains, therefore, to be seen what impact the more individualistic
tendencies of Protestantism will have on the bonds of ethnic community. There
is clearly no reason to assume, given the demonstrated flexibility of ethnic
identity, that the two are incompatible. Moreover, recent developments
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indicate renewed vigor and independence in indigenous political and cultural
activism. 18
The Catholic Church Looks to the Future
As important as the explosive growth of evangelical churches is, the
majority of Guatemalans are, and for the foreseeable future will probably
continue to be, Roman Catholic. What cultural dilemmas do they confront? The
analysis which follows focuses principally on the responses of the Church
hierarchy. It is a leadership whose position well reflects the cultural complexity
of modern Catholicism. While traditionally among the continent's most
conservative clergy, the violence and political fragmentation of the past several
decades have gradually provoked the Guatemalan Bishops to take more critical
positions on matters of social policy. While still very cautious about embracing
liberation theology, the Bishop's 1988 letter "El Clamor por la Tierra" set forth
a position on Guatemala's land problem which is clearly grounded in
mainstream Catholic social teaching. Pope John Paul II's highly publicized
confrontation with several Catholic priests and bishops with regard to
liberation theology has led some to emphasize his conservative
anti-communism, but other Papal statements reflect continuity with the
Church's traditional critique of the cultural and economic significance of
capitalism. 19
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The 1988 letter on land strongly echoed the Church's traditional
perspective on the dignity of labor and the right of all to the fruits thereof. It
didn't hesitate to suggest that current Guatemalan social structures were an
unjust affront to the humanity of the majority. While there is none of the
fundamental questioning of capitalism that characterizes liberation theology,
the letter clearly attempted to challenge well-off Guatemalans to consider their
national reality with more conscience and compassion. And while the letter
stopped short of calling for land reform, the attacks directed at the Bishops
from private sector groups after its release reflected clearly that the letter was
not viewed as a harmless sermon.
The Church's support was critical in getting off the ground the process
of "national dialogue," which is analyzed in the following chapter, and it has
been the continual initiative of Monsenor Rodolfo Quezada Toruno, President
of the Committee of National Reconciliation, which has kept the dialogue alive.
The Church leadership has expressed growing concerns about what a 1989
statement by the Bishops Council termed a condition of "social decomposition
and internal rupture in the society." The Bishops starkly described a society
torn apart by violence, corrupt public officials, and widespread public despair,
cynicism, and apathy.20 The Council also released several statements
admonishing their followers to vote during the 1990 presidential elections and
their support for the dialogue is clearly driven by an appreciation of the long
term dangers of the present situation.
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There is a deeper issue here which recent Church documents address as
the problem of "being church." This issues is not new; Catholic Action and the
political organizing done by many priests and lay catechists in the 1970s
sought to make the Church a more responsive vehicle for the spiritual and
material aspirations of its faithful. The concept of the Church as a "pilgrim
people" was intended as way to de-emphasize institutions and structures and
deepen the sense of community.21 But in a period of horrific political violence,
natural disaster and economic dislocation, new religious communities spoke
more meaningfully to many Guatemalans. The Church remains a very
hierarchical institution but it clearly cannot avoid the challenge to develop
more participatory structures and programs, and, as Levine notes:
new concepts and forms of political action necessarily alter the impact
of politics on religion, providing new pressures, problems, and models
for action. (1981: 29)
The position of the Church can be partly understood by reference once
again to Weber's analysis of religion. He distinguished three categories of
religious actors: laity, prophet, and priest. The role of the priest is to rationalize
religious doctrine, often after periods of revolution or renewal by prophets.
The priest has a complex task; he must balance the needs of the religious
institution with those of his community. This is where the political importance
of the priest is manifest:
Pastoral care in all its forms is the priesfs real instrument of power,
particularly over the workaday world and it influences the conduct of
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life most powerfully when religion has achieved an ethical character. In
fact the power of ethical religion over the masses parallels the
development of pastoral care. Wherever the power of an ethical religion
is intact, the pastor will be consulted in all the situations of life by both
private individuals and the functionaries of groups. (Weber 1978: 465)
This is the level where Protestants have been winning converts, whether
because of a shortage of priests or mistrust of the Church or simply the appeal
of a new perspective in confronting new problems which shattered previous
bonds of community and solidarity. At the same time, the Catholic Church
knows something is happening and they have a pretty good idea what it is. In
Guatemala, the problem may well be that it is too late.
Conclusion
As Guatemalans live in a world where the social and cultural fabric is
being ripped apart by internal and external forces and traditional sources of
meaning are losing their power, they continue to wonder if they can construct
a future, or will things only get worse? I often heard Guatemalans from
different sectors lament that "only God can save us now." While this is played
out in contemporary political battles, sometimes violently, individuals make
their own choices based on their own reflection on meaning, faith, and
identity. I have tried to set forth some empirical and theoretical reasons why
we ought to be careful about facile conclusions based on the intentions of
religious and political elites.
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Once again we see the themes, within a quite different setting, which
shaped Weber's study of the Protestant Ethic. Recall Weber's interest in the
cultural significance of the idea of a "calling" and the imperative it fixed on the
"conduct of life," according to a conception of rationality which sought the
possibility of a faint earthly echo of divine order. Weber stressed, refuting all
efforts to generalize, that rationality was not a universal concept: it could mean
different things depending on one's ultimate values and ends: "it is our first
concern" he noted, "to explain the special peculiarity of Occidental rationality."
My approach to cultural analysis has, following Weber, stressed that cultural
changes-such as changes in religion and world view-occur within a historical
context which shapes how the challenges of the present are constructed as
cultural problems. The continuity we have seen between evangelical and Maya
religious practice displays this process concretely.
Weber also understood well the gap between intentions and outcomes.
Protestants had set out to uncover a sign of their chosenness by pursuing a
calling; they ended up constructing "the iron cage." Gaps such as these
pervade Guatemalan history. It was Protestants who offered support for the
revolution of Arevalo and Arbenz, and who suffered repression afterwards. As
the politics of new and more indigenous evangelical churches moved to the
right or turned away from politics, the efforts of the Catholic Church to
develop their own alternative to revolution gradually were radicalized by
changes Archbishop Rossell could scarcely have imagined, and those efforts in
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turn provoked a torrent of state terrorism from which Guatemalan have only
begun to recover.
"No one knows who will live in this cage in the future," wrote Weber;
and no one knows where evangelicals or Catholics-Maya or ladino--will arrive
with their choices. Weber argued that religions which were better able to
preserve the tension between their ethical standards and the political world,
remaining at least partly "not of this world," were in a better position to
withstand the process of rationalization and the resulting "disenchantment
with the world," which the Protestant ethic had helped engender. He also
understood that for modern religious communities, the most important
"competing god" was the modern nation state. While the political project of the
Guatemalan military seeks to deploy religious symbols and images within the
national "imagined community" it hopes to construct, the long history of
tension between national and religious identities in Guatemala should not be
forgotten. This is not a country which promises to reward theories on the
inevitability of secularization any time soon.
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Notes
1. The pitfalls in viewing what is happening against too broad a theoretical or
global background are evident in a major recent work by David Martin (1990). He
attempts to deploy a general theory of secularization developed in his earlier
work to interpret the significance of Protestant growth in Latin America.
Interpreted in that light, recent changes are inevitably viewed as more novel and
unprecedented than is the case, while the elements of continuity as well as the
grounding of events in cultural traditions get obscured. While Martin's book
provides a very valuable synthesis of important and often little known empirical
research, his theoretical framework is too over-generalized to interpret Guatemala
adequately, a point I elaborate more fully later in this chapter .
2. The most theoretically and empirically interesting work in this area has been
pursued by Daniel H. Levine (1990; 1985; 1981a; 1981b; and many others). Other
important contributions include Smith (1982), Mainwaring (1985), Bruneau (1982),
and Berryman (1984), whose book includes an excellent chapter on Guatemala.
For a further bibliography, and essays which reflect the high quality of recent
work see Levine's edited collection (1986). Levine's debt to Weber is particularly
strong and explicit (1985).
3. Levine's approach builds heavily on the work of Weber and Geertz, but his
emphasis on religion as a continually changing practice of reflection and action
is also a central element of liberation theology. However transcendent God's truth
may be, what its revealed to the historical church is partial and shaped by its
setting. Changing circumstances demand new questions of theology as scripture
is continually re-interpreted in the light of new experience. Seen in this way,
religion is not a timeless system of beliefs, but rather a set of powerful cultural
practices which like any other must be continually reinvented to fit new settings.
This assumes what Geertz has demonstrated persuasively: religions form cultural
systems which provide "conceptions of the world, the self, and the relations
between them." Far from having a purely metaphysical meaning, religions "color
a sense of the reasonable, practical, humane, and moral" (1973: 122-3). If we fail
to take seriously the day-to-day power of religious values upon the way people
think and act in a wide variety of "secular" realms, we weaken our capacity to
understand how these choices look from the ground.
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4. My heavy reliance on Burnett's account reflects how invaluable it is in
documenting the history of Protestantism. At the same time, her use of terms
such as "Guatemalan/' "indigenous," and "nationalism," at times almost
interchangeably, creates some confusion in her analysis. This lack of clarification
has the effect of obscuring the complexity of ethnicity and nationalism in
Guatemala. These new churches may indeed be more indigenous and local, but
not necessarily nationalistic in any clear sense. Still, Burnett's discussion is highly
perceptive and suggestive of the complexity of national political identity in
Guatemala.
5. See Roberts (1968). A growing literature on gender and conversion to
Protestantism has emerged in recent years and is well examined by Stoll (1990)
and Martin (1990). Shelton Annis' study of San Antonio Aguas Calientes explores
this issue also (1988).
6. One of the most important changes occurred in the Church's attitude towards
Marxism. While continuing to reject its atheism and materialist orientation, the
humanism in its appeal was acknowledged by Paul VI:
Some Christians are today attracted by socialist causes and their various
developments. They try to recognized their a certain number of aspirations
they carry within themselves in the name of their faith. They feel they are
a part of that historical current and want to play a part in it. (Pope Paul VI,
"Apostolic Letter to Cardinal Ratzinger," U.S. Catholic Conference, 1971)
7. It is interesting to note the parallels between Latin American Churches and
militaries in this regard. Both were engaged in intensive reflection on their
national realities and sought to improve their academic competence to do so.
While the conclusions drawn were obviously different, this process reveals
important ways that Latin American political culture was being reshaped by the
selective appropriation of modern ideas.
8. The literature on liberation theology is too large to quickly summarize. The best
overviews are provided by Cleary (1984) and Berryman (1984; 1987). See also
Levine's perceptive review article (1981). The social and cultural analysis in
liberation theology drew on two elements of the Marxist tradition. Dependency
analysis offered a method for studying socio-economic conditions which offered
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useful insights. A perceptive and sympathetic analyst of liberation theology,
Michael Dodson, points out that the use of dependency theory was at times
overly simplistic in its prescriptions, but that the theory, as it evolved in
complexity, did offer persuasive counter-arguments to regional policies influenced
by developmentalist theories (1979).
The concept of the Church as a "pilgrim people" was influenced by the
philosophy of history Marx learned from Hegel. Gustavo Gutierrez wrote that
"history is the locale where God reveals the mystery of his person. His word will
reach us to the extent that we immerse ourselves in the ongoing process of
history, and that history is riddled with conflict" (1979: 16). This formulation of
the Church's condition applied Hegel's idea that history reflected a series of time
bound standards of truth and reason groping towards absolute truth. God's truth
is not relative, but the Church's perception of it is historically bound. Scripture
must therefore be continually interpreted in the light of new experiences. As
Hegel had believed that the truth of an age must look its negation in the eye and
"abide" with it, so did liberation theology conclude that it must look at the
"otherness" in its own setting. For the Latin American Church, it was argued, the
most immediate "other" was not atheism, it was poverty.
9. This is a theme which is stressed in several analyses of the problem of national
integration which appear in Revista Militar . One analysis of "El Poder Nacional"
explicitly lists religious divisions as a source of disintegration and weakness
(Caceres Rojas 1982). See also Mejia Carranza (1979).
10. This tone was sharpened in August 1990 when the Bishops Conference
released another letter ("Guatemala Tarea de Todo") in reference to the upcoming
elections. In admonishing Guatemalans to vote-polls were reflecting high levels
of voter apathy and dissatisfaction with the electoral choices-they warned against
candidates who sought to divide Guatemalans religiously or used "moral
manipulation" in their advertising-both clear attacks on the candidacy of Rios
Montt. See La Hora, August 22, 1990.
11. I heard this kind of argument continually when I visited Guatemala in 1989
and 1990 and it appears to be the common wisdom among many members of the
"popular movements" as well as intellectuals. It is further elaborated by the
Resource Center (1987). This is a perspective with a history, reflecting the
frustration historical See Carol Smith (1987) and Arturo Arias (1990) on the
theoretical and practical difficulties ethnicity has presented for the Guatemalan
left. Richard Adams (1990) and Kay Warren (1990) have recently argued that
non-Indians are only beginning to understand how the Maya have constructed
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their own experience. Existing largely within oral traditions that are themselves
strategies of survival, those histories remain to be understood by outsiders.
12. One of the dangers of such a global frame of reference is the ease with which
such an analysis can be deployed by those seeking to resuscitate crude versions
of a so-called "Weber thesis" which locates Protestantism as the force which will,
at long last, create values conducive to the emergence of democratic capitalism
in Latin America. This is exactly what Peter Berger does in his introduction to
Martin's book. Martin is much more cautious on the subject of democracy, though
his political preference for Protestantism is evident throughout. It is important to
add that these criticisms are aimed at the relevance of his general argument to
Guatemala. Martin's book is still a valuable synthesis of important and often little
known empirical research.
13. This generalization about decentralization should not be taken too far. The
intentions of Catholic leaders in different Latin American countries have been
various and often ambiguous. Essays by Daniel Levine on Colombia and Scott
Mainwaring on Brazil in Levine, ed. (1986) illustrate the quite different character
and significance of base communities in the two countries. Levine argues that
their political impact in Colombia has been carefully controlled by the country's
conservative Catholic leadership.
14. David Stoll's account (1990) is the best place to start though he admits his
distinctions and typologies are still rough and inexact, in keeping with the
complexity of the subject matter itself.
15. Barbara Tedlock argues, in her study of indigenous religion syncretism in
Momostenango, that these practices often emerge from the effort to confront the
tensions and ambiguity present in everyday confrontations with the ladino
political and religious elites (1983). The apparent theological contradictions which
often develop do not reflect simple naivete, nor are these contradictions simply
ignored by peasants too unsophisticated to understand. They are the subject of
ongoing cultural interpretation and reflection. Another anthropologist and
Presbyterian minister, David Scotchmer, observes:
In that symbols are ambiguous and variously interpreted by their
adherents, symbols make community possible because they permit a
variety of meanings to coexist within any given context. (1989: 285)
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If we think about Christianity and its encounter with "modernism", the point is
perhaps clearer and more obvious.
16. Burnett also argues persuasively that more than political prudence was
involved in many churches choice to cooperate with the military:
...the message of the evangelicals seems to have offered some spiritual
solace to victims of violence. (1986: 207)
17. This analysis reinforces the point established in Chapter 3 and supported by
Watanabe and Warren regarding the limits of associating ethnic identity with
particular practices, or assuming that transformation of the practice equals
elimination of ethnic identity.
18. See Chapter 7. In his discussion of the rise of evangelical sects among the
Maya in Mexico, David Martin describes this as the product of a "crumbling
world" (1990: 174). Perhaps so, but hasn't it been continually so since the
Conquest?
19. The Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo in 1891 is the classic modern expression of
the Catholic Church's antipathy for some of the excesses of industrial capitalism.
This was framed in terms of the sinful aspects of greed and competition.
Industrialists were called upon to allow workers a greater share in the fruits of
their labor while, of course, socialism and class struggle were completely rejected.
For fuller discussion see Berryman (1984; 1987). A recent statement of the Pope's
views of capitalism and labor appeared in an encyclical released on May 1, 1991
on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Leo's classic statement; "...it is
unacceptable to say the defeat of the so-called 'real socialism' leaves capitalism
as the only model of economic organization." The letter went on to question the
materialism, greed, and insensitivity to suffering that unregulated market
economies can promote:
it is not wrong to want to live better; what is wrong is a style of life which
is presumed to be better when it is directed towards 'having' rather than
'being'" (Reported in the Boston Globe May 3 and May 7, 1991),
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20. The bishops' document dealing with these issues was summarized in Prensa
Libre, August 8, 1989.
21. The practical significance of these issues within one of Guatemala's largest
dioceses can be seen in the analysis and program set forth in the Plan Pastoral
Diocesano 1990-1994 (Diocesis de Quezaltenango 1990). While the document is
careful in the terms employed, a strong commitment to social and economic
needs, and a clear analysis of their condition, is set forth in the Plan. The general
objective is stated in terms which echo Liberation Theology but are stated less
confrontationally:
To construct, in communion and participation, a Church that is
evangelized and is an evangelizer, in order that, from the preferential
option for the poor, the Kingdom of God will grow in our communities as
they struggle and search for a more just society. (68)
The document distinguishes three modes of "being church:" rejecting a more
traditional, hierarchical, clergy dominated model on the one hand which is
characterized as "classist, without commitment to the people," and the closed,
sectarian, apolitical approach that is a clear reference to evangelical sects on the
other. The document's analysis and program clearly reflects a view of the Church
as a comunidad profetica which
is characterized by its formative interest in the community; decentralized
and ministerial. It promotes more egalitarian and communitarian relations,
places importance on political compromise, is committed to the defense of
the poor, and promotes service and solidarity. (42)
The use of this concept points up further the complexity which public debates on
the Pope and liberation theology obscure. Levine's analysis of "lo popular " (1986)
provides an excellent theoretical and practical discussion of these issues within
the Latin American Church. A more recent paper analyzed the meaning of "being
church" in the religious and political reflection of Venezuelan Catholics among
whom Levine has done research (1990).
CHAPTER 7
DEMOCRACY AND TERROR: GUATEMALA 1985-1991
Until now our country has been a society nearly without interlocutors.
Words have come in the form of manifestos, ordinances, decrees. There
has never existed authentic communication because the messages have
been put forward in a one way manner, without attention to the
response. There has been a grand fear of the word dialogue, because the
fact of sitting down to dialogue implied the act of legitimizing the other.
Roberto Castaneda
Guatemalan Labor Party
This work began with the argument that the Guatemalan state
confronted a fundamental political problem: the failure to construct a sense of
national identity upon which a legitimate political order might be established.
Using Benedict Anderson's analysis, I argued that Guatemala continues to
contain not one, but many "imagined communities." In Chapter 5, we
examined how the military has understood this problem over the past several
decades and then analyzed an ambitious effort by leading military officers to
construct a coherent national project. We saw that their political
project-developed most fully in the "thesis on national stability"--sought the
establishment of a process of concertacion that would engender national
consensus regarding political and economic development. We also saw that the
military officers who fashioned this process sought to promote greater
civil-military cooperation while at the same time retaining clear boundaries on
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the capacity of civilian leaders to interfere in what were considered military
matters.
Knowing how the military has understood the "transition to democracy,"
it is now necessary to examine what has actually happened. The military
clearly intended to combine the establishment of legitimacy with increased
institutional power over the direction and parameters of Guatemalan politics.
To what degree have they been successful? I will argue in this chapter that
while democratization in Guatemala remains restricted and incomplete, the
military has thus far failed to attain its broader objectives. Evidence for that
conclusion will be drawn from analysis of the response which the military
project has provoked from other sectors. In examining the political meaning of
those responses, I will be directly applying the assumptions about political
culture developed more theoretically in Chapter 2. 1 argued that the purpose of
cultural analysis was not to study "what a people think," if it is construed as a
monolithic set of ideas; rather, the question is "how does a community think
together?" By emphasizing the terms of public debate, particularly within the
Guatemalan press, I intend to examine the multiplicity of political
interpretations and cultural agendas which are present. The cultural dilemma
confronting Guatemala~in the Weberian terms developed earlier-is seen quite
differently and we must consider several cultural perspectives which are
present.
The military project is a complex mix of cultural symbols in its own
terms: indigenous, national, military, developmental, democratic. In that sense,
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like most national projects, it contains contradictions which must be balanced.
Placing democratization at the center of its legitimating symbols has not
eliminated human rights abuses; we have seen General Gramajo acknowledge
that a certain level of ongoing repression was still necessary. But by using the
language of democratization the military must also permit some space for
other groups who are neither part of the military project, nor likely to be
coopted by it. This includes religious leaders and what are referred to in
Guatemala as the "popular movement": labor, Indian, and human rights
organizations. At the same time, the military has not been able to consolidate
the support of Guatemala's traditional elites. So, while the institutional power
of the military has grown in some areas, other forces—some new, some
old—have used the political space which has opened in the past six years to
directly challenge the legitimacy of the military and frustrate its broader
political intentions. In this way, the project of "national stability" has deepened
the problems it was intended to resolve. Whatever the intentions of the
military, it has expressed its goals in a cultural language which helped shape
the form and content of the program as well as the response to it in ways that
have greatly complicated its realization.
One of the most important reasons why the military has thus far failed
is that Guatemala's system of political parties has proven largely incapable of
serving the function that the authors of the "national stability" doctrine
intended. This chapter will begin, therefore, with an analysis of the political
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culture of the current party system, focusing particularly on the role of the
Christian Democratic Party (PDCG-Partido Democracia Cristiano
Guatemalateco). We can then proceed to examine the political position and
significance of other actors-dissident military factions, business elites, popular
sector organizations-as well as the policies of current Guatemalan President
Jorge Serrano Elias, elected in January 1991. I will pay particular attention to
the process of "national dialogue", originally mandated under the Central
American Peace Accords signed at Esquipulas, Guatemala in 1987, but which
only became meaningful in Guatemala in 1990. While the goal of "national
reconciliation" is still far from realization, the dialogue process has
demonstrated some political will towards compromise among Guatemalan
political groups.
As before, I do not intend cultural explanations for political events;
rather, I want to analyze the cultural significance, the dilemmas of political
meaning and identity which change has posed. The military's political agenda
is a central structural influence upon other political actors in Guatemala, but
economic crisis, regional developments, and global political change also cast a
powerful shadow over that cultural context. At the same time, political
violence remains a pervasive influence on how Guatemalans think and act
politically. The legacy of violence and terror is at the heart of debates in recent
years over the role of the military and the issue of impunity. Matters of such
complexity and importance within Guatemalan political culture deserve much
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deeper analysis, but I will conclude the chapter by briefly examining the
significance of recent events and policy debates as they relate to the broader
issues of political legitimacy and national community examined in this work.
The Military and the Christian Democrats
We are not considering bringing anyone to trial because Guatemala is
not Argentina. In Guatemala we are trying to get along with an army
which considers itself successful and victorious, and not with an army
that came out of a war with its tail between its legs.
Marco Vinicio Cerezo, 1985.
Whoever becomes President is going to have to be very diplomatic with
the military-he is going to have to do business with a bottle of Johnny
Walker Black in his hand.
Archbishop Prospero Penados del
Barrio, 1985.
This election is the final step in the re-establishment of democracy in
Guatemala.
United States Embassy, 1985
The election of Christian Democrat Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo in
1985 was widely hailed internationally as an important step away from
repressive military rule and towards the creation of legitimate political
democracy. By receiving 68% of the vote, Cerezo also appeared to possess a
broad mandate from the Guatemalan electorate. Yet, by the end of his term in
January 1991, and in fact well before that, the Cerezo Administration's public
approval rating was dismal and the President was widely viewed as corrupt or
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incompetent. What brought about such a fall from grace? What did Cerezo and
his party do with the mandate they received in November 1985?
In order to answer those questions we must first understand the
philosophy of the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (PDCG). How did
they understand their position and what did they hope to accomplish? These
issues must be interpreted in the context of Guatemalan political culture and
the historical evolution of the party's response to national issues. The PDCG is
often viewed from the context of United States political culture as a long- term
foe of the military, occupying a fragile political space between violent forces on
the left and right. This perspective has some basis, given the murder of over
100 Christian Democratic politicians by the military and death squads in the
late 70s and early 80s; the fraudulent denial of the FNO coalition (in which the
party was a leading force) in 1974; and the general opinion of the Guatemalan
right that the party was communist, or at least fairly pink.
Yet, from the perspective of Cerezo and other leading Christian
Democratic figures, the working relationship with the military high command
that made their electoral victory in 1985 possible was not simply a short-term
tactical choice. Instead, it brought to fruition a decade-long effort within an
influential segment of the party which sought a partnership with moderate
military officers. This goal was first elaborated in 1975 by Danilo Barillas, a
former secretary General of the PDCG, in a book entitled Christian Democracy
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and its Position on the Guatemalan Army of Today
. Barillas argued that:
In Guatemala it is advisable to forget the possibility of governing if it is
not through a political decision of the army. The army has the
capability, through their armed power, to decide who governs; because
of this capability it is the strongest and most important pressure
group....And its men are capable of assuming many responsibilities of
government. (Cited in IGE 1989: 16)
Barillas subtitled his book "A Call for an Historic Compromise" and
urged reform-minded military officers to carry out a coup against the
Laugerud regime (Painter 1987: 70-74). Extensive criticism of this perspective,
both from within the party and without, led its proponents to lower their
profile. Vinicio Cerezo, Secretary General of the party at the time, argued
publicly that Barillas' perspective was personal and did not reflect official
party analysis. Yet, at the same time, Cerezo was expressing a very similar
analysis in internal party discussions. In "The Army: An Alternative," Cerezo
argued that
Instead of regarding the army as an enemy of the democratic parties, we
ought to consider accepting it as an ally of these parties. What we are
suggesting here is that progressive politicians and military officers have
a common responsibility....The key factor in the creation of a new order
resides in the taking of power by the national army and the
PDCG....Current conditions present us with a dead-end conflict unless
both sectors UNITE and make a gigantic and joint effort to reorganize
and redirect the nation's course. (IGE 1989: 16-17)
This perspective reflects two important aspects of the Party's political
position towards the military: first, that the sort of civil-military dialogue
endorsed by General Gramajo and other military leaders represented the
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development within the military, independently, of a perspective long held by
Cerezo and other leading Christian Democrats. At the same time, it also
reflected the divisions within the party regarding reform. The party originally
attracted young Catholic political activists seeking a non-marxist path toward
reform of Guatemala's unjust social, economic, and political structures.
Changes within Catholic social teachings and the continued resistance of
Guatemala's traditional elites to reform engendered a still present identity
problem for the PDCG. While reform proposals in the party's platform were
generally rather mild, they provoked suspicion and resistance nonetheless
among the military and oligarchy. Those reactions encouraged some party
members towards more radical positions and other political movements, while
the virulent anti-communism of other members led them to support the 1963
coup. In the late 60s and early 70s, the party was closely linked to the Catholic
Action Movement, which was in turn assisting the growth of a rural
cooperative movement. The party was a major force behind the FNO coalition
which put forward Rios Montt in 1974. But many party activists were
disillusioned by the party's weak response to the blatant fraud which put
Laugerud in power. Its constituency among unions and rural organizations
also grew increasingly disenchanted with elections, furthering weakening the
party's popular base and making it an insignificant factor in the elections in
1978 and 1982. Nonetheless, the party did gradually build stronger links with
elements of the military.
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The election of Cerezo in 1985 did not, of course, simply represent the
military coming around to the party's analysis. By 1985, the political spectrum
represented by Guatemalan parties was more narrow than ever; this process
was accelerated after 1974 and grew especially murderous after 1978. The
violence of the late 70s and early 80s decimated center-left political
movements; the forces which could represent a "social democratic" electoral
political project have yet to recover from the murders of such prominent
political leaders as Alberto Fuentes Mohr and Manuel Colom Argueta. The
platform put forward by Cerezo in 1985 was circumspect with regard to
reforms that challenged traditional structures. Agrarian reform and the
dismantling of civil defense patrols were discussed vaguely, as were efforts to
investigate human rights abuses and establish an effective judicial system. But
once in office, Cerezo was very cautious.
It was in the area of agrarian reform that many hoped Cerezo would
use his mandate in order to challenge a system in which 2% of the population
held over 60% of the arable land. The importance of this issue was stated by
the Catholic bishops in their 1988 pastoral letter El Clamor por la Tierra, which
stopped short of calling for land reform but described the country's social
injustices as sinful. Cerezo was directly pressured by the Pro-Tierra movement
led by Father Andre Giron. 1 Cerezo's administration downplayed land reform
and emphasized agrarian policies which promoted "non-traditional exports":
flowers, and vegetables for the winter market in the United States. This
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economic activity would, proponents argued, provide more income to small
farmers as well as employment for the landless.2
These policies reflected the Christian Democrats' firm desire to not
offend the military. As their commitment to that path became more apparent,
their relationship with left and popular sector groups, who had initially taken
a wait- and-see attitude towards the new government, began to deteriorate.
Yet, at the same time, its alliance with the military did little to improve the
PDCG's standing with the right, especially among business groups. The
tensions and strains with the latter were evident in the 1987 conflict over tax
reform in which the military strongly sided with the PDCG in an effort to
strengthen the state's fiscal resources and infrastructure. While claiming they
were not opposed to fiscal modernization, business groups, led by CACIF
(Chamber of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations)
distrusted Cerezo and Gramajo's will to follow through on economic reforms
and maintained the state would waste new revenue because of incompetence
and corruption.
Cerezo further angered conservatives by taking some initial steps
towards improvements in relations with the Soviet bloc. Apparently even an
appearance by the Moscow Symphony was too much "Soviet penetration" and
was canceled after right-wing pressure (Painter 1987: 144). Cerezo also took
some initial steps towards the process of "national reconciliation" set forth
under the Esquipulas Accords signed in August 1987 by the five Central
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American presidents.3 Cerezo played a prominent role in the signing of the
accord, and the military viewed it as an important element in the effort to
establish a more independent foreign policy in the region. The Military viewed
the Accords' embrace of dialogue and reconciliation as a framework for
resolving military conflict in El Salvador and Nicaragua, but did not consider
it relevant to Guatemala where, it was argued, guerrilla groups had been
decisively defeated.4 A Committee for National Reconciliation (CNR) was
established in September 1987, and talks were held between the government
and the URNG in October in Madrid. The following spring, four prominent
representatives of the exile-based Representation Unitaria de Oposicion
Guatemalteca (RUOG), including Indian activist Rigoberta Menchu, returned to
Guatemala briefly to test the possibility for dialogue. Their visit provoked
outrage on the right and they soon left after many death threats.
Cerezo furthered angered business groups in March 1988 when he
reached agreement with the Unidad de Action Sindical y Popular (UASP), an
important new labor and popular sector coalition which formed in early 1988,
on a broad package of social policy including a higher minimum wage and
price controls on electrical services and a few other items. Cerezo also
committed the government to the investigation of human rights violations and
to a fuller discussion of a process by which the 40,000 Guatemalan refugees in
Mexico, generally viewed as "rebel sympathizers" by the right and military,
might safely return.
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Before Cerezo had much opportunity to demonstrate his political will to
back up these commitments, dissident military officers attempted a coup on
May 11, 1988. Though General Gramajo and the High Command defended the
President and put down the golpe, the coup marked a fundamental turning
point in the Cerezo Administration. It revealed contradictions well expressed
in the analysis of the coup by Inforpress, a Guatemala City-based weekly
newservice:
One of the few advantages of a failed coup is that it permits a clearer
examination afterwards of the political processes...because it brings to
light facts and circumstances that actors and institutions try to keep in
the dark. (May 19, 1988)
While General Gramajo publicly declared the military to be firmly behind the
democratic process and committed to taking immediate steps to insure that the
coup attempt was not repeated, the General's comments also reflected some
implicit warnings to civilian political groups:
We are taking determined-but sensible-decisions in order that there is
no next time [another coup]. The problem is that the army is not alone
responsible for the "next time." The rest of Guatemalan society will also
have to act wisely. (Cronica, May 19, 1988: 21)
The actions of the Cerezo Administration in the subsequent months
reflected that the coup plotters achieved many of their goals. Cerezo quickly
moved away from the commitments made in the agreement with UASP as
well as, for the time being, talks with the URNG. The military rebels behind
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the coup also criticized the handling of the war and sought the sacking of
Gramajo. While the General stayed on and disagreements were temporarily set
aside, the coup shed new light on the failure of the "national stability" project
to eliminate internal divisions. Tensions within the military continued to fester
with an estimated one-third of the military supportive of the coup plotters.
Another coup was attempted in May 1989, and again pitted the officers who
were behind the coups of 1982 and 1983 against younger, self-defined "officers
of the mountain" (Jonas 1991: 168-169).
After the May 1988 coup attempt, Cerezo and the PDCG entered a
period of nearly unrelenting criticism and declining popularity that continued
through the Presidential elections held in two rounds in November 1990 and
January 1991. The President and his party were seen as incompetent at best,
while charges of corruption, including involvement in narcotics trafficking,
became common and openly expressed assumptions of many Guatemalans.
The previously outlined partnership between the party and the military
generated a continual political problem that Cerezo and the PDCG were never
able to overcome: while viewed with continual suspicion and eventual
contempt by the left, the party was equally unable to establish strong or
consistent support from groups on the right. When Cerezo stepped back from
the agreement with UASP, his administration's lack of political will now
seemed irrefutable from the perspective of popular sector groups. Yet, his
actions did little to improve relations with CACIF and the private sector.
5
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During the 1990 election campaign, with its prospects for re-election dim, the
PDCG made a weak effort to strengthen its electoral support among the
constituency represented by UASP; a group of well known center-left political
figures explicitly referred to the tradition embodied by the murdered leaders
Fuentes Mohr and Colom Argueta in giving their support to Christian
Democratic presidential candidate Alfonso Cabrera. Their stated goal was to:
...establish a popular and democratic convergence that seeks a real and
authentic process of democratization through a strategic alliance of
popular organizations and responsible, modern, democratic political
groups with the reformist faction of the Christian Democrats in the
government. (Prensa Libre August 5 1990: 3)
This support did little to revive the political fortunes of the PDCG
however. Indeed, it revealed the complete lack of popular support. Cronica
derided what it called "operation rescue" as a feeble effort to establish "la
izquierda lite ." This effort was not joined by the Guatemalan Social Democratic
Party (PSD). The Party's presidential candidate Mario Solorzano, exiled from
the country through much of the 1980s, dismissed it as a political maneuver by
the Christian Democrats to use a group of politicians generally associated with
the left to:
...try to give a bit of forced color to their formula, though it is difficult
to believe that one, two, or three persons inside the DC can cause a
change in the course of a new government. (Interview in Cronica, Aug.
24, 1990: 25)
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Solorzano posited that the PDCG hoped to use this display of support from
the center-left to attract voters frightened by the prospect of Rios Montt, but he
argued that these individuals-political personalities without any real political
base-could do little to repair the Christian Democrats' image. At the same
time, however, Solorzano and the PSD received minuscule support themselves.
The whole episode sharply illustrated the non-existence of the left in electoral
politics.
1990 Elections: None of the Above
For much of 1989 and 1990, Jorge Carpio of the Union del Centro
Nacional (UCN) appeared the clear favorite to succeed Cerezo. Using his
newspaper El Grafico as a daily forum, Carpio was able gradually to develop a
political infrastructure to compete with the PDCG at the departmental and
municipal level. His "filosofia centrista" was presented in an attractive
pamphlet available in supermarkets, while his face appeared on telephone
poles and billboards throughout the country (Carpio 1990). Yet, with each new
poll in 1990 it became clear that Carpio and his centrismo were failing to
generate much enthusiasm in spite of widespread hatred of the PDCG. His
campaign appeared to many to be rather short on specifics beyond the rhetoric
of "ni la izquierda, ni la derecha" (neither of the left or the right).
6
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The first round of the Presidential elections was scheduled for
November 1990. As the campaign moved on through August and September
and into the final weeks, the electorate continued to express profound
dissatisfaction with political parties and politicians. A poll taken at the end of
July revealed 40% still undecided and 10% responding none of the above. The
leader in that poll--the preference of 19% of the respondents-was not even a
legally accepted candidate, General Efrain Rios Montt. The General's candidacy
was unconstitutional under Article 186 of the 1985 constitution which
prohibited individuals who had previously come to power through a military
coup from running for president. Rios possessed a vocal and committed core
of support however, and ran a campaign which spoke directly to public
disdain with political leaders who seemed clearly incapable of dealing with
economic deterioration, public employee strikes, and intensified political
violence and street crime.7
It is in that context that the support expressed for Rios Montf s
campaign must be understood. Foreign news accounts of the General's
candidacy consistently expressed incredulity at his current popularity given the
widespread reports of human rights abuses during his 1982-83 regime, and the
international condemnation which ensued. It was generally assumed that his
popularity represented an anti-democratic impulse towards order and stability.
But support for General Rios Montt was also, in part, a popular response to
the political culture of elections. Guatemalans do not, for reasons the account I
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have given makes apparent, generally hold political parties in high esteem as
the standard bearers of democracy; instead, they are seen as corrupt vehicles of
patronage and personal aggrandizement. As thoroughly hated as the ruling
Christian Democrats were, what was more striking was the complete failure,
consistently reflected in polls, of other parties to gain public support as
alternatives.8 So the process of elections and democratization experienced by
Guatemalans seemed if anything to be further discrediting the country's
political leaders and perhaps its political system in general. I noted in Chapter
5 that we must be very careful in assessing expressions of support for Rios
Montt in some rural areas such as the heavily militarized Ixil Triangle in
northern Quiche department. But in the capital and other urban areas, many
ladinos openly expressed positive remembrances of the General's rule-in those
days people worked, believed in God, and the government was honest. When
asked about reported human rights abuses, many expressed skepticism about
whether innocent "non-subversives" were killed. 9
The Guatemalan Supreme Court finally resolved the issue of the legality
of Rios Montf s campaign in October 1990 by affirming that Article 186
prohibited his candidacy. While the General and his followers made vague
threats prior to that ruling, they were not pursued and his campaign quickly
fell apart. As Rios presence finally faded in the weeks before the first round on
November 11, one of the apparent also-rans among the candidates began to
gather support among some Rios' backers and undecided voters. Jorge Serrano
316
Elias, of the Movimiento de Action Solidaria, came from out of
nowhere-around 2% in the polls in the final weeks--and managed to finish
second in the voting (23%), thereby forcing Jorge Carpio (24%) into a runoff in
January. Serrano accelerated his momentum from that point and easily
defeated Carpio in January, receiving 68% of the vote. I will look more closely
at Serrano's policies in a later section; what was particularly notable in this
election was the high rate of non-participation--estimated at between 55 and
70% of the voters. This suggested that the new President's honeymoon would
be brief, and as we shall see, it was.
The National Dialogue Revived
1990 was the year of elections, but at the same time, the process of
national dialogue and reconciliation set forth in the Esquipulas Accords
regained momentum and appeared to many Guatemalans to offer better
prospects for bringing change. In the process, the political dialogue over
Guatemala's future began to expand beyond the political cultural boundaries
the military had previously sought to establish. When the Guatemalan
government helped complete the Esquipulas Accords in 1987, the military
dismissed the relevance to Guatemala of the process of national reconciliation
mandated by the accords. It argued that the URNG (Unidad Revolucionario
Nacional Guatemalteca) was a defeated force without a significant national
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constituency. The Cerezo Administration did nonetheless enter briefly into
informal discussions with guerrilla representatives, but dropped these contacts
after the coup attempt in May 1988.
At that time most of the international attention and pressure focused on
using the Esquipulas Accords as a step towards resolution of the conflicts in
Nicaragua and El Salvador. The accord did lead to the establishment of the
Commission of National Reconciliation in Guatemala, however, largely
through the initiative of religious leaders. By early 1990, amidst sustained
economic crisis, it was apparent that the military had been premature in
declaring the war over, while human rights abuses were growing. The
Commission, led by Archbishop Rodolfo Quezada Toruno, held a meeting
with the URNG in Oslo in March 1990. With assistance from the United
Nations, the commission organized a series of meetings between the URNG
and various sectors. The first of these meetings was held in Madrid in May
1990 with representatives of Guatemala's political parties and was aimed at
beginning a process for ending the war and incorporating the guerrillas into
the political system. The meeting was significant because it brought together
members of Guatemala's extreme right and armed left and appeared to reflect
a genuine desire among both sides for an end to the war. MLN leader Mario
Sandoval Alarcon, long associated with the most intransigent and violent
elements of the extreme right, stunned participants and observers when he
acknowledged the genuine political will of the URNG to find solutions; he
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went so far as to actually acknowledge the guerrillas leaders as Guatemalan
patriots.
Subsequent meetings were held between the URNG and other sectors:
business, religious, popular movements. Especially significant were meetings
held with CACIF, the leading private sector organization, in Ottawa in
September 1990. While the meeting did not produce any concrete proposals, it
did represent an important step in the growing legitimacy of the URNG as a
political force in Guatemala. Editorials in the conservative daily Prensa Libre
echoed the attitude expressed by Sandoval Alarcon: after 30 years it was time
to end the war.
In spite of growing support for the dialogue process among Guatemalan
political and economic elites, as well as regional actors, the military continued
to reject joining the process directly, even though all agreed that its
participation was crucial. But in April 1991, a delegation which included
members of the High Command met with the URNG in Mexico City and
agreed to an agenda for future talks. 10
While the high command reluctantly accepted the need to negotiate,
given the state of the economy and external pressures, dissident factions
within the military quickly accused their leaders of selling out. A June
communique from a group calling themselves the "officers of the Mountain"
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complained:
We are on the battlefield suffering and rationing food with the troops
while the high command lives in luxury and allows officers to drink it
up at the negotiations with the subversives themselves. (CERIGUA, June
16, 1991)
This is the group of officers who attempted coups against the Cerezo
Administration in May 1988 and again in May 1989. While this group did not
constitute an immediate threat to the High Command or President Serrano, the
worsening human rights situation, described in more detail below, led some
commentators to suggest that elements opposed to the dialogue were sowing
disorder. 11
Meanwhile, serious and difficult issues were on the table for negotiation.
The most important of these were human rights, the role of the military, and
the meaning of democratization. As Frank Larue noted:
The two parties approach the theme of "democratization" from different
perspectives. The government considers itself a democratic regime and
views the discussion as one of "perfecting" democracy. The URNG sees
the need for a thoroughgoing process, particularly addressing the
question of guarantees of popular participation. (1991)
In spite of increased political violence, optimism about the prospects for
an agreement grew after meetings held in Queretaro, Mexico, July 23-26,
produced another accord setting forth a working definition of democracy to
guide future discussion. The "Preliminary Accord regarding democratization
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for the search for peace through political means" agreed on the following
points:
1) The pre-eminence of civil society
2) The development of an institutional democracy
3) The effective functioning of citizens' rights.
4) The permanent elimination of political repression, electoral fraud,
military attacks and pressures, and anti-democratic actions.
5) The strict respect of human rights, which should be clearly defined to
both parties by the Mediator to prevent misunderstanding on either
side.
6) The subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian control.
7) Recognition and respect for the identity and rights of the indigenous.
8) Access to and enjoyment of the financial benefits of national
production and the country's natural resources, which should be based
in principles of social justice.
9) The effective resettlement of the free population displaced in the
armed conflict.
This accord reflected compromises on each side. As noted by Inforpress :
The URNG has tacitly acknowledged the constitution as the legal
framework in which to operate politically, while the government has
clearly made concessions by linking the concept of democracy to
indigenous rights. Moreover, the military has accepted the supremacy of
civilian rule. (August 2, 1991)
But the fate of the dialogue in the following months vividly revealed the gap
that remained between words and deeds. The human rights situation showed
no improvement; in the first 10 days of August 1991, 38 deaths were reported
bearing the classic death squad trademarks-signs of torture, death by a shot to
the head. Most significant of these was the murder of the Head of the
Homicide Division of the National Police, Jose Miguel Merida Escobar on Aug.
5. Merida's death was widely assumed to be related to his conscientious
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investigation of the murder in September 1990 of well known Guatemalan
anthropologist Myrna Mack in a case which attracted enormous international
attention. A September 1991 report released by Americas Watch documented
the continuing failure of civilian authorities to challenge military impunity
with regard to human rights abuses.
The worsening human rights problems reflected the centrality and
difficulty of the issue on the table when the government and the URNG met in
Mexico City, Sept 20-24: processes for verifying compliance with human rights
accords. The URNG proposed 5 points:
1) indemnification of past victims.
2) abolition of civil patrols.
3) end of forced conscription.
4) end of all clandestine operations-including use of plain clothes police
and unmarked cars.
5) abolition of the amnesty law covering 1982-86.
The meetings in September were still fairly cordial but inconclusive. The
rhetoric of the Serrano Administration grew more hostile in the next month
however, suggesting that it was being magnanimous in talking to the URNG
but repeating ever more strongly its position that Guatemala was already a
democracy ruled by a constitutionally elected government.
The meetings held in Mexico City October 22-24 began with some
mutual compromises on the issues of indemnification and conscription. But the
talks broke off over the URNG proposal that a commission be established
under U.N. auspices to monitor compliance of human rights. The divide
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between the two sides was substantial and revolved around the issue of
timing: do human rights abuses and the counter-insurgency need to end
immediately, as the URNG argued; or, is a cease fire and full peace pact a
prior necessity. The government maintained that the proper goal of the
meetings was a cease-fire, not new political and military reforms. In addition,
the government viewed the participation of the UN as an unconstitutional
infringement upon its status as a democracy while the URNG argued that:
...human rights violations are not just the project of the internal armed
conflict as the government maintains; but rather arose from the existing
political system, upheld by consecutive regimes, since before the war
began. (In Inforpress Nov 1, 1991: 2)
The President of the CNR, Monsenor Quezada Toruno, met with the
URNG on November 15 in an effort to rebuild some consensus regarding
points for future discussion. But at the same time, increased military
encounters between the URNG and the military suggested that the war might
be heating up again with each side looking perhaps to rebuild its leverage.
Nonetheless, while the Serrano Administration was taking a more hard line
approach, the two leading military representatives in the negotiations received
promotions. In the beginning of December, Serrano replaced his Defense
Minister and Army Chief of Staff; the changes did not signal a change in
attitude towards the dialogue in principle, but did reflect continued division
between those who supported and opposed negotiations.
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At the same time, the dialogue process is not the only issue and often
gets tangled up with internal military issues regarding promotions and
corruption in the High Command. When the military appeared willing to
investigate the participation of several navy officers in the robbery and murder
of 11 on a highway in Escuintla department in July 1991, these actions were
portrayed by the military and government as an important step in addressing
the issue of military impunity. As this case involved purely criminal as
opposed to political motivations, human rights activists expressed skepticism
about its significance in confronting that larger issue. At the same time, a
communique in August from the "Officers of the Mountain" argued that the
navy officers were scapegoats, and maintained that officials of the elite military
intelligence unit G-2 were responsible (Inforpress August 23, 1991: 1-2). Given
the central role long attributed to the G-2 within Guatemala's apparatus of
repression, any effort to prosecute, or simply ask questions of its members
would have presented a whole range of problems. While the dissident officers
had no interest in questioning the methods used to fight "subversion," they
objected to having lower level officers being made sacrificial lambs in an effort
to develop a more positive international image.
The issues under discussion when the dialogue broke off raise
fundamental questions regarding how to view both the past, present, and
future of Guatemala. I will return to these questions in more depth in the
discussion on human rights and the "culture of terror" which will conclude this
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chapter. The achievements of the dialogue so far are not insignificant, but it is
apparent that further agreements will only come gradually, if at all. Whether
the process of national dialogue will lead to some kind of "historic
compromise," or is simply a passing footnote amidst continuing political
violence remains to be seen. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will
examine the other main political cultural forces which will influence that
outcome.
The Changing Political Culture of the Left: The URNG
The process of national dialogue, while still far from bringing
permanent changes in Guatemalan politics, has at least generated discussion
between the URNG and many sectors of Guatemalan society. How ought we
to understand the position of the URNG within this context? The end of the
cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union have generated much discussion
and speculation on the implications for Latin American revolutionary
movements. Those who previously assumed Central American revolutionary
movements took their ideological and military initiative from Havana and
Moscow have tended also to assume that such groups would be forced to
abandon their previous positions or become irrelevant. Yet, guerrilla
movements which have endured in one form or another for thirty years cannot
be dismissed as simply the puppets of external forces. Those groups have
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survived, as General Gramajo acknowledged in his analysis, because of their
capacity to adapt their tactics and analysis in the light of experience.
Guatemala's guerrilla organizations have clearly been affected by regional and
global revolutionary doctrine in the past, and recent changes in the analysis of
URNG leaders reflect their realization of the new political and economic
environment of the 1990s and the challenges which it presents.
Structural factors conditioned these perceptions: political weakness,
regional changes including the electoral defeat of the FSLN in Nicaragua,
pressure from allies abroad to end the war through negotiation.At the same
time, it didn't take the collapse of the Soviet Union or the electoral defeat of
the Sandinistas to interest the URNG in dialogue with the Guatemalan
military. While previously portrayed by the United States State Department as
a sectarian and xenophobic extreme undisposed to compromise, the URNG
began to move away from its previously triumphalist declarations and sought
contacts with the Cerezo Administration shortly after the new President's
inauguration. The experience of the early 1980s had clearly convinced many in
the URNG that while they could continue to harass the army and hold off total
defeat, the war was not winnable. Military operations were from this point
conceived principally as a means to obtain political leverage by convincing the
army and political elites that the state could not win the war either and that a
political solution was necessary.
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This analysis of the current coyuntura also reflected changes in URNG's
own political perspective regarding the question of democracy. A socialist
polity achieved through the armed capture of the state was no longer
considered a realistic or desirable goal. Instead, the guerrilla organizations
sought to establish an environment within which a broader range of political
movements and groups could securely participate in Guatemalan political life.
The URNG has been able, through participation in the dialogue, to
move slowly towards realization of that goal. What for many Guatemalans had
previously been a rather shadowy force that only showed up in the press as
"terrorists" and "subversives" defeated by the military was by 1990 widely
recognized as an essential part of the solution to Guatemala's problems.
Whereas only a few activists and intellectuals could previously read about the
analysis of the URNG in exile publications from the United States or Mexico,
its point of view is now regularly reported in the newspaper.
What are URNG leaders saying to their compatriots? As with the
military, and perhaps to an even greater extent, the URNG is not completely
united. It is an amalgam of guerrilla armies, each of which has somewhat
different popular bases, histories, and political tendencies. Still, the position set
forth by URNG leaders within the national dialogue process has been fairly
consistent. Their analysis has noted the obvious changes in East-West relations
and emphasized the opportunities provided by a less ideological United States
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foreign policy. Luis Felipe Bekker, a principle negotiator for the URNG, told an
reporter for the daily La Hora :
The foreign policy of the United States now appears to favor stability in
Central America because it has been proven that their investment and
economic dominion cannot achieve the desired results in a climate of
war. Thus, they have begun to have less confidence in military solutions
and U.S. diplomacy has sought other paths. (August 16, 1990: 10)
Bekker argued that the end of the Cold War placed new pressures on both
sides and went on to argue that some elite groups within Guatemala also
believed that the war and political violence was damaging their own interests:
There are inside CACIF sectors who want to modernize the system
given that the traditional economic model [based on agro-exports] has
shown itself to be obsolete and incapable of serving as a basis for
stabilizing the situation and defending their interests. (Ibid)
At the same time, the URNG has argued that there can be no basis for
"genuine democracy" without some fundamental transformations in the role of
the military. The demand for demilitarization has meant the need for, in the
words of Comandante Gaspar Horn:
...the reorganization, suppression, and investigation of police and
intelligence entities and the unrestricted subordination of security and
police entities to the judicial system....we haven't fought for 30 years in
order to receive an amnesty....Peace ought to resolve problems not
simply end the war. For that reason we wont accept peace at any cost.
(Cronica, July 27, 1990: 32)
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The dialogue process offers, in the view of the URNG, the best prospects for
initiating such changes, though as indicated previously the negotiations will
not be easy.
The fact that the URNG is participating in the dialogue also represents
its members' new perspective on democracy. The evolution in perspective
parallels in some ways a trend Robert Barros has analyzed in the Southern
Cone:
The defeat of the left in Chile, Uruguay and Argentina at what was
thought to be the height of each one's power, along with the ferocious
repression unleashed to destroy guerrilla organizations, disorganize left
parties and trade unions, and instill fear in their supporters, has badly
shaken the previous ideological certainty of the left. (1986: 50)
In this context, Barros notes that the previous disdain of "bourgeois"
democracy and "reformist" political programs has been replaced by the
realization that
...the possibility of advancing even the most elementary revindicative
demands of lower class groups came to hinge on the recovery of civil
and political liberties. (1986: 51)
This rethinking has led to political action intended to create and consolidate
political spaces and institutions which can serve as a buttress against military
rule. The "reform vs revolution" polemic of the 1960s and 1970s has thus given
way to a new appreciation of the need to restore, or in some cases establish,
institutions and rules of law that can provide greater protection against the
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unprecedented, for Latin America, levels of state terrorism practiced in the
1970s and 1980s (Lechner 1981; Munck 1989: 1-24). Given the powerlessness of
the URNG to defend its popular bases against the military's
counter-insurgency, these issues have inspired intensive reflection and critique
of previous assumptions about democracy in a non-socialist context. 12
Susanne Jonas began her recent study of Guatemala with the question
"Is social revolution still on the agenda in Latin America?" The prevailing
assumption in many current analyses is that it is not; or if a revolution is
occurring, capitalism and liberal democracy, and perhaps evangelical
Protestantism rather than socialism, are its terms . Given the failures of
"existing socialism" and past Latin American statist development projects, the
reasons for such assumptions are not hard to see. However, the URNG has by
no means completely abandoned its socialist identity despite a more
conciliatory perspective towards the private sector and capitalism in general.
Moreover, while the guerrilla organizations are a central actor, they are not the
whole left. If and when agreements are reached, their meaning and worth will
be established through the daily struggles of specific political organizations.
The members of guerrilla organizations will most certainly play an important
role in that process. At the same time, they will need to build day-to-day
working relationships, strategies, and political projects with popular sector
political organizations already in place, and already engaged in their own
struggles and programs. A cease-fire and end to the war will provide new
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peasants learn about the human rights guaranteed them under the Guatemalan
constitution.
National Coordinator of Guatemalan Widows (CONAVIGUA) was founded in
1989 and has organized approximately 9000 women around a wide range of
health, literacy, income and employment generation projects, while publicizing,
speaking out, and pressuring the government with regard to continued
violence and repression.
Union Sindical de Trabaiadores de Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA) . A
confederation of 25 of Guatemala's most militant unions which seeks to
coordinate labor responses to repression against union activity as well as to the
deteriorating economic situation. They have been particularly active in
opposition to the philosophy of "solidarismo" which many companies and
business leaders—including Serrano's Movimiento de Action Solidaria-have
sought to promote among workers. Solidarismo is based on a more corporatist
and paternalistic relationship based on reciprocity; UNSITRAGUA argues it is
an effort to destroy workers' rights.
National Council of Displaced in Guatemala (CONDEG) . Formed in 1988 to
represent some of the hundreds of thousands displaced by the war who are
now trying to survive in cities, especially in the capital or the South Coast,
because it is not safe to return to their villages in the highlands.
Comunidades de Poblacion en Resistencia (CPR) . The Communities of
Population in Resistance went public in 1990 but represents communities
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which have been surviving in hiding since 1983. They are now demanding that
they be able to peacefully return to their homes. They are also calling for the
elimination of the model villages and civil patrols and are demanding that the
government officially recognize them as a non-combatant civilian population.
Comite de Unidad Campesina (CUQ . This organization was organized in
1976-78 in response to intensified repression against indigenous
communities. 13 CUC's close identification with the Guerrilla Army of the Poor
(EGP) forced it to operate underground for most of the 80s, but it re-emerged
as the leading force behind farmworker strikes in the coastal plantations in
1989 and 1990.
Since these are groups which the military has generally viewed as
subversive, they were not viewed as legitimate participants in the process of
concertacion envisioned by the thesis of "national stability." They also have
little relationship to the leading political parties, even though they represent,
taken together, at least as wide a constituency. They have used the political
openings present since 1984 to challenge the popular legitimacy of the Cerezo
and Serrano Administrations, as well as the military's political project. But
while the situation is better than during the darkest periods in the early 80s,
the efforts of the popular organizations to build and conserve political space
are still plagued by political.
The importance of these organizations was implicitly acknowledged by
President Serrano in his effort to negotiate a "social pact" between government,
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business and the popular sector. That discussion will be examined in more
detail in the following section. These groups challenge the legitimacy of the
current Guatemalan state at several important levels. The work of CERJ has
brought international attention to the existence of the civil patrols, and its
leader, Amilcar Mendez, has been honored by U.S. human rights
organizations. The Communities in Resistance challenge the legitimacy and
even the continued viability of development poles, model villages, and the
other rural infrastructure organized by the military. They were visited in
February 1991 by a "multi-partite commission" made up largely of religious
and popular organization leaders and through which they presented three
demands:
1) recognition as a civilian population distinct from the URNG; 2)
freedom of movement and organization within their territory: "we don't
want civil patrols and development poles. They divide us and impede
communication"; 3) unrestricted entrance for church and human rights
organizations. (Siglo Veintiuno, March 14, 1991)
The CPRs have also affirmed the dialogue process and asked the Committee
for National Reconciliation to verify their situation. Most of these organizations
joined together in early 1988 to form the Unidad de Action Sindical y Popular
(UASP) in an effort to achieve greater coordination of their common agendas.
UASP negotiated an agreement with Cerezo on wages, prices, and human
rights in March 1988, but the president backed away from his commitment
after the May 1988 coup.
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These organizations have strongly and consistently supported the
dialogue process, and they share much of the social and political agenda
reflected in the negotiating positions of the URNG. At the same time, each
organization has its own issues and agendas which, as Susanne Jonas has
stressed, are partly born of the desire to establish autonomous political and
organizational identities in the wake of the massive repression suffered by
popular movements in the 1970s (1991: 186-193).14
A New Social Pact?
When Jorge Serrano Elias assumed the Presidency, many commentators
wondered how he would govern given the weakness of his own political
party. Serrano argued in response that what was perceived as weakness by
many was in fact a source of strength. Without the more extensive party
infrastructure of the UCN or PDCG, he would be better able to work towards
a policy of unity and reconciliation between parties and sectors. He put this
assumption into practice almost immediately when he named a cabinet of
ministers which, while mostly representing the right, included Social
Democratic leader Mario Solorzano as Minister of Labor. Reacting to the
fragmented new Congress in which no party held a majority Serrano told
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Cronica :
It will be a gift to govern a country with a Congress without
majoritarian blocs, and in which it will be necessary to look always for a
balance. For an autocratic President this would represent a serious
problem, but not for me for I have been a conciliator. (Nov. 16, 1991: 20)
For the new president to show that this claim reflected real political
gifts and not simply rhetoric, he would have to quickly convince Guatemalans
across the socio-economic and political spectrum that he had some genuine
solutions to Guatemala's severe economic woes. The current situation is
generally considered to be the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. Over the
past decade, and especially since 1985, Guatemala has moved near to the
bottom of the hemispheric list in virtually every quality of life indicator. U.S.
AID estimated that by 1990 the percentage of the population living in extreme
poverty, without the resources to meet minimum nutritional needs, had
increased from 52% to 72% (Jonas 1991: 178). The Guatemalan National
Statistics Institute estimated that 75.5% lived below the poverty line, and in
rural areas estimated that figure at 94%. 15 Unemployment in 1989 was
estimated at roughly 50% while purchasing power was 22% compared to 1972.
Inflation in 1989 and 1990 was 60%, brought on by devaluations of the
quetzal. 16 While the figures for inflation, GDP growth, foreign reserves, and
interest rates all improved in 1991 (Central America Report, Nov. 8, 1991),
unemployment and wage levels continued stagnant.
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President Serrano responded to this situation by immediately proposing
negotiation of what he termed a "social pact". This effort to reach agreement
between government, labor, and business was Serrano's version of
concertacion, but it was soon confronted by highly negative reactions from the
other two sectors. Nearly all of Guatemala's independent labor organizations
rejected the pact; the Unidad de Action Sindical y Popular (UASP) argued, in a
paid announcement in the press, that:
The government and the powerful sectors of the country want to impose
the so-called social pact with the fundamental objective of breaking the
just demands and struggles of the popular movement....They want to
put a strait-jacket on these groups...and we believe that signing of the
pact signifies resigning ourselves to living in misery. (Cited in Critica,
April 26, 1991: 12)
Given the continued harassment of labor, and non-enforcement of existing
legislation regarding minimum wages and collective bargaining, as well as
Serrano's clear commitment to the company-union oriented Solidarismo
movement, many labor groups were completely disinclined to trust either the
state or the private sector.
If unions viewed the social pact in this fashion, it might be assumed that
President Serrano could count on strong support from the private sector, but
such was not the case. The President of CACIF, Victor Suarez, asked why such
a pact was necessary; "Guatemalans already have a social pact: the
constitution." CACIF was skeptical about how the pact would contribute to
economic growth and feared it was simply a pretext to government economic
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intervention. The private sector would be forced to pay new wages and taxes
while the government failed to address what Suarez considered the more
important issue: "our economic model is exhausted... [and] internal production
is stagnant" (Critica, April 26, 1991: 14).
Despite this rampant skepticism, negotiation between the government
and the state workers union (FENASTEG), and other segments of organized
labor continued into the Summer of 1991. President Serrano announced the
formation of a Commission of Salaries, Prices, and Employment of the Social
Pact, and initially announced the possibility of salary increases of up to 15% in
some areas. But the talks stagnated by the end of July and have yet to establish
any real momentum.
The failure, thus far, of Serrano's "social pact" is not surprising given the
inherent tension between the commitment to free market, neo-liberal policies
on the one hand, and the regulation and governmental intervention on the
other inherent in the idea of the pact. Given the inability of Serrano to
convince or co-opt labor to join what, shorn of a strong statist economic
agenda, amounts to a corporatist project, those tensions continue to dominate
the present political landscape. With the social pact and the national dialogue
both stalled, the present government completed its first year in office
appearing even weaker than its predecessor.
The lack of success of Serrano's social pact reflects the political tensions
described, but it also reflects the cultural confusion inherent in a period of
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potentially profound national change. Guatemala's economic crisis may well
prove to be the early stages of a transformation at least as profound as what
occurred in the 1960s and perhaps as far-reaching as the liberal reform era of
the 1870s and 1880s. In such a context, the contours of which are still far from
clear and probably will remain blurred for much of the 1990s as global and
regional economic processes gradually unfurl, the challenges confronting
Guatemalan labor organizations are especially strong. Only 5% of the work
force is presently unionized and the largest growth in employment in recent
years has come in the largely non-unionized maquiladora sector. While
Guatemalan efforts to attract more of these industries have been less successful
than elsewhere in the isthmus, any future growth will weaken existing unions
unless they are able to respond effectively. At the same time, changes in the
agricultural sector—including the movement towards non-traditional export
crops—will also require new analyses and strategies by farmworker movements
such as the Committee of Campesino Unity (CUC).
Ethnicity and Political Identity
500 years After the Conquest
The earlier discussion of the "popular movement" included several
organizations based heavily among indigenous communities; but given the
enduring importance of ethnic identity a fuller treatment is necessary. As I
noted in chapter 3, analysts from across the political spectrum have long
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predicted that forces and processes were conspiring to gradually weaken
ethnic identity and replace it with, for better or worse, more "modern" forms. I
suggested that the historical evidence should inspire caution about such
assumptions. The efforts of the military over the past decade to integrate
indigenous communities have led some to speak of a "third conquest" and ask
whether the Maya could continue to preserve their ethnic identity (Carmack
ed. 1988). Or, were the combined forces of earthquake, horrific political
violence, displacement, counter-insurgency, and economic depression finally
going to accomplish what previous efforts at cultural, political, and economic
assimilation of the Maya could not?
The provisional answer to that question at this point is clearly "no".
While communities have been torn apart and only partly reconstituted, and
hundreds of thousands of Maya have been forced to migrate to the cities, new
and important forms of indigenous political activity have recently emerged.
These groups and activities are significant because they directly challenge the
political goals of the military's counter-insurgency project and reflect its
failure, so far, to resolve the legitimacy problem of the Guatemalan state. These
new Maya-based movements also challenge the traditional ladino left by
insisting that indigenous issues be given more than lip-service, and by
demonstrating the desire and capability to chart political agendas which may
work with larger political movements while insisting on maintaining their own
autonomy. Carol Smith has recently referred to this as a nascent "Maya
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nationalism" which has sought not an independent state, but "the creation of a
strong and general Mayan identity, one that maintains the values of the past,
while dealing with developmental issues of the present" (Smith 1990: 279).
An important organizing symbol for these new indigenous movements
has been the "500 years of resistance" campaign being carried out by
indigenous groups throughout the hemisphere. The Second Encounter of the
500 years of Indigenous and Popular Resistance was held October 7-12 in
Quezaltenango. The meeting brought together delegates from 26 countries. As
a continent-wide process, the meeting revealed continuing tensions between
indigenous and non-indigenous groups and agendas. But the conference was a
significant political cultural event in Guatemala. Most notable was the
prominent press attention accorded Rigoberta Menchu, long branded
subversive by the state, and the open participation by the Communities in
Resistance and other largely indigenous organizations.
The future direction of these development is still quite unpredictable.
Whatever their outcome, however, they indicate that the events of the past two
decades are changing the nature of ethnic political identity, not eUminating it.
This new "nationalism" is emerging in a time when the majority of Maya no
longer live in the traditional rural communities which have for so long
provided a base for cultural survival. Recent research has also challenged the
conventional assumptions about the impact of urbanization and ethnic
identity.17
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These new developments and activism do not constitute a unified
movement, and it is not clear that such unity would be desirable for realizing
their goals. The Maya have survived past efforts to assimilate them partly
because their cultures and identities have long been, as Smith argues "plural
and localized rather than generic and monolithic" (1991: 31). Past history
demonstrates clearly that unified indigenous movements risk provoking a
powerful repressive response from the state. They could also give too much
power to Maya elites and weaken local efforts. The emergence of strongly
indigenous evangelical churches may foster more local action, as well as be a
barrier to unity. New indigenous political movements might also offer a way
to finally build a Guatemalan political order which represents, and is seen as
legitimate by, the majority. They may also gradually forge a more
decentralized relationship which challenges the unifying assumptions of
modern nation-states, an issue which I will examine more fully in returning in
the final chapter to the issue of modern nationalism which began this work.
These are the dilemmas, compounded by all the other forces transforming
Guatemala's socio-economic structures, which will confront indigenous
movements into the 21st century.
The Culture of Terror
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We have seen that despite enormous problems and tensions, there is
clear evidence that the present context has generated conditions within which
a broad range of Guatemalans-including important elements of the left,
oligarchy, military, and the superpowers-appear willing to negotiate and
consider compromise in the pursuit of a new political order. That the extreme
right and the armed left are willing to talk and envision a place for each other
within Guatemalan politics is a significant political cultural development.
But any assessment of this process of dialogue must be tempered by
recognition of how pervasive the influence of terror remains within
Guatemalan political culture. One of the fundamental issues which has
confronted newly democratizing countries in Latin America has been how to
deal with the terror and violence of the past. In Guatemala, where the level of
violence deployed by the state was the most extreme and prolonged in Latin
America, the issue is central to current political debate and shows no signs of
going away. Before looking at recent discussion and events more closely, there
are some general issues that need to be examined.
The specific issue around which the larger questions usually gather is
impunity. Should military officers, as well as their subordinates, be held
responsible for human rights abuses which occurred during periods which
those officials consider states of war within which their actions were justifiable
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in terms of national security? Responses to the issue have ranged from
military-granted amnesty laws in Chile and Brazil, an act of Congress in
Uruguay which was later ratified by national referendum, and limited
prosecution of officers held responsible for the "dirty war" in Argentina in the
late 1970s. 18 In the latter case, initially seen as an important new precedent,
Presidents Alfonsin and Menem eventually pardoned most officers accused of
rights violations. In Guatemala, the military issued Decree 8-86 which granted
amnesty covering all actions undertaken after the March 1982 coup.
In a paper on the subject of impunity and civil-military transitions, J.
Patrice McSherry has noted four general perspectives: pragmatic, legal, social,
and moral (1990). From the "pragmatic" perspective, "impunity is the necessary
price for the transition to civilian rule"; the pursuit of absolute justice
complicates the goal of stability for an emerging civilian regime. This
argument has informed the policy of President Cerezo and Serrano; in order to
move ahead with the full cooperation of the military and without rancor and
recrimination, the past should, they argue, be left in the past.
The "legal" perspective views blanket amnesty laws and the message of
impunity that they carry as a threat to international law because they
undermine international human rights norms such as the U.N. Declaration and
the Geneva Accords. What McSherry calls the "social" perspective is closely
related to this, but brings the matter closer to home by arguing that laws such
as Decree 8-86 weaken the long term legitimacy of democratic institutions in
344
the pursuit of short term objectives. Without processes for resolving the
suffering caused by human rights violations by the state, "a culture of fear
persists...the fear that terror might recur" (1990: 5). The individual who must
daily pass her torturer in the street, or the parent who can never learn what
happened to his child continue to experience a culture of lawlessness within
which personal security is always in doubt. The wounds can never be healed
because the state cannot bring itself to say: what happened to you as a citizen
was a violation of the law and an injustice which must be punished.
The larger political effect of "putting the past behind", from this
perspective, is the weakening of civilian authority, "by strengthening the
military and encouraging increased perceptions of impunity, contempt for
civilian rule, and self righteousness" (McSherry 1990: 5). The Guatemalan
military clearly view their actions as the necessary tactics of a war against
subversion; no apologies are required, and in fact would strike at the heart of
the military's own well-developed sense of mission and identity. The thesis on
"national stability", as elaborated by General Gramajo, assumes quite explicitly
that a certain level of violence against the civilian population is essential given
the infiltration of subversive elements. In that sense, the Mutual Support
Group (GAM), and Widows Committee (CONAVIGUA) are not the only ones
battling over the meaning of the past. When civilian presidents tell
Guatemalans to look ahead and not behind, they support, intentionally or not,
military version of history and political morality.
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The issue of impunity remained central to Guatemalan political debate
in 1991, revealing an important political cultural fissure. Signs of change and
continuity were present and are clearly illustrated in the case of slain
anthropologist Myrna Mack. One of Guatemala's most prominent academics,
Mack's most recent research had produced highly critical studies of
government policy which documented the continuing impact of
counter-insurgency programs on displaced persons in the highlands. The work
of Mack and her colleagues at the Association for the Advancement of the
Social Sciences in Guatemala (AVANCSO) sought both to investigate current
conditions and to reestablish independent social science after a decade of
murder, exile, and intimidation. Given the nature of her work, Mack's murder
was widely viewed as a direct effort to intimidate independent inquiry.
The first official reaction from the government suggested that the
anthropologist was the victim of street crime. But the widespread domestic
and international publicity given the case gradually led to a more rigorous
investigation by the head of the Homicide Division of the National Police, Jose
Miguel Merida Escobar. Merida concluded that the murder had been
"politically motivated" and his investigation implicated a security officer
working under the Presidential Chief of Staff. The case was widely viewed
inside and outside Guatemala as an acid test of the state's willingness to
investigate and punish political crimes by military officials. But Merida was
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himself murdered on August 5, 1991, and in the first 10 days of August there
were 38 murders bearing the classic signature features of political killings. 19
A September 1991 report by Americas Watch and Physicians for Human
Rights, Who's at Fault?: Getting Awav with Murder, documented the
continuing failure of efforts to challenge military impunity.20 It was against
the background of these events that efforts to discuss human rights-especially
verification issues-led to a breakdown of the dialogue in October 1991.
At the same time, there is some reason for optimism if one looks at the
local and national reaction to an internationally publicized massacre of 14
Indian peasants by soldiers at a military barracks at Santiago Atitlan in
December 1990. In the aftermath, extensive discussion ensued inside
Guatemala regarding the role of the military. While then President Cerezo was
slow to react, both he and the national assembly supported the request by
townspeople that the barracks be removed from their community. Subsequent
efforts by the military to move were opposed by other towns in the area. The
success of these efforts to make the President truly perform his function as
Commander-in-Chief, rather than permit the military its traditional autonomy
over its own affairs, suggests that the usual pattern of civil-military relations
may be open to change. The political battle against impunity is still far from
won, but recent events clearly show the military is on the defensive. 21
We should also not discount the genuine achievements that popular
movement organizations continue to make in widening political space beyond
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that envisioned by the authors of the national stability project. The return of
Rigoberta Menchu and the coming into the open of the Committees in
Resistance are two examples. Popular sector organizations held the first
"Conference of Victims of Violence and Impunity" in Guatemala City, July
18-19 1991, an event which as Inforpress noted was "remarkable more for
context than content." Given that such a meeting would have been unthinkable
in 1988 or 1989, the potential cultural significance should not be dismissed. 22
Human Rights and United States Policy
The treatment of human rights was also affected by changes in U.S.
policy towards Guatemala in 1990 and 1991. The Reagan and Bush
Administrations had generally been very upbeat about the democratization
process and strongly supportive of the efforts and sincerity of President Cerezo
and General Gramajo. U.S. officials initially called Cerezo's election the "final
step in the re-establishment of democracy," and though Cerezo's relative
neutrality regarding U.S. concerns in Nicaragua, as well as his role in the
Esquipulas Accords angered U.S. officials, Cerezo's image in Washington
remained considerably better than it did at home until well into 1989.
United States policy efforts to support the agenda of Cerezo and
Gramajo included several "pro-democracy" programs which generated great
controversy in and out of Guatemala. These included a program to train
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Guatemalan police and justice officials. Particularly controversial was an AID
supported program run by the Harvard Law School. The program brought
Guatemalan judges to Harvard and was criticized by human rights and exile
groups as a mostly cosmetic effort by Cerezo and Gramajo to use Harvard's
prestige to legitimize their government. Harvard eventually ended its
participation in the program in July 1990. 23
Harvard was also strongly criticized when it granted a fellowship to
General Gramajo. During his graduation ceremony, Gramajo was given notice
of a suit filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of nine
Guatemalans whose relatives, it was alleged, were the victims of human rights
abuses by the military. Another lawsuit involved the case of an North
American nun, Diana Ortiz, who charged that she had been raped and
assaulted by Guatemalan police officials. The suit was based upon
international tort law agreements which permitted foreign citizens to sue in
U.S. courts if the perpetrator is on United States soil. The case provoked the
Guatemalan weekly Cronica to charge a "conspiracy at Harvard" in a cover
story (June 20, 1991); the weekly traced a network of exiles, journalists, U.S.
Representatives, and human rights activists who, it was argued, were
interfering in Guatemala's sovereignty and democratic process. Gramajo's
accusers argued, on the other hand, that the General, and his U.S. allies, were
using Harvard in order to clean up his image and get him ready to run for
President in 1995.
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The incident points up the continued significance of international
human rights networks in Guatemalan politics. The reactions of both United
States and Guatemalan actors indicate that these groups play an important part
in the political dialogue and influence the terms of the debate regarding
human rights and what I have termed the "political culture of terror." They
play an influential role in discussions of aid to Guatemala in the U.S.
Congress; pressure from Congressional Democrats was partly responsible for
the cut off of aid announced by the Bush Administration in December 1990.
The impact of human rights groups is complex however, supporting the efforts
and concerns of many Guatemalans while at the same time provoking
nationalist emotions and defenses in others. At the same time, opponents of
President Cerezo on the right often cited the work of Amnesty International
and Americas Watch when it reinforced their criticisms.
Several factors caused the United States government to distance itself
from the Guatemalan government; with elections scheduled for 1990 the U.S.
wanted to counter the perception that it favored the Christian Democrats,
especially as their electoral hopes plummeted. The worsening human rights
situation generated congressional efforts to cut off or limit military aid. New
developments compounded the pressure; the case of Diana Ortiz; the murder
of Michael Devine, a North American who had lived in Guatemala for many
years and ran a well known camp for travellers on the way to the Peten; and
extensive negative reporting in the United States media on the brutality
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suffered by street children in Guatemala City. Military and/or national police
officials were strongly implicated in each of these matters. In December 1990,
after the massacre in Atitlan and continuing inaction on the Devine case, the
Bush Administration cut off military aid.
Looking to the Future
While the previous two sections suggested possibilities for a weakening
of what I have called the culture of terror, there are also good reasons to
suggest that these issues will prove more difficult in Guatemala than they have
been elsewhere. Unlike Chile and Uruguay, there is no well-developed
tradition of the rule of law which can be invoked, however ambiguous it may
be. 24 There is not a strongly established national identity which can be
restored~it remains rather to be constructed. I argued in Chapter 5 that the
Guatemalan state's power vis-a-vis civil society was arguably the strongest in
Latin America, but we must amend this conclusion with an important
distinction set forth by Carol Smith—between a state which is strong and
hegemonic, borrowing Gramsci's concept of hegemony, and one which is weak
and coercive (1991: 31). The Guatemalan state's coercive power has grown as a
response to the lack of hegemonic power; that is the problem which Gramajo
and his colleagues understood so clearly and sought, in their fashion, to
change.
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But it remains difficult to see how a sense of Guatemala as a national
community can emerge without some definitive break from what Guatemalan
Archbishop Prospero Penados del Barrio has recently called the "culture of
death" and which his Central American colleagues have characterized as:
The galloping corruption in all walks of life and the impunity with
which the most detestable deeds are committed. Almost without
realizing it we have entered into a culture of death. We are so
accustomed to live in the midst of such horrible violence and dreadful
massacres and crimes that we have been left insensible. (Cited in
Central America Report, Dec. 6, 1991)
During the controversy over whether General Rios Montt could legally
be a candidate for President, political parties and editorialists often framed the
issue in straight-forward constitutional terms: Article 186 says he can't, so he
can't. But for many Guatemalans the constitution, if they can read it, says a
lot of things which don't take place in reality. The work of CERJ (Ethnic
Communities We Are All Equal) has been previously noted; they try to teach
peasants about their constitutionally guaranteed human rights-including the
right to not serve in the civil patrols. The group's leader, Amilcar Mendez, has
received repeated death threats and is usually accompanied by at least one
member of the international group Peace Brigades; many less well known
members have disappeared or been assassinated. In the villages where CERJ
works, the army follows up with cartoons that show chickens (peasants) being
attacked by foxes who, the peasants are told, represent the "politics of human
rights."
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So when we talk about the possible emergence of a stronger political
culture of dialogue and democracy we must be cautious about predicting its
direction and must remember that the political culture of terror is still
pervasive. Important political spaces have been opened and remain significant
despite being under nearly constant challenge. But this is only a start.
Moreover, we must see these issues against a larger set of cultural memories. If
ever there was a place where, in Marx' words, "dead generations weigh like a
nightmare upon the brain of the living," it is Guatemala.
I argued earlier that cultural analysis ought to focus on the ways
meaning and structure interact. A weakness of many approaches to culture is
an emphasis on attributes or structures without adequate attention to their
historical formation. While change prompts new cultural reflection, the past is
still present in some fashion. Throughout this work, I have stressed the
continuing dialectic of structure and culture and sought to analyze the ways
structural changes influence ongoing issues of meaning and identity. The
urgency with which many groups in the popular movement, especially labor,
view the dialogue reflects their own sense of the importance of the current
moment and its fleeting nature. The same is true of the Catholic Church, as I
noted in the previous chapter, and the implications of the changes are also
increasingly clear to the private sector. As the quote by CACIF leader Suarez
indicated, many of them know the old economic and political model is dead.
The movement towards a hemispheric free trade zone, while still far from a
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reality, will also place transformative pressures on Guatemala's socio-economic
structures. CACIF supports the dialogue process because private sector leaders
realize that global and regional economic transformations are occurring which
will potentially leave Guatemala behind its neighbors if a greater degree of
peace and stability cannot be established.25
A Guatemalan friend said to me, "The national dialogue is our last
chance." Possibilities for the future are never conceived in the abstract, they are
always informed by historical /cultural understandings of the past that shape a
sense of the possible. The conquest and its legacy of violence and racism, the
old dictatorships, the failed revolution of the 1940s and 50s, U.S. intervention,
and the horrific political violence of the past 25 years all help shape
Guatemalans' understanding of the cultural task they confront, though in
radically different ways. This is especially true for Guatemala's indigenous
communities, where fear and terror have a long history, as do the forms of
direct and indirect resistance which James Scott has referred to as "weapons of
the weak." The memory of the early 1980s-the hundreds of villages destroyed
and thousands of people killed, and hundreds of thousands displaced-color
every aspect of the military's project of democracy and counter-insurgency. If
we simply see it as terror we lose sight of why it is applied, why it works, and
why it fails. Civil Patrols may eventually be dismantled, only to be replaced by
something different. Unless the fear and hatred which that legacy reflects is
fully measured and kept in view it will be impossible to intelligently wonder
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about the ways the diverse "imagined communities" which inhabit Guatemala
might find a way to live with each other.26
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Notes
1. In August 1990, Father Giron announced he was leaving the priesthood in
order to seek a position in Congress. His active embrace of the Christian
Democrats provoked anger from some of his supporters.
2. Cerezo's policy was reinforced by analysis which emerged in criticism of the
Bishop's letter. Lionel Toriello Najera of the Asociacion de Amigos del Pais
challenged the assumption that land reform was the sine qua non of economic
modernization. Whatever merits such a policy may have had in the past, he
argued, it was no longer realistic given land and population pressures, especially
if the result was to lock peasants into subsistence without genuine opportunities
for income. The goal of policy should be to create jobs, not freeze Guatemala into
being an agrarian society (Cronica (March 10, 1991).
3. Esquipulas is the Guatemalan town in which the five presidents signed the
accord which in the United States was often referred to as the Arias Peace Plan
in reference to Costa Rican President and Nobel Peace Laureate Oscar Arias.
4. While the military continued to portray the guerrillas in this fashion, they also
carried out extensive military operations in the highlands in 1987, including a
"final offensive" which was the largest since 1983 (Painter 1989: 139-140).
5. Immediately after the May 1988 coup, the Cerezo administration began legal
actions against the owner of a television station which broadcast a program
openly supportive of the coup plotters. These actions provoked extensive
controversy and were denounced by much of the conservative Guatemalan press
as censorship which revealed Cerezo's authoritarian agenda. These same groups
were less concerned when the office of La Epoca, a weekly founded by exile and
liberal journalist Julio Godoy, was bombed at the same time. These incidents
occurred during my first visit to Guatemala and after reading in the U.S.
press-especially the left press-about Cerezo's subservience to the old order, I was
a bit surprised at first to see how the old order talked about him in their own
public discourse.
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6. Carpio's centrist language illustrates a point made in chapter 2 regarding the
cross-cultural aspect of political culture; it cannot be understood if we only
analyze its meaning for domestic audiences. Carpio knew that he was
campaigning in Washington also and the symbols and discourse he employed
often seemed rather distant from the violent reality of Guatemala and more
attuned to Washington discourse in which Francis Fukuyama's "The End of
History" provoked such controversy and debate. This is complex however; the
experience of President Cerezo offers a good lesson in the dangers of being
toasted internationally and hated at home. Cerezo was often seen by many
Guatemalans in a way George Bush would recognize: as a President who used
diplomatic missions as a way to flee domestic criticism and seemingly intractable
problems. Political cultures are always a complex blend of internal and external
forces influencing each other; hence, care is required in any attempt to take a
culture "on its own terms."
7. The line between these forms of violence was often rather obscure. People of
no obvious political involvement would turn up randomly killed in traditional
death squad fashion leading to some speculation that an effort was being made
in some quarters to generate concerns about the ability of the government to
insure public order.
8. A North American political scientist, Frederick Turner from the University of
Connecticut, generated some controversy during a visit to Guatemala in July 1990.
Turner presented a series of lectures explaining polling research he had conducted
on the subject of the presidential elections. The very conservative editorial board
of Prensa Libre took exception to Turner's description of Guatemalans, based on
their responses to his questions, as apathetic and uninformed.
His [Turner's] conclusions are based on the fact that many of the citizens
consulted responded, "I don't know"; I am not going to vote," when they
were asked about political matters....Such responses are a form of self
defense because for many years here nobody confided in anybody, much
less to foreigners asking questions. His hosts could tell him that this is a
piece of the earth in which are produced possibly more kidnappings,
disappearances, and assassinations than any other....The country of Dr.
Turner-particularly in the academic circles he frequents-has been the
birthplace of a word dedicated to Guatemala: matamaticas, [playing on the
Spanish verb matar, to kill] in order to describe the cannibalism which is
destroying us. In such conditions, how can a normal person answer the
questions of a stranger? (Prensa Libre, July 26 1990: 10).
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9. Rios Months following was often assumed to be largely evangelical protestants
attracted by the General's membership as a pastor in the Iglesia Verbo . The
Catholic Bishop's issued several warnings about the divisive potential of an
evangelical resident, but I heard many positive opinions expressed towards the
General by Catholics even though they were at the same time concerned about
the evangelical influence.
10. For an excellent analysis of the politics of the dialogue process see Aguilera
Peralta (1991). He rightly stresses the significance of new attitudes among external
powers in reinforcing the efforts of the CNR. For a recent statement of the URNG
perspective on this process see the interview with Pablo Monsanto, Comandante
of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR) in Cronica, May 10, 1991.
11. See the May 24 1991 issue of Cronica .
12. Carol Smith suggests that these attitudes may parallel a larger critique of
traditional left attitudes towards the state (1990: 276-279); this issue will be
discussed more fully in the final chapter. An excellent analysis of the issue of
democracy and the Latin American Left is offered by Ronaldo Munck (1989).
13. The most important account of this is provided by Rigoberta Menchu; her
father was one of the co-founders of the CUC. (1984)
14. These organizations also gain an important part of their influence from the
links they have been able to develop with international human rights, labor, and
"solidarity" organizations. These connections have generated pressure on their
behalf from foreign government and organizations. While the Guatemalan
government tries in turn to portray these actions as interference, Guatemalans in
exile form an important part of the international network. The significance of this
factor in Guatemalan political culture is further considered in the section on
human rights later in this chapter. For an original and Uluminating discussion of
the significance of international networks in the success of the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, see Alison Brysk (1991).
15. Jonas cites an extensive collection of supporting statistics including a 1987
UNICEF study which, combining infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy
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concluded that Guatemala had the lowest "physical quality of life" index in
Central America.
16. Between July 1989 and August 1990, the quetzal's value declined from 2.90 to
5.00 against the dollar.
17. This research on indigenous migrants to Guatemala City was presented in a
FLACSO study by Manuela Camus and Santiago Bastos (1990). The report
presented extensive evidence to refute the widespread assumptions about
urbanization and the loss of ethnic identity noting that
The existence of indians that no longer have their traditional reference
points in community, land, language, or clothing, are developing a new
ethnic identity which we call indigenas urbanos . (Cited in Frayssinet 1990-
12)
The broader significance of these patterns of change and continuity is explained
nicely by Stefano Varese in considering changing ethnic identity throughout Latin
America:
This new sociology of the native peoples of Latin
America-transnationalized, urban, proleteriat, border-crossing, bilingual
and trilingual, professional-poses a direct challenge to established
anthropological tradition. To be an Indian meant fundamentally to belong
to a residential indigenous community located in a marginal rural zone, to
be preferably monolingual in a native language, to have a strong
communal and ceremonial understanding of life, to show some rejection
of the logic of the market economy, and to be satisfied with the repetitive
and "traditional" use of antiquated technology....What do we do with an
entire community of Mixtecs who own pick-up trucks, have parabolic
antennae on their roofs and VCRs in the kitchen next to the comal? In
which of the boxes of anthropological taxonomy do they fit? Obviously,
this is a problem that worries academics and development specialists a lot
more than it does Indians. (1991: 16)
18. An excellent account of the public debate in Uruguay, and the cultural, social
and psychological impact of widespread repression, especially the use of torture,
is provided by Lawrence Weschler (1990). His book also includes the
extraordinary story of how the evidence presented in Nunca Mais, a
documentation of torture and other secret police activity in Brazil, was collected,
in secret and at enormous personal risk, from the Brazilian polices' own files.
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19. This description of the Mack case is drawn from accounts in Central America
RePor t, Cronica, the Christian Science Monitor, and reports from the Guatemalan
Human Rights Commission.
20. The Physicians group visited the country to help train Guatemalans in forensic
techniques that would improve local investigation (Siglo Veintiuno. July 2, 1991).
21. The massacre at Santiago Atitlan and the ensuing controversy were given
excellent coverage in Cronica (Dec. 7, Dec 14, 1990). See also the Boston Globe
(Dec. 5, 1990); Christian Science Monitor (Dec. 12. 1990).
22. The conference released a public statement published in the press and stating
three demands: an end to impunity; elimination of development poles;
compensation for victims.
23. The director of the program at Harvard, Phillip Heymann explained these
actions in Cronica (Aug 24, 1990: 27-28). He attributed the failure of these efforts
to a lack of political will on the part of President Cerezo and Minister of Defense
Gramajo.
24. Some point to the 1944-1954 period, but my analysis in chapter 4 tried to
suggest both the power and the limits of the revolution in establishing a national
political community.
25. Another increasingly significant factor, whose potential implications require
an analysis not possible in this context, is Guatemala's growing role in
international drug trafficking networks.
26. Richard Adams (1990) and Kay Warren (1990) have recently argued that
non-Indians are only beginning to understand how the Maya have constructed
their own experience. Existing largely within oral traditions that are themselves
strategies of survival, their history remains to be learned by non-Indians. Recent
works by Susan Bourque and Kay Warren (1988), and Michael Taussig (1987)
have begin to ask important questions about the cultural construction and
representation of terror and political violence.
CHAPTER 8
LIVING IN THE "IRON CAGE":
CULTURAL ANALYSIS, MODERNTIY, AND THE PROBLEM OF
MEANING
Nations, States and Political Identity
After the Cold War
Over the past decade, the field of comparative politics has been
dominated by studies of "democratization." This began in generally limited
efforts to analyze the complex series of civil-military transitions that occurred
in Southern Europe in the 1970s and Latin America in the 1980s. With the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the Breshnev Doctrine in Central Europe and the
subsequent break up of the Soviet Union itself, euphoria and triumphalism
were the initial response and some analysts spoke of the emergence of a global
democratic political culture. Events in parts of Africa and Asia seemed to offer
further evidence of such an occurrence.
But the optimism of many regarding democratization in Eastern Europe
has rather quickly given way to a realization of the deeper historical forces
which Soviet domination drove underground and which are now re-emerging
amidst a new and difficult structural environment. And while civilian-
governed electoral democracies are still in power in most of Latin America,
recent events in Haiti and Peru suggest that electoral systems have yet to
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establish their capacity to solve the economic and political dilemmas
confronting states and civil societies on the continent.
The issues of national identity, legitimacy, and cultural meaning
explored in this work with regard to the effort of the Guatemalan military over
the past decade are thus by no means unique to that country. It is clear that
these issues will be a particularly important field of study as the end of the
cold war focuses greater attention on specific cultural and historical dilemmas
in areas previously subject to greater structural constraints within the
international system. Social scientists will need to ask much more specific
kinds of questions about the relationship between concrete cultures and
political projects and resist the temptation to believe that the "end of history,"
with or without a capitol "H", is here. Students of political culture can provide
an empirical and normative contribution to this process by more fully
developing our capacity to look at the complexity and ambiguity within all
national political cultures.
This attention should, moreover, not be confined to the areas in which
conflicts over national identity are most visible. The argument here is not
meant to apply only to places where the process of constructing a national
"imagined community" is clearly problematic. The stirrings of political and
cultural discontent in Western Europe are increasingly evident in the renewed
vigor of national movements seeking greater autonomy or independence from
existing states. Further evidence is provided as well by the electoral success of
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right wing political parties in France, Germany, and Italy. Europe may indeed
be coming together; but centuries-old questions about national identity are by
no means dead. Anxiety about the fate which befell Europe in the 1930's
amidst economic collapse and political drift, inspired much of the original
literature on political culture. While the prescriptions for stability and order
produced by the authors of that literature were perhaps too strongly colored
by the Cold War, and their analysis theoretically weakened by structural
functionalism, their concerns about the cultural dilemmas confronting modern
democracies remain as relevant as ever. Perhaps as the 1930s gradually are
read less in terms of appeasement and the Munich analogy, other lessons will
receive more attention.
Similar issues haunt our own politics and can be seen in a multitude of
manifestations from the debates over "multi-culturalism" and liberal education,
the polemics unleashed by Oliver Stone's film "JFK," and the string of
media-saturated events which have defined U.S. politics in recent years. The
ample evidence of cultural discontent, dissent, and ferment point up what
Anderson's analysis strongly suggests-that the construction of national
identity is a never-ending cultural task which, stable appearances to the
contrary, is continually being re-examined in the light of new experience and
new problems.
It is well to remember that Anderson stressed that the nation state
emerged amidst a complex combination of economic, technological, and
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cultural factors which made it possible for "growing numbers of people to
think about themselves and relate to others in profoundly new ways." The idea
of a nation as a "sociological organism moving calendrically" grew from the
ways print technology created possibilities for connection and solidarity among
larger and larger communities of readers, at the same time as older forms of
community were losing their dominance.
We can expect that a cultural institution of such complexity and power
as the nation-state will not quickly fade away. At the same time, modern
nation-states find themselves confronting economic and technological change
which blur borders and challenge traditional conceptions of sovereignty. It is
still the state which is most often looked to when citizens want protection from
transnational dangers such as terrorism, refugees, disease, drug trafficking and
environmental problems. Yet, in some countries, and the list may be
growing-Peru, Colombia, Somalia, Liberia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines,
Lebanon, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Republics-the state
appears to confront a society which is nearly ungovernable. In the past such
situations never lasted indefinitely; new states and political structures
eventually imposed their order for a time. Some states have begun to consider
larger economic alliances and regimes to deal with problem beyond the
capacity of individual states. But whatever new systems and structures
emerge, they will not survive on economic rationality or political force alone;
cultural legitimacy will have to be constructed. For that reason, the nation state
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will in all likelihood be with us for some time; the 'ghostly imaginings" of
collective identity it carries show no sign of becoming less important.
Nonetheless, the total, unifying claims of the state to represent a
particular nationalism, a particular "imagined community," continue to
generate internal conflicts between competing communities. In many of these
conflicts, nationhood is the goal of groups which are challenging existing
states. In a international system in which nation states have the most rights,
statehood remains the best way to be certain that national claims will be
recognized. At the same time, the emergence of new indigenous political
organizations in Guatemala and elsewhere in the hemisphere provide the
possibility of an alternative model, one in which the state's claims are less total
and distinct imagined communities with their own cultural identity are able to
work within the same national framework. While these are at present only
possibilities, these movements deserve more attention for they may provide an
alternative to civil war and fragmentation, and point towards more consciously
heterogeneous political communities. The prospect of such a world often
drives political scientists to reach for Hobbes; but as long as self-determination
and national identity continue among the most powerful forces in modernity,
the construction of legitimacy and political order will be complex and never
ending tasks.
Modernity. Nihilism, and Social Science
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The moral sense has been bred out of certain sections of the
population, like the wings have been bred off of certain chickens to
produce more white meat. This is a generation of wingless chickens,
which I suppose is what Nietzsche meant when he said God was dead.
-Flannery O'Connor
It is not the object of the story to convey a happening per se,
which is the purpose of information; rather, it embeds it in the life of
the storyteller in order to pass it on as an experience to those listening.
It thus bears the marks of the storyteller much as the earthen vessel
bears the marks of the potter's hands.
-Walter Benjamin
The approach to cultural analysis I have developed and applied in this
work carries some moral premises which remain to be considered briefly by
way of conclusion. The most simple premise is that a manner of study is itself
a cultural practice and never reflects the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. 1
If we wish, therefore, to think about political culture in Guatemala or
anywhere else it is not be enough to simply listen carefully to how individuals
and communities construct meanings and identities. We must also recognize
the force of our own constructions of other cultures, both in the past and
present, and subject them, and the problematics they pose to greater scrutiny.
There are thus new possibilities, but significant new dangers also in James
Clifford's admonition that we "open ourselves to other histories:" relativism,
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new forms of textual privileging, interpretations of meaning which distort and
collapse another culture, the temptation to forge a new synthesis, the failure to
follow Nietzsche's admonition that we be "hard with our own heart," the
illusion that we are "letting difference be" in our interpretation. Foucault's
warning still applies: "We must not imagine that the world turns towards us a
legible face which we would only have to decipher; the world is not the
accomplice of our knowledge," (1984, 127). If "opening" ourselves means
anything, it means having an clearer understanding of what we are looking for
and who we are. Western analysts must be especially cautious about
interpreting current events as some sort of affirmation of our own political
culture and ask instead what are forms of study reveal about ourselves.
One of the best ways to observe the relationship between inquiry and
identity is to consider the diverse ways that modernity is constructed. Perhaps
the most influential trope of modern social science, modernity once seemed to
carry profound prospects for reason and liberation. I argued that the anxiety of
Parsons and others regarding the potential for fragmentation and disorder
generated by modernization motivated the effort to construct modes of social
inquiry that could provide a rational basis for legitimacy. But the ferocity of
recent polemics surrounding multiculturalism, 'canons', and academic
standards provide further illustration of Weber's conviction that modernity
was partly characterized by a legitimacy problem from which the social
sciences were by no means immune.
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How are we to understand this problem? and how are we to
understand modernity? Baudelaire wrote "you have no right to despise the
present." And yet many of us seem to feel lost in modernity, believing that our
cultural moorings have come unglued. The anxieties about order and
fragmentation in the academy express pervasive questions about meaning and
value which seem unlikely to be resolved any time soon. Why has modernity
gone so sour on us?
An especially rich and provocative discussion of these issues has been
offered by anthropologist Mary Douglas. Writing about the sort of cultural
criticism and analysis of secularization represented by Daniel Bell and Peter
Berger, Douglas argues that the cultural differences between modernity and
earlier ages are often misunderstood. Consider the assumption that people in
earlier ages were more religious:
Indeed, reflection shows that the evidence for old-time sanctity comes
from suspect sources such as hagiography, panegyrics, and sermons. If
we now read even that biased evidence more critically we would notice
the professionals upbraiding the mass of ordinary people for lack of
faith, as if the gift of which, we are told, modernity has deprived us
were always rather the exception. (1982: 5)
Or consider the assumption that science has taken the wonder and mystery out
of the world, leaving us to feel more alienated. This may be the case if we are
talking about trees and rivers, but if nature is that which "contrasts with
culture; ...that part of the cosmos that humans do not fabricate, that humans
can learn about but never change," then Douglas is more skeptical. Perceptions
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of nature, Douglas argues, have always been mediated by culture, and there is
no reason to assume, without studying the concrete cultural processes
themselves, that modernity is necessarily less religious, more prone to identity
crisis and mental illness, or less capable of feeling religious or wholeness than
earlier ages. "Everything is wrong because our stereotypes of premoderns is
wrong" (1982, 17); they were neither as religious or as integrated as some feel
we ought to be. It is certainly true, nevertheless, that the conditions in which
matters like God, fate, death, duty, and moral integrity are constructed are
different.
Benedict Anderson's conception of "imagined community" provided an
ideal type with which to analyze the Guatemalan military's effort to construct
culturally legitimate national political institutions. At the same time, the way in
which he constructed his argument provided an example which I have tried to
follow in this work as a whole: a careful historical tracing of the ways ideas
develop in response to change and yet continue to reveal the past from which
they came. While nations are clearly a modern form of community, they carry
within them ancient questions about fate, death, redemption, and community,
and the same is true of the diverse "imagined communities" which inhabit
Guatemala. Anderson is continually aware of the importance of structural or
economic change, but his central preoccupation is to watch human
communities refigure and reinvent themselves.
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In the 1980s the Guatemalan military put forward an ambitious effort to
reinvent Guatemala as a national political community and to construct a
political culture that reinforced that goal. Their project emerged from a
recognition that there is not one but several political cultures in Guatemala
with their own visions of past, present, and future. None of these cultures
have been unphased by the forces of modernization, let alone by each other.
What has endured are sources of political identity which while changing over
time, have remained in conflict and which have inhibited~in very different
ways in different historical periods--a variety of efforts to fashion a united
collective national identity.
The project of "national stability" which grew out of the military's
counter-insurgency strategy was thus an effort to resolve a legitimacy problem
which, as this work has tried to establish, is deeply rooted in Guatemalan
history. The country's future political shape began to develop as a backwater
in a colonial effort which, while brutal in its impact upon the indigenous
population, was on its own terms beset by internal contradiction and conflict
over its meaning, identity, and purpose. Medieval Catholicism, Enlightenment
rationalism, liberalism, and positivism have engendered confused and
conflicted responses within a long context of economic dependency and
weakness. These cultural conflicts broke apart the Central American Federation
after independence, and they have continued to scar Guatemalan political life
ever since.
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While the Spanish colonialists and their Guatemalan offspring have
struggled among themselves, a much deeper divide has separate ladinos from
Maya communities. A recent inquiry into the political significance of ethnicity
in Latin America argued that:
Common wisdom holds that native American cultures are relics of the
past destined to survive only as museum pieces. Underlying this
unfortunate meeting point of many on the left and Right is the belief
that Indians are bound to abandon their ethnicity as modernity spreads
its tentacles into the outer reaches of the Western World. (NACLA 1991-
12)
This work has presented ample evidence of the enduring capacity of the Maya
to retain a powerful sense of their own ethnic identity. Constructed in the face
of successive, brutal efforts at conquest and assimilation, the content of Mayan
political identity has changed enormously and yet continually illustrated the
weakness of this "common wisdom."
Images of Maya heritage in the Aurora International Airport in
Guatemala City opened this work. What do they tell us about Guatemala as an
modern "imagined community"? In offering the world the image of Guatemala
as a nation which is proud of its Indian past, the country's ladino elite can of
course be seen as simply cynical. But it may also express a cultural identity
crisis and desire to establish a unique national identity. The willingness of the
military to embrace the heroic efforts of past Maya leaders who resisted
Spanish domination, and their acknowledgment of racism and exploitation
reflect a recognition, if not explicitly, of the cultural limits of both their own
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traditions as well as the new cultural resources offered by "modernity" and
"development".
At another level, however, these invocations of an collective Indian past
carry on the "common wisdom." Ruins, markets, marimba bands, and Maya
warriors may now be seen as cultural treasures which adorn airports and draw
tourists, but as Carol Hendrickson has argued, these images reinforce a
conception of Maya culture as traditional, mysterious, and unchanging (1991).
From such a perspective "modernized" Mayas could only be expected to
assimilate themselves and their political and cultural aspirations to a modern,
and largely ladino, national community. Moreover, the analysis set forth by
General Gramajo and his colleagues seems to assume, as have other ladino
politicians and activists with perspectives otherwise quite different from
Gramajo, that some services and a better educational system will resolve the
problem. And yet, as we have seen, exposure to modernity has so far not
destroyed, though it has surely transformed Mayan political and cultural
identity. Being modern and being Indian are not a contradiction in practice.2
This is perhaps the most important lesson that the Maya can teach us,
for they have been forced to reinvent themselves culturally amidst enormous
change and violence for over 450 years. The study of political culture must
start from the assumption that modernity is not a value system, attitude, or a
destination; it is a condition characterized by the interplay between old and
new sources of meaning challenged by change. When we become more aware
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of our historical and cultural biases about what being modern means, we
might then be better able to understand and evaluate the ways our own
political and cultural identities try to balance science and faith, reason and
mystery, freedom and contingency, and tradition and modernity.
The power which Max Weber's work continues to possess resides not
simply in the general insights he presents into the relationships between
culture and structures. He was not principally interested, after all, in telling the
German state how it could effectively manage issues of national development
and economic modernization. Instead he wanted to know what becomes of the
human beings who live in the structures and institutions of modernity? His
work continually explored how those predicaments were resolved, how
communities and individuals made sense of a world that was continually
presenting new dilemmas. As I noted in Chapter 2, these interests were not
esoteric; and for all the rationality and abstraction, what is still most profound
in Weber's writing is the pathos of his personal experience of modernity.
It is striking that Weber, despite his own professed lack of religiosity,
chose so often to use religious language-duty, calling, devotion. Weber's
encounter with Nietzsche left him strongly convinced that science could not
solve the problem of what was worth knowing and thinking about:
still less can it be proved that the existence of the world that these
sciences describe is worthwhile, that it has any meaning, or that it
makes any sense to live in such a world. Science does not ask for the
answers to such questions. (1946: 143)
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At some point the pursuit of meaning and value required a leap of faith. When
Weber spoke therefore of a "battle of gods" Weber referred to the framework
of values which oriented one's personal search for meaning and identity. And
from this perspective, one of the predominant gods of modernity was the
modern state.
At the heart of all of Weber's work, from the detailed historical studies
of medieval Europe to the deeply personal lectures on vocation, was a
profound effort to infuse the modern political realm with the authority and
purpose once granted religious institutions. He explicitly equated the political
quest of the social scientist with the classical platonic attempt to harmonize the
elements of the soul while recognizing the earlier attempts to reconcile soul
and polity were less available. In an age when scientific method was rapidly
developing hegemony, he hoped to fashion a political realm, statecraft, which
reconciled science with an individual sense of purpose and meaning. The
social scientist also had a political responsibility to the state. The task was to,
in Wolin's words, "nourish notions of what is significant", and hence worthy of
inquiry. "Significance... symbolizes the moment of freedom.. .it is akin to a
momentary and secular salvation for it creates meaning in an otherwise
meaningless world" (1981: 81). In this way, the social scientist helps the state
establish legitimacy.
Weber recognized that this endeavor left him caught ambiguously
between two conflicting points of reference. He could not accept the notion of
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value-free social science, but he also rejected subjectivism. His solution was to
push the frame of reference to where the methods of the natural sciences were
unable to follow-into the realm of values. In trying to analyze the
"phenomenon of life in terms of their cultural significance" (Wolin 1981: 71),
Weber recognized that choices existed: the theorist or the the social scientist
had to recognize the values implicit within their own project. More than
simply a recognition of values for the sake of intellectual honesty, this was an
affirmation of what the scientist /political man held to be most important
After listing many of the causes which might animate political action, Weber
argued:
Some kind of faith must always exist. Otherwise, it is absolutely true
that the curse of the creatures' worthlessness overshadows even the
strongest political successes. (1946: 117)
But Weber also feared that modern forms of rationalization carried their own
tendency to subordinate individual meanings and values and establish ends
and means which were absolute rather than relative. This was reflected, for
example, in the tension between democratic rights an modern governance.
Democracy promoted bureaucracy in seeking an even-handed and neutral
policies. But charged with the task of managing in the interests of all,
rational-legal forms of authority are unlikely to tolerate the chaotic impulses
found within democracy. Science cannot make sense of concepts such as
equality or rights, for they conflict with the norms of rationality. The
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orientation of science is towards solving a problem in the most orderly manner
available. Weber is quite explicit that
Democracy as such is opposed to the rule of bureaucracy, in spite of
and perhaps because of its unavoidable yet unintended promotion of
bureaucracy. Under certain conditions democracy creates obvious
ruptures and blockages to bureaucratic organization. (1984: 47)
In this way the passion which animated a true calling for politics could
confront the same "iron cage" which previously was the fate of Protestants. The
image of the cage is often understood as a metaphor for a modern world
devoid of ethical meaning. But Weber's own work sought to reveal something
quite different: the gap between intentions and consequences which Weber
believed was an inescapable condition of politics.
Weber provides an extraordinary account of the tragic dimension of
political action. While he did not conceive of rationalization as a universal
process, Weber's dark prophecy of a "polar night of icy darkness and
hardness" expressed despair for the fate of those who were not what Weber
termed "specialists without spirit." By examining the origins and and
developmental tendencies of western rationalism, Weber sought to preserve
the capacity for reflective awareness regarding the conditions in which
individuals and communities think about who and what they are in an age in
which modes of rationalization were crowding out those capacities.
3
At the same time, it is often said of Weber that his attention to
Nietzsche made him a relativist, even a nihilist. The most sophisticated version
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of this charge was put forward by Leo Strauss: "Weber assumed as a matter of
course that there is no hierarchy of values: all values are of the same rank."
Strauss understood that this was not literally true; Weber certainly had his
preferences. But what crippled Weber's social science for Strauss was the
complete rejection of the possibility of uncovering the objective truth:
Every pursuit, every whim, becomes as defensible or as legitimate as
any other. But Weber did not always go this far. He also said that the
goal of science was clarity, i.e., clarity about the great issues, and this
means ultimately clarity not indeed about the whole but about the
situation of man as man. Science or philosophy is then the way towards
freedom from delusion....It is concerned with the knowable truth, which
is valid regardless of whether we like it or not. Weber went up to this
point. But he refused to say that science of philosophy is concerned with
the truth which is valid for all men regardless of whether they desire to
know it or not. (1953: 72-73)
A defense against this criticism can be mounted by turning to the work
of a contemporary thinker who was strongly influenced by Nietzsche and
Weber. Michel Foucault is often criticized for offering analyses which appear
to offer no possibility for subjective agency. His analysis of the role of the
modern state in the increased application of various forms of disciplinary
control over larger populations, and in ways which are not always apparent,
does render problematic areas of social life not generally considered threats to
freedom. For some this puts forward the message of "no way out:" you can run
but you can't hide, because even reforms reveal new levels of non-freedom
and disciplinary control.
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This is a serious misreading of Foucault, however. Power may appear to
be everywhere, but it is not all powerful. Power relations set boundaries which
privilege particular subjects and attempt to structure an order. But they are
structures which emerge from discontinuity and contingency and while they
may seek their own reification as totalizing powers, the point of Foucault's
genealogies is that in a world which "is not the accomplice of our knowledge,"
something gets away, something Foucault calls resistance.4 Moreover, his
work, and this is explicit it does not need to be dug out as some contend,
assumes a subject capable of understanding discrepancies between who we are
and who we say we are (1984).
This attitude towards social inquiry is most evident in Foucault's essay
"What is Enlightenment?," in which he located his critical genealogies of social
and political practice within the project of the Enlightenment and its task of
greater ethical reflection. He warns us against succumbing to what he terms
the "enlightenment blackmail" of being "for or against the enlightenment." This
carried with it the need to decide for or against reason, rationalism, and all the
other baggage carried within that tradition. While Foucaulfs work reveals the
dark side of reason, the ways its promises of freedom have obscured the
expansion of social discipline, power and surveillance over our daily
experience, he also recognized the critical resources the Enlightenment offered
as:
...an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what
we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the the
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limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of
going beyond them....that is, a patient labor giving form to our
impatience for liberty. (1984: 50)
Foucault was not, though his critics often argue otherwise, working
within science-anti-science, or rationalism-anti-rationalism dualities.
Challenging the assumptions of some approaches is not to argue for their
reversal. In this sense, I understand Foucauldian genealogy the same way in
which Nietzsche understood his own writing--as a sort of "ghost language"
within reason which revealed the underside, the suppressed nihilism within its
claims, forcing it to be more truthful. Some have been frustrated that when
Foucault tells us that "everything is dangerous," while locating power in places
we are accustomed to viewing unproblematically, he gives us no basis for
deciding and no place to stand intellectually. But in pushing forward the
question "how did we become what we are?," Foucault forces us to continually
ask hard questions of our knowledge, taking us in the direction that Weber
called an "ethic of responsibility," and characterized as the "ability to let
realities work upon him with inner concentration and calmness." (1946, 115)
Constructed within complex historical settings, our forms of inquiry and
interpretation possess a fundamentally moral /ethical character. We ask
particular kinds of questions of a world which is opaque and not self evident.
This is the essential cultural problem~to make sense of a history which is
continually being seen in new ways in the light of new experience. Moreover,
Guatemalan political history examined in this work illustrates that the meaning
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of that history is often a source of intense division and debate among different
groups. Similar dynamics are evident in the controversy over what our
children should be taught about Columbus 500 years after he landed in the
Caribbean. These questions are not just idle curiosity-they make our forms of
life possible. When we offer an interpretation we do more than explain
reality~we reveal more fundamentally what we think it means. This gives to
our interpretations something of the quality of storytelling. They attempt to
give narrative coherence to historical events and a present whose meaning, like
that contained within biblical scripture, is shadowy, even obscure. Social
science has traditionally sought to buttress its stories with more facts and
figures, but we have not been able to avoid the more basic fact—that meanings
are created and re-enforced within particular social worlds and the interpretive
resources they make available to the local storytellers. This is what the case
study of Guatemala makes clear, and these are the issues which cultural
analysis can help Uluminate.
Some will view this as the soft, subjective and merely speculative, but it
should be clear that this is not an embrace of relativism. Logic, the capacity to
illuminate concrete situations, factual accuracy as far it goes, are all crucial.
This is certainly not to say that some interpretations aren't better than others.
But what is held to be a persuasive account-a satisfying story--is built partly
from cultural meanings and not simply the demonstration of truths which exist
independently of the social world within which they are constructed. Social
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science is as much a set of cultural practice as are the worlds it attempts to
study. This is the dilemma that Weber understood and with which he sought
to come to terms in making more explicit the cultural problematic which
informed his inquiry and gave it both meaning and transience. 5
Politics is about many things, but most of all it is driven by competing
visions of how we ought to live. Weber understood that these were not simply
abstract ideas; they were embodied in our conduct and shaped by our
encounter with a world which locates us and readies consequences that can
never be forseen. He believed us to live in an age when that cultural task was
becoming more complex and his concern was to inquire what it required.
Weber hoped his "cultural sciences" would provide a way to take the full
measure of circumstances in order that we might go on. All of our efforts to
develop more accurate models, more elegant theories, more precise
hypotheses, or clearer concepts risk becoming either abstract or shallow when
they become disconnected from the realization that, while politics is fought
within institutions and structures, between classes, sectors, status groups and
political actors, questions of identity and meaning are what is at stake. Our
theories and approaches are only useful in so far as they cast light upon those
cultural dilemmas. At that point social science moves away from the
technocratic ambitions Weber denied it, and helps us ponder the
questions-what is our fate? and how are we to live?
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Notes
1. See Guillermo O'Donnell's reflective comments on the element of "thoughtful
wishing" involved in the study of democratization (1986: 3-18).
2. The complexity of modern Mayan identities is beautifully illustrated in
Rigoberta Menchu's account (1984). While the sources of identity upon which she
draws-ethnic, religious, class, gender, national-appear contradictory within the
categories of social science, they become quite plausible in practice. Interestingly,
her account has been seized upon by many critics of "multiculturalism" as an
example of what Dinesh D'Souza has called "victim studies," and characterized
as a fraudulent and manipulative effort by left-wing academics and activists to
use Menchu as grist for their political mill (1990). My views of D'Souza's
perspective is expressed more fully in a letter to the Editor, Christian Science
Monitor, April 18, 1991, written in response to an Op-ed by D'Souza on the use
of Rigoberta Menchu's book in college curricula.
3. The issues under discussion in this section have also been addressed by some
Latin American social scientists as part of an effort to revitalize the concept of
politics within the context of recent movements away from military rule. A
particurally rich—both politically and philosophically—discussion is offered by
Norbert Lechner (1988). His work continues the critique of traditional approaches
to the subjects of politics and democracy among the Latin America left. For a
discussion of Weber which explores the same issues see Flisfisch (1987: 103-147).
4. Critics of Foucault see power operating everywhere in his analysis and hence
assume that efforts to escape can only be new forms of entrapment. But Foucault
suggests there is an instability in these forms of power which hinders their,
usually unstated, totalizing ambitions. In creating certain forms of truth and
bestowing legitimacy on certain discourses, authors, rituals, and rules of textual
formation, power creates and gradually broadens the potential for resistance from
"subjugated knowledges." As the demands of these systems become more
stringent, the pressure on individuals to maintain the most privileged forms of
subjectivity creates powerful deconstructive counter-pressures. In the absence of
genuinely transcendental standards, the norms of rationality which emerge,
including those in Weber's account, are never able to completely obtain total
control. Power finds itself caught in an ironic trap; since the subject is the
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principle way in which power is reproduced, it is forced to encounter the
resistance generated by that same subject. This study of Guatemala has revealed
several instances which confirm Foucaulfs understanding of power. The most
notable of these include the multiple uses of religions and ethnic identity and the
ways even the most violent of states is seldom able to fully impose its own
networks of meanings.
5. William Connolly has stated this point well in this analysis of the politics of
analytic language:
As long as modernity continues to house debates over the character of the
good life, political discourse will provide sites upon which the debates are
pursued. (1982:225)
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